diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security/vboot')
-rw-r--r-- | src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c index d666ae8a5e..37665bc23d 100644 --- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c +++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h> #include <string.h> #include <security/tpm/tspi.h> +#include <security/tpm/tss.h> +#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h> #include <vb2_api.h> #include <console/console.h> @@ -68,6 +70,26 @@ static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) uint32_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) { + if (!CONFIG(TPM2)) { + /* + * Before reading the kernel space, verify its permissions. If + * the kernel space has the wrong permission, we give up. This + * will need to be fixed by the recovery kernel. We will have + * to worry about this because at any time (even with PP turned + * off) the TPM owner can remove and redefine a PP-protected + * space (but not write to it). + */ + uint32_t perms; + + RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_get_permissions(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, + &perms)); + if (perms != TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE) { + printk(BIOS_ERR, + "TPM: invalid secdata_kernel permissions\n"); + return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; + } + } + uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, |