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Diffstat (limited to 'src/vendorcode/intel/edk2/UDK2017/MdePkg/Include/Ppi/Security2.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/vendorcode/intel/edk2/UDK2017/MdePkg/Include/Ppi/Security2.h | 101 |
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/vendorcode/intel/edk2/UDK2017/MdePkg/Include/Ppi/Security2.h b/src/vendorcode/intel/edk2/UDK2017/MdePkg/Include/Ppi/Security2.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0265974921 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/vendorcode/intel/edk2/UDK2017/MdePkg/Include/Ppi/Security2.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/** @file + This file declares Pei Security2 PPI. + + This PPI is installed by some platform PEIM that abstracts the security + policy to the PEI Foundation, namely the case of a PEIM's authentication + state being returned during the PEI section extraction process. + + Copyright (c) 2006 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> + This program and the accompanying materials + are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License + which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at + http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php + + THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. + + @par Revision Reference: + This PPI is introduced in PI Version 1.0. + +**/ + +#ifndef __SECURITY2_PPI_H__ +#define __SECURITY2_PPI_H__ + +#define EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI_GUID \ + { 0xdcd0be23, 0x9586, 0x40f4, { 0xb6, 0x43, 0x6, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xed, 0x4e, 0xde } } + + +typedef struct _EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI; + +/** + Allows the platform builder to implement a security policy + in response to varying file authentication states. + + This service is published by some platform PEIM. The purpose of + this service is to expose a given platform's policy-based + response to the PEI Foundation. For example, if there is a PEIM + in a GUIDed encapsulation section and the extraction of the PEI + file section yields an authentication failure, there is no a + priori policy in the PEI Foundation. Specifically, this + situation leads to the question whether PEIMs that are either + not in GUIDed sections or are in sections whose authentication + fails should still be executed. + + @param PeiServices An indirect pointer to the PEI Services + Table published by the PEI Foundation. + @param This Interface pointer that implements the + particular EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI instance. + @param AuthenticationStatus Authentication status of the file. + xx00 Image was not signed. + xxx1 Platform security policy override. + Assumes same meaning as 0010 (the image was signed, the + signature was tested, and the signature passed authentication test). + 0010 Image was signed, the signature was tested, + and the signature passed authentication test. + 0110 Image was signed and the signature was not tested. + 1010 Image was signed, the signature was tested, + and the signature failed the authentication test. + @param FvHandle Handle of the volume in which the file + resides. This allows different policies + depending on different firmware volumes. + @param FileHandle Handle of the file under review. + @param DeferExecution Pointer to a variable that alerts the + PEI Foundation to defer execution of a + PEIM. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The service performed its action successfully. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The object cannot be trusted. + +**/ +typedef +EFI_STATUS +(EFIAPI *EFI_PEI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_STATE)( + IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices, + IN CONST EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI *This, + IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus, + IN EFI_PEI_FV_HANDLE FvHandle, + IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle, + IN OUT BOOLEAN *DeferExecution +); + +/// +/// This PPI is a means by which the platform builder can indicate +/// a response to a PEIM's authentication state. This can be in +/// the form of a requirement for the PEI Foundation to skip a +/// module using the DeferExecution Boolean output in the +/// AuthenticationState() member function. Alternately, the +/// Security PPI can invoke something like a cryptographic PPI +/// that hashes the PEIM contents to log attestations, for which +/// the FileHandle parameter in AuthenticationState() will be +/// useful. If this PPI does not exist, PEIMs will be considered +/// trusted. +/// +struct _EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI { + EFI_PEI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_STATE AuthenticationState; +}; + + +extern EFI_GUID gEfiPeiSecurity2PpiGuid; + +#endif |