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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
#include <arch/exception.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <console/console.h>
#include <bootmode.h>
#include <fmap.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi/crtm.h>
#include <security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h>
#include <security/vboot/misc.h>
#include <security/vboot/vbnv.h>
#include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <timestamp.h>
#include <vb2_api.h>
#include <boot_device.h>
#include "antirollback.h"
/* The max hash size to expect is for SHA512. */
#define VBOOT_MAX_HASH_SIZE VB2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
/* exports */
vb2_error_t vb2ex_read_resource(struct vb2_context *ctx,
enum vb2_resource_index index,
uint32_t offset,
void *buf,
uint32_t size)
{
struct region_device rdev;
const char *name;
switch (index) {
case VB2_RES_GBB:
name = "GBB";
break;
case VB2_RES_FW_VBLOCK:
if (vboot_is_firmware_slot_a(ctx))
name = "VBLOCK_A";
else
name = "VBLOCK_B";
break;
default:
return VB2_ERROR_EX_READ_RESOURCE_INDEX;
}
if (fmap_locate_area_as_rdev(name, &rdev))
return VB2_ERROR_EX_READ_RESOURCE_SIZE;
if (rdev_readat(&rdev, buf, offset, size) != size)
return VB2_ERROR_EX_READ_RESOURCE_SIZE;
return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
static vb2_error_t handle_digest_result(void *slot_hash, size_t slot_hash_sz)
{
int is_resume;
/*
* Chrome EC is the only support for vboot_save_hash() &
* vboot_retrieve_hash(), if Chrome EC is not enabled then return.
*/
if (!CONFIG(EC_GOOGLE_CHROMEEC))
return VB2_SUCCESS;
/*
* Nothing to do since resuming on the platform doesn't require
* vboot verification again.
*/
if (!CONFIG(RESUME_PATH_SAME_AS_BOOT))
return VB2_SUCCESS;
/*
* Assume that if vboot doesn't start in bootblock verified
* RW memory init code is not employed. i.e. memory init code
* lives in RO CBFS.
*/
if (!CONFIG(VBOOT_STARTS_IN_BOOTBLOCK))
return VB2_SUCCESS;
is_resume = platform_is_resuming();
if (is_resume > 0) {
uint8_t saved_hash[VBOOT_MAX_HASH_SIZE];
const size_t saved_hash_sz = sizeof(saved_hash);
assert(slot_hash_sz <= saved_hash_sz);
printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "Platform is resuming.\n");
if (vboot_retrieve_hash(saved_hash, saved_hash_sz)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Couldn't retrieve saved hash.\n");
return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
if (memcmp(saved_hash, slot_hash, slot_hash_sz)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Hash mismatch on resume.\n");
return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
} else if (is_resume < 0)
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Unable to determine if platform resuming.\n");
printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "Saving vboot hash.\n");
/* Always save the hash for the current boot. */
if (vboot_save_hash(slot_hash, slot_hash_sz)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "Error saving vboot hash.\n");
/* Though this is an error don't report it up since it could
* lead to a reboot loop. The consequence of this is that
* we will most likely fail resuming because of EC issues or
* the hash digest not matching. */
return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
static vb2_error_t hash_body(struct vb2_context *ctx,
struct region_device *fw_body)
{
uint64_t load_ts;
uint32_t remaining;
uint8_t block[CONFIG_VBOOT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t hash_digest[VBOOT_MAX_HASH_SIZE];
const size_t hash_digest_sz = sizeof(hash_digest);
size_t block_size = sizeof(block);
size_t offset;
vb2_error_t rc;
/* Clear the full digest so that any hash digests less than the
* max have trailing zeros. */
memset(hash_digest, 0, hash_digest_sz);
/*
* Since loading the firmware and calculating its hash is intertwined,
* we use this little trick to measure them separately and pretend it
* was first loaded and then hashed in one piece with the timestamps.
* (This split won't make sense with memory-mapped media like on x86.)
*/
load_ts = timestamp_get();
timestamp_add(TS_HASH_BODY_START, load_ts);
remaining = region_device_sz(fw_body);
offset = 0;
/* Start the body hash */
rc = vb2api_init_hash(ctx, VB2_HASH_TAG_FW_BODY);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Extend over the body */
while (remaining) {
uint64_t temp_ts;
if (block_size > remaining)
block_size = remaining;
temp_ts = timestamp_get();
if (rdev_readat(fw_body, block, offset, block_size) < 0)
return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
load_ts += timestamp_get() - temp_ts;
rc = vb2api_extend_hash(ctx, block, block_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
remaining -= block_size;
offset += block_size;
}
timestamp_add(TS_LOADING_END, load_ts);
timestamp_add_now(TS_HASHING_END);
/* Check the result (with RSA signature verification) */
rc = vb2api_check_hash_get_digest(ctx, hash_digest, hash_digest_sz);
if (rc)
return rc;
timestamp_add_now(TS_HASH_BODY_END);
return handle_digest_result(hash_digest, hash_digest_sz);
}
static vb2_error_t extend_pcrs(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
vb2_error_t rv;
rv = vboot_extend_pcr(ctx, CONFIG_PCR_BOOT_MODE, BOOT_MODE_PCR);
if (rv)
return rv;
return vboot_extend_pcr(ctx, CONFIG_PCR_HWID, HWID_DIGEST_PCR);
}
#define EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_VERIFIED_RW 0x00
#define EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_UNTRUSTED_RO 0x01
#define EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_TRUSTED_RO 0x02
static const char *get_boot_mode_string(uint8_t boot_mode)
{
if (boot_mode == EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_TRUSTED_RO)
return "TRUSTED_RO";
else if (boot_mode == EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_UNTRUSTED_RO)
return "UNTRUSTED_RO";
else if (boot_mode == EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_VERIFIED_RW)
return "VERIFIED_RW";
else
return "UNDEFINED";
}
static void check_boot_mode(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
uint8_t boot_mode;
int rc;
rc = tlcl_cr50_get_boot_mode(&boot_mode);
switch (rc) {
case TPM_CB_NO_SUCH_COMMAND:
printk(BIOS_WARNING, "GSC does not support GET_BOOT_MODE.\n");
/* Proceed to legacy boot model. */
return;
case TPM_SUCCESS:
break;
default:
printk(BIOS_ERR,
"Communication error in getting GSC boot mode.\n");
vb2api_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_GSC_BOOT_MODE, rc);
return;
}
printk(BIOS_INFO, "GSC says boot_mode is %s(0x%02x).\n",
get_boot_mode_string(boot_mode), boot_mode);
if (boot_mode == EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_UNTRUSTED_RO)
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_NO_BOOT;
else if (boot_mode == EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_TRUSTED_RO)
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED;
}
/* Verify and select the firmware in the RW image */
void verstage_main(void)
{
struct vb2_context *ctx;
vb2_error_t rv;
timestamp_add_now(TS_VBOOT_START);
/* Lockdown SPI flash controller if required */
if (CONFIG(BOOTMEDIA_LOCK_IN_VERSTAGE))
boot_device_security_lockdown();
/* Set up context and work buffer */
ctx = vboot_get_context();
/* Initialize and read nvdata from non-volatile storage. */
vbnv_init();
/* Set S3 resume flag if vboot should behave differently when selecting
* which slot to boot. This is only relevant to vboot if the platform
* does verification of memory init and thus must ensure it resumes with
* the same slot that it booted from. */
if (CONFIG(RESUME_PATH_SAME_AS_BOOT) &&
platform_is_resuming())
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_S3_RESUME;
if (!CONFIG(VBOOT_SLOTS_RW_AB))
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_SLOT_A_ONLY;
/* Read secdata from TPM. Initialize TPM if secdata not found. We don't
* check the return value here because vb2api_fw_phase1 will catch
* invalid secdata and tell us what to do (=reboot). */
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMINIT_START);
if (vboot_setup_tpm(ctx) == TPM_SUCCESS) {
antirollback_read_space_firmware(ctx);
antirollback_read_space_kernel(ctx);
}
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMINIT_END);
if (get_recovery_mode_switch()) {
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_FORCE_RECOVERY_MODE;
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_DISABLE_DEV_ON_RECOVERY))
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_DISABLE_DEVELOPER_MODE;
}
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_WIPEOUT_SUPPORTED) &&
get_wipeout_mode_switch())
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_FORCE_WIPEOUT_MODE;
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_LID_SWITCH) && !get_lid_switch())
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_NOFAIL_BOOT;
/* Mainboard/SoC always initializes display. */
if (!CONFIG(VBOOT_MUST_REQUEST_DISPLAY) || CONFIG(VBOOT_ALWAYS_ENABLE_DISPLAY))
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_DISPLAY_INIT;
/*
* Get boot mode from GSC. This allows us to refuse to boot OS
* (with VB2_CONTEXT_NO_BOOT) or to switch to developer mode (with
* !VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED).
*
* If there is an communication error, a recovery reason will be set and
* vb2api_fw_phase1 will route us to recovery mode.
*/
if (CONFIG(TPM_GOOGLE))
check_boot_mode(ctx);
if (get_ec_is_trusted())
ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED;
/* Do early init (set up secdata and NVRAM, load GBB) */
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Phase 1\n");
rv = vb2api_fw_phase1(ctx);
if (rv) {
/*
* If vb2api_fw_phase1 fails, check for return value.
* If it is set to VB2_ERROR_API_PHASE1_RECOVERY, then continue
* into recovery mode.
* For any other error code, save context if needed and reboot.
*/
if (rv == VB2_ERROR_API_PHASE1_RECOVERY) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Recovery requested (%x)\n", rv);
vboot_save_data(ctx);
extend_pcrs(ctx); /* ignore failures */
goto verstage_main_exit;
}
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
}
/* Determine which firmware slot to boot (based on NVRAM) */
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Phase 2\n");
rv = vb2api_fw_phase2(ctx);
if (rv)
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
/* Try that slot (verify its keyblock and preamble) */
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Phase 3\n");
timestamp_add_now(TS_VERIFY_SLOT_START);
rv = vb2api_fw_phase3(ctx);
timestamp_add_now(TS_VERIFY_SLOT_END);
if (rv)
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Phase 4\n");
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION)) {
struct vb2_hash *metadata_hash;
rv = vb2api_get_metadata_hash(ctx, &metadata_hash);
if (rv == VB2_SUCCESS)
rv = handle_digest_result(metadata_hash->raw,
vb2_digest_size(metadata_hash->algo));
} else {
struct region_device fw_body;
if (vboot_locate_firmware(ctx, &fw_body))
die_with_post_code(POSTCODE_INVALID_ROM,
"Failed to read FMAP to locate firmware");
rv = hash_body(ctx, &fw_body);
}
if (rv)
vboot_save_and_reboot(ctx, rv);
vboot_save_data(ctx);
/* Only extend PCRs once on boot. */
if (!(ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_S3_RESUME)) {
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMPCR_START);
rv = extend_pcrs(ctx);
if (rv) {
printk(BIOS_WARNING, "Failed to extend TPM PCRs (%#x)\n", rv);
vboot_fail_and_reboot(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_RO_TPM_U_ERROR, rv);
}
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMPCR_END);
}
/* Lock TPM */
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMLOCK_START);
rv = antirollback_lock_space_firmware();
if (rv) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Failed to lock TPM (%x)\n", rv);
vboot_fail_and_reboot(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_RO_TPM_L_ERROR, 0);
}
timestamp_add_now(TS_TPMLOCK_END);
/* Lock rec hash space if available. */
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE)) {
rv = antirollback_lock_space_mrc_hash(MRC_REC_HASH_NV_INDEX);
if (rv) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Failed to lock rec hash space(%x)\n", rv);
vboot_fail_and_reboot(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_RO_TPM_REC_HASH_L_ERROR, rv);
}
}
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Slot %c is selected\n",
vboot_is_firmware_slot_a(ctx) ? 'A' : 'B');
verstage_main_exit:
timestamp_add_now(TS_VBOOT_END);
}
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