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authorEvgeny Zinoviev <me@ch1p.io>2020-12-08 15:50:23 +0300
committerEvgeny Zinoviev <me@ch1p.io>2020-12-08 15:50:23 +0300
commit07e4587d4f2e0ffe1a36c41b95e0a25fc74ca789 (patch)
tree142c599a4bf298b985a3d35b4d1536a82984ef85
parentcc24315bfd72ce0c2a275e54869b8fe77a655a46 (diff)
add comments to the code
-rw-r--r--README.md14
-rw-r--r--config.h8
-rw-r--r--voidnsrun.c103
-rw-r--r--voidnsundo.c6
4 files changed, 100 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1fd9f83..e2af752 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Options:
"container"), it can read it from the `VOIDNSRUN_DIR` environment variable or
you can use `-r` argument to specify it.
-By default, **voidnsrun** binds only `/usr` from the container. But if you're
+By default, **voidnsrun** binds only `/usr` from the container. But if you're
launching `xbps-install`, `xbps-remove` or `xbps-reconfigure`and using
**voidnsrun** version 1.1 or higher, it will bind `/usr`, `/var` and `/etc`.
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ Options:
**voidnsundo** can be used in two modes.
-One is the **"normal" node**, when you invoke it like `voidnsundo <PROGRAM> [ARGS]`
-and your `PROGRAM` will be launched from and in the original mount namespace.
+One is the **"normal" node**, when you invoke it like `voidnsundo <PROGRAM> [ARGS]`
+and your `PROGRAM` will be launched from and in the original mount namespace.
For example, if you don't have a glibc version of firefox installed (so there's
no `/usr/bin/firefox` in the container), but you want to launch the "real" (the
@@ -262,10 +262,10 @@ generally bad, it's a common attack vector that allows local privilege
escalation by exploiting unsafe code of setuid programs.
While these utilities have been written with this thought in mind, don't trust
-me. Read the code, it's not too big. Place yourself in attacker's shoes and try
-to find a hole. For every new discovered vulnerability in these utilities that
-would allow privilege escalation or something similar I promise to pay $25 in
-Bitcoin. Contact me if you find something.
+me. Read the code, it's not too big and it's commented. Place yourself in
+attacker's shoes and try to find a hole. For every new discovered vulnerability
+in these utilities that would allow privilege escalation or something similar I
+promise to pay $25 in Bitcoin. Contact me if you find something.
## Changelog
diff --git a/config.h b/config.h
index 27645ea..be6d22a 100644
--- a/config.h
+++ b/config.h
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@
#define VOIDNSRUN_CONFIG_H
#define PROG_VERSION "1.2"
+
#define USER_LISTS_MAX 50
+
#define CONTAINER_DIR_VAR "VOIDNSRUN_DIR"
#define UNDO_BIN_VAR "VOIDNSUNDO_BIN"
-#define SOCK_PATH "/run/voidnsrun/sock"
#define VOIDNSUNDO_NAME "voidnsundo"
+/* This path has not been made configurable and is hardcoded
+ * here for security purposes. If you want to change it, change it
+ * here and recompile and reinstall both utilities. */
+#define SOCK_PATH "/run/voidnsrun/sock"
+
#endif //VOIDNSRUN_CONFIG_H
diff --git a/voidnsrun.c b/voidnsrun.c
index 8516343..6a70caa 100644
--- a/voidnsrun.c
+++ b/voidnsrun.c
@@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ size_t mount_dirs(const char *source_prefix, size_t source_prefix_len, struct st
continue;
}
+ /* Should be safe as we just checked that total length of source_prefix
+ * and targets->list[i] is no more than PATH_MAX-1. */
strcpy(buf, source_prefix);
strcat(buf, targets->list[i]);
+
if (!isdir(buf)) {
ERROR("error: source mount dir %s does not exists.\n", buf);
continue;
@@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ size_t mount_undo(const char *source, const struct strarray *targets, struct int
{
int successful = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < targets->end; i++) {
+ /* If the mount point does not exist, create an empty file, otherwise
+ * mount() call will fail. In this case, remember which files we have
+ * created to unlink() them before exit. */
if (!exists(targets->list[i])) {
if (mkfile(targets->list[i]))
intarray_append(created, i);
@@ -111,7 +117,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
int nsfd = -1;
char *dir = NULL;
- char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX*2];
char *undo_bin = NULL;
int sock_fd = -1, sock_conn = -1;
size_t dirlen;
@@ -129,8 +135,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct strarray undo_mounts;
strarray_alloc(&undo_mounts, USER_LISTS_MAX);
- struct intarray tounlink;
- intarray_alloc(&tounlink, USER_LISTS_MAX);
+ /* List of indexes of items in the undo_mounts array. See comments in
+ * mount_undo() function for more info. */
+ struct intarray to_unlink;
+ intarray_alloc(&to_unlink, USER_LISTS_MAX);
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "vhm:r:u:U:iV")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
@@ -184,34 +192,52 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERROR_EXIT("error: %s is not a directory.\n", dir);
dirlen = strlen(dir);
+ if (dirlen >= PATH_MAX)
+ ERROR_EXIT("error: container's path is too long.\n");
DEBUG("dir=%s\n", dir);
- /* Get undo binary path, if needed. */
+ /* Get voidnsundo path, if needed. */
if (undo_mounts.end > 0) {
if (!undo_bin)
undo_bin = getenv(UNDO_BIN_VAR);
if (!undo_bin) {
ERROR_EXIT("error: environment variable %s not found.\n",
UNDO_BIN_VAR);
- } else if (strlen(undo_bin) > PATH_MAX)
+ }
+
+ size_t undo_bin_len = strlen(undo_bin);
+ if (undo_bin_len >= PATH_MAX)
ERROR_EXIT("error: undo binary path is too long.\n");
- /* Validate it. */
- if (!isexe(undo_bin))
+ /*
+ * Check that it exists and it is an executable.
+ * These strcpy and strcat calls should be safe, as we already know that
+ * both dir and undo_bin are no longer than PATH_MAX-1 and the buf's size
+ * is PATH_MAX*2.
+ */
+ strcpy(buf, dir);
+ strcat(buf, undo_bin);
+ if (!isexe(buf))
ERROR_EXIT("error: %s is not an executable.\n", undo_bin);
DEBUG("undo_bin=%s\n", undo_bin);
}
- /* Get current namespace's file descriptor. */
+ /* Get current namespace's file descriptor. It may be needed later
+ * for voidnsundo. */
nsfd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
if (nsfd == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("error: failed to acquire mount namespace's fd.%s\n",
strerror(errno));
/* Check socket directory. */
- strncpy(buf, SOCK_PATH, PATH_MAX);
+ /* TODO: fix invalid permissions, or just die in that case. */
+
+ /* This should be safe, SOCK_PATH is hardcoded in config.h and it's definitely
+ * smaller than buffer. */
+ strcpy(buf, SOCK_PATH);
+
char *sock_dir = dirname(buf);
if (access(sock_dir, F_OK) == -1) {
if (mkdir(sock_dir, 0700) == -1)
@@ -224,11 +250,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
DEBUG("sock_dir=%s\n", sock_dir);
- /* Get current working directory. */
+ /* Get current working directory. Will need to restore it later in the
+ * new mount namespace. */
getcwd(cwd, PATH_MAX);
DEBUG("cwd=%s\n", cwd);
- /* Do the unshare magic. */
+ /* Create new mount namespace. */
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("unshare: %s\n", strerror(errno));
@@ -237,7 +264,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
if (mount_dirs(dir, dirlen, &user_mounts) < user_mounts.end && !ignore_missing)
ERROR_EXIT("error: some mounts failed.\n");
- /* Then necessary stuff. */
+ /* Then the necessary stuff. */
struct strarray default_mounts;
strarray_alloc(&default_mounts, 3);
strarray_append(&default_mounts, "/usr");
@@ -248,16 +275,36 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
if (mount_dirs(dir, dirlen, &default_mounts) < default_mounts.end)
ERROR_EXIT("error: some necessary mounts failed.\n");
- /* Bind mount undo binary. */
- if (mount_undo(undo_bin, &undo_mounts, &tounlink) < undo_mounts.end
+ /* Now lets do bind mounts of voidnsundo (if needed). */
+ if (mount_undo(undo_bin, &undo_mounts, &to_unlink) < undo_mounts.end
&& !ignore_missing)
ERROR_EXIT("error: some undo mounts failed.\n");
- /* Mount sock_dir as tmpfs. It will only be visible in this namespace. */
+ /* Mount socket directory as tmpfs. It will only be visible in this namespace,
+ * and the socket file will also be available from this namespace only.*/
if (mount("tmpfs", sock_dir, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4k,mode=0700,uid=0,gid=0") == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("mount: error mounting tmpfs in %s.\n", sock_dir);
- /* Fork. */
+ /*
+ * Fork. We need it because we need to preserve file descriptor of the
+ * original namespace.
+ *
+ * Linux doesn't allow to bind mount /proc/self/ns/mnt from the original
+ * namespace in the child namespace because that would lead to dependency
+ * loop. So I came up with another solution.
+ *
+ * Unix sockets are capable of passing file descriptors. We need to start a
+ * server that will listen on a unix socket and pass the namespace's file
+ * descriptor to connected clients over this socket. voidnsundo will connect
+ * to the socket, receive the file descriptor and perform the setns() system
+ * call.
+ *
+ * We also need to make sure the socket will only be accessible by root.
+ * The path to the socket should be hardcoded.
+ *
+ * So we fork(), start the server in the child process, while the parent
+ * drops root privileges and runs the programs it was asked to run.
+ */
pid_t ppid_before_fork = getpid();
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1)
@@ -266,18 +313,24 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
forked = true;
if (pid == 0) {
- /* Catch SIGTERM. */
+ /* This is the child process.
+ * Catch SIGTERM: it will be sent here when parent dies. The signal will
+ * interrupt the accept() call, so we can clean up and exit immediately.
+ */
struct sigaction sa = {0};
sa.sa_handler = onterm;
sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
- /* Ignore SIGINT. */
+ /* Ignore SIGINT. Otherwise it will be affected by Ctrl+C in the parent
+ * process. */
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
/* Set the child to get SIGTERM when parent thread dies. */
int r = prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM);
if (r == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("prctl: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Maybe it already has died? */
if (getppid() != ppid_before_fork)
ERROR_EXIT("error: parent has died already.\n");
@@ -288,13 +341,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct sockaddr_un sock_addr = {0};
sock_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strncpy(sock_addr.sun_path, SOCK_PATH, 108);
+
+ /* The size of sun_path is 108 bytes, our SOCK_PATH is definitely
+ * smaller. */
+ strcpy(sock_addr.sun_path, SOCK_PATH);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sock_addr, sizeof(sock_addr)) == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("bind: %s\n", strerror(errno));
listen(sock_fd, 1);
+ /* Accept incoming connections until SIGTERM. */
while (!term_caught) {
sock_conn = accept(sock_fd, NULL, 0);
if (sock_conn == -1)
@@ -336,9 +393,11 @@ end:
if (dirptr != NULL)
closedir(dirptr);
- if (tounlink.end > 0 && (!forked || pid == 0)) {
- for (size_t i = 0; i < tounlink.end; i++) {
- char *path = undo_mounts.list[tounlink.list[i]];
+ /* If we created some empty files to bind the voidnsundo utility,
+ * delete them here. */
+ if (to_unlink.end > 0 && (!forked || pid == 0)) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < to_unlink.end; i++) {
+ char *path = undo_mounts.list[to_unlink.list[i]];
if (umount(path) == -1)
DEBUG("umount(%s): %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
if (unlink(path) == -1)
diff --git a/voidnsundo.c b/voidnsundo.c
index 6720b8d..9639d51 100644
--- a/voidnsundo.c
+++ b/voidnsundo.c
@@ -80,7 +80,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct sockaddr_un sock_addr = {0};
sock_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strncpy(sock_addr.sun_path, SOCK_PATH, 108);
+
+ /* The size of sun_path is 108 bytes, our SOCK_PATH is definitely
+ * smaller. */
+ strcpy(sock_addr.sun_path, SOCK_PATH);
if (connect(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sock_addr, sizeof(sock_addr)) == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("connect: %s\n", strerror(errno));
@@ -89,6 +92,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
if (!nsfd)
ERROR_EXIT("error: failed to get nsfd.\n");
+ /* Change namespace. */
if (setns(nsfd, CLONE_NEWNS) == -1)
ERROR_EXIT("setns: %s.\n", strerror(errno));