summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/security/vboot
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2021-10-07security/vboot: Remove vb2ex_hwcrypto stubsYu-Ping Wu
Now that the vb2ex_hwcrypto_* stub functions are included in vboot fwlib (CL:2353775), we can remove the same stubs from coreboot. BUG=none TEST=emerge-brya coreboot TEST=emerge-cherry coreboot BRANCH=none Change-Id: I62bdc647eb3e34c581cc1b8d15e7f271211e6156 Signed-off-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/58095 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com>
2021-09-16vboot_logic: Set VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED in verstage_mainHsuan Ting Chen
vboot_reference is introducing a new field (ctx) to store the current boot mode in crrev/c/2944250 (ctx->bootmode), which will be leveraged in both vboot flow and elog_add_boot_reason in coreboot. In current steps of deciding bootmode, a function vb2ex_ec_trusted is required. This function checks gpio EC_IN_RW pin and will return 'trusted' only if EC is not in RW. Therefore, we need to implement similar utilities in coreboot. We will deprecate vb2ex_ec_trusted and use the flag, VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED, in vboot, vb2api_fw_phase1 and set that flag in coreboot, verstage_main. Also add a help function get_ec_is_trusted which needed to be implemented per mainboard. BUG=b:177196147, b:181931817 BRANCH=none TEST=Test on trogdor if manual recovery works Signed-off-by: Hsuan Ting Chen <roccochen@chromium.org> Change-Id: I479c8f80e45cc524ba87db4293d19b29bdfa2192 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/57048 Reviewed-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-09-15vboot: Call check_boot_mode before vb2api_fw_phase1Daisuke Nojiri
Currently, check_boot_mode is called after vb2api_fw_phase1, which makes verstage_main exit before reaching check_boot_mode if recovery mode is manually requested. Thus, recovery mode isn't able to test whether VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED is set or not. This patch makes verstage_main call check_boot_mode before vb2api_fw_phase1 to fix the issue. BUG=b:180927027, b:187871195 BRANCH=none TEST=build Change-Id: If8524d1513b13fd79320a116a83f6729a820f61f Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/57623 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2021-07-26vboot/secdata_tpm: Add WRITE_STCLEAR attr to RW ARB spacesAseda Aboagye
It can be nice to update the TPM firmware without having to clear the TPM owner. However, in order to do so would require platformHierarchy to be enabled which would leave the kernel antirollback space a bit vulnerable. To protect the kernel antirollback space from being written to by the OS, we can use the WriteLock command. In order to do so we need to add the WRITE_STCLEAR TPM attribute. This commit adds the WRITE_STCLEAR TPM attribute to the rw antirollback spaces. This includes the kernel antirollback space along with the MRC space. When an STCLEAR attribute is set, this indicates that the TPM object will need to be reloaded after any TPM Startup (CLEAR). BUG=b:186029006 BRANCH=None TEST=Build and flash a chromebook with no kernel antirollback space set up, boot to Chrome OS, run `tpm_manager_client get_space_info --index=0x1007` and verify that the WRITE_STCLEAR attribute is present. Signed-off-by: Aseda Aboagye <aaboagye@google.com> Change-Id: I3181b4c18acd908e924ad858b677e891312423fe Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/56358 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-07-01vboot: add VBOOT_X86_SHA256_ACCELERATION configSubrata Banik
Add Kconfig option for VBOOT_X86_SHA256_ACCELERATION, which will use x86-sha extension for SHA256 instead of software implementation. TEST=Able to call vb2ex_hwcrypto_digest_init() and perform SHA using HW crypto engine. Change-Id: Idc8be8711c69f4ebc489cd37cc3749c0b257c610 Signed-off-by: Subrata Banik <subrata.banik@intel.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/55611 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2021-06-14security/vboot: Add timestamps when loading verstageRaul E Rangel
We are not currently tracking how long it takes to load verstage. The enum values already exist, they just weren't used. BUG=b:179092979 TEST=Dump timestamps 501:starting to load verstage 2,280,656 (1) 502:finished loading verstage 2,340,845 (60,189) Signed-off-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Change-Id: I2cde58cb8aa796829a4e054e6925e2394973484b Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/55370 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2021-06-10security/vboot: Add support for ZTE spacesAseda Aboagye
This commit adds support for the Chrome OS Zero-Touch Enrollment related spaces. For TPM 2.0 devices which don't use Cr50, coreboot will define the RMA+SN Bits, Board ID, and RMA Bytes counter spaces. The RMA+SN Bits space is 16 bytes initialized to all 0xFFs. The Board ID space is 12 bytes initialized to all 0xFFs. The RMA Bytes counter space is 8 bytes intialized to 0. BUG=b:184676425 BRANCH=None TEST=Build and flash lalala, verify that the ZTE spaces are created successfully by undefining the firmware antirollback space in the TPM such that the TPM undergoes factory initialization in coreboot. Reboot the DUT. Boot to CrOS and run `tpm_manager_client list_spaces` and verify that the ZTE spaces are listed. Run `tpm_manager_client read_space` with the various indices and verify that the sizes and initial values of the spaces are correct. TEST=Attempt to undefine the ZTE spaces and verify that it fails due to the unsatisfiable policy. Signed-off-by: Aseda Aboagye <aaboagye@google.com> Change-Id: I97e3ae7e18fc9ee9a02afadbbafeb226b41af0eb Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/55242 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-06-10vboot: Assign 2 to EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_TRUSTED_RODaisuke Nojiri
This patch assings 2 to EC_EFS_BOOT_MODE_TRUSTED_RO to make coreboot set VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED when the GSC reports TRUSTED_RO. Old GSC doesn't use 2. So, the new BIOS won't mistakenly set VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED. BUG=b:180927027, b:187871195 BRANCH=none TEST=build Change-Id: I11a09d0035a4bd59f80018c647ca17e3318be81e Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/55373 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-06-04vboot: Add VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTEDDaisuke Nojiri
This patch makes coreboot set VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED based on the EC"s boot mode. Vboot will check VB2_CONTEXT_EC_TRUSTED to determine whether it can enter recovery mode or not. BUG=b:180927027, b:187871195 BRANCH=none TEST=build Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Change-Id: I9fa09dd7ae5baa1efb4e1ed4f0fe9a6803167c93 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/54099 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2021-05-30Apply more uses for Kconfig TPMKyösti Mälkki
Change-Id: I54b296563940cd46fe9da9fe789b746f2fc1987d Signed-off-by: Kyösti Mälkki <kyosti.malkki@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/55016 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@mailbox.org>
2021-05-26Add Kconfig TPMKyösti Mälkki
Defined as TPM1 || TPM2. Change-Id: I18c26d6991c2ccf782a515a8e90a3eb82b53b0e6 Signed-off-by: Kyösti Mälkki <kyosti.malkki@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/54853 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz>
2021-05-18vboot/secdata_mock: Make v0 kernel secdata contextAseda Aboagye
The new kernel secdata v1 stores the last read EC hash, and reboots the device during EC software sync when that hash didn't match the currently active hash on the EC (this is used with TPM_CR50 to support EC-EFS2 and pretty much a no-op for other devices). Generally, of course the whole point of secdata is always that it persists across reboots, but with MOCK_SECDATA we can't do that. Previously we always happened to somewhat get away with presenting freshly-reinitialized data for MOCK_SECDATA on every boot, but with the EC hash feature in secdata v1, that would cause a reboot loop. The simplest solution is to just pretend we're a secdata v0 device when using MOCK_SECDATA. This was encountered on using a firmware built with MOCK_SECDATA but had EC software sync enabled. BUG=b:187843114 BRANCH=None TEST=`USE=mocktpm cros build-ap -b keeby`; Flash keeby device, verify that DUT does not continuously reboot with EC software sync enabled. Signed-off-by: Aseda Aboagye <aaboagye@google.com> Change-Id: Id8e81afcddadf27d9eec274f7f85ff1520315aaa Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/54304 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2021-05-16vboot/secdata_tpm: Create FWMP space in corebootAseda Aboagye
This commit has coreboot create the Chrome OS Firmware Management Parameters (FWMP) space in the TPM. The space will be defined and the contents initialized to the defaults. BUG=b:184677625 BRANCH=None TEST=emerge-keeby coreboot Signed-off-by: Aseda Aboagye <aaboagye@google.com> Change-Id: I1f566e00f11046ff9a9891c65660af50fbb83675 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52919 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2021-05-16vboot/secdata_tpm: Rename set_space()Aseda Aboagye
The name `set_space()` seems to imply that it's writing to a TPM space when actually, the function can create a space and write to it. This commit attempts to make that a bit more clear. Additionally, in order to use the correct sizes when creating the space, this commit also refactors the functions slightly to incorporate the vboot context object such that the correct sizes are used. The various vboot APIs will return the size of the created object that we can then create the space with. BUG=b:184677625 BRANCH=None TEST=`emerge-keeby coreboot` Signed-off-by: Aseda Aboagye <aaboagye@google.com> Change-Id: I80a8342c51d7bfaa0cb2eb3fd37240425d5901be Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/54308 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-05-14cbfs: Increase mcache size defaultsJulius Werner
The CBFS mcache size default was eyeballed to what should be "hopefully enough" for most users, but some recent Chrome OS devices have already hit the limit. Since most current (and probably all future) x86 chipsets likely have the CAR space to spare, let's just double the size default for all supporting chipsets right now so that we hopefully won't run into these issues again any time soon. The CBFS_MCACHE_RW_PERCENTAGE default for CHROMEOS was set to 25 under the assumption that Chrome OS images have historically always had a lot more files in their RO CBFS than the RW (because l10n assets were only in RO). Unfortunately, this has recently changed with the introduction of updateable assets. While hopefully not that many boards will need these, the whole idea is that you won't know whether you need them yet at the time the RO image is frozen, and mcache layout parameters cannot be changed in an RW update. So better to use the normal 50/50 split on Chrome OS devices going forward so we are prepared for the eventuality of needing RW assets again. The RW percentage should really also be menuconfig-controllable, because this is something the user may want to change on the fly depending on their payload requirements. Move the option to the vboot Kconfigs because it also kinda belongs there anyway and this makes it fit in better in menuconfig. (I haven't made the mcache size menuconfig-controllable because if anyone needs to increase this, they can just override the default in the chipset Kconfig for everyone using that chipset, under the assumption that all boards of that chipset have the same amount of available CAR space and there's no reason not to use up the available space. This seems more in line with how this would work on non-x86 platforms that define this directly in their memlayout.ld.) Also add explicit warnings to both options that they mustn't be changed in an RW update to an older RO image. BUG=b:187561710 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I046ae18c9db9a5d682384edde303c07e0be9d790 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/54146 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2021-05-04security/vboot: Include fspt.bin in the RO region onlyArthur Heymans
fspt.bin is run before verstage so it is of no use in RW_A/B. Change-Id: I6fe29793fa638312c8b275b6fa8662df78b3b2bd Signed-off-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52853 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Michał Żygowski <michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2021-04-14vboot: ec_sync: Switch to new CBFS APIJulius Werner
This patch changes the vboot EC sync code to use the new CBFS API. As a consequence, we have to map the whole EC image file at once (because the new API doesn't support partial mapping). This should be fine on the only platform that uses this code (Google_Volteer/_Dedede family) because they are x86 devices that support direct mapping from flash, but the code was originally written to more carefully map the file in smaller steps to be theoretically able to support Arm devices. EC sync in romstage for devices without memory-mapped flash would be hard to combine with CBFS verification because there's not enough SRAM to ever hold the whole file in memory at once, but we can't validate the file hash until we have loaded the whole file and for performance (or TOCTOU-safety, if applicable) reasons we wouldn't want to load anything more than once. The "good" solution for this would be to introduce a CBFS streaming API can slowly feed chunks of the file into a callback but in the end still return a "hash valid/invalid" result to the caller. If use cases like this become pressing in the future, we may have to implement such an API. However, for now this code is the only part of coreboot with constraints like that, it was only ever used on platforms that do support memory-mapped flash, and due to the new EC-EFS2 model used on more recent Chrome OS devices we don't currently anticipate this to ever be needed again. Therefore this patch goes the easier way of just papering over the problem and punting the work of implementing a more generic solution until we actually have a real need for it. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I7e263272aef3463f3b2924887d96de9b2607f5e5 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52280 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-04-06verstage: Add debug print when returning from verstageJulius Werner
RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE is a somewhat tricky construct that we don't normally do otherwise in coreboot. While it works remarkably well in general, new development can lead to unintentional interactions with confusing results. This patch adds a debug print to the verstage right before returning to the bootblock so that it's obvious this happens, because otherwise in some cases the last printout in the verstage is about some TPM commands which can be misleading when execution hangs after that point. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I9ca68a32d7a50c95d9a6948d35816fee583611bc Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52086 Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-03-30security: vboot: Clarify PCR extension algorithms/sizesJulius Werner
The PCR algorithms used for vboot are frequently causing confusion (e.g. see CB:35645) because depending on the circumstances sometimes a (zero-extended) SHA1 value is interpreted as a SHA256, and sometimes a SHA256 is interpreted as a SHA1. We can't really "fix" anything here because the resulting digests are hardcoded in many generations of Chromebooks, but we can document and isolate it better to reduce confusion. This patch adds an explanatory comment and fixes both algorithms and size passed into the lower-level TPM APIs to their actual values (whereas it previously still relied on the TPM 1.2 TSS not checking the algorithm type, and the TPM 2.0 TSS only using the size value for the TCPA log and not the actual TPM operation). Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: Ib0b6ecb8c7e9a405ae966f1049158f1d3820f7e2 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/51720 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2021-03-19cpu/intel/fit: Add the FIT table as a separate CBFS fileArthur Heymans
With CBnT a digest needs to be made of the IBB, Initial BootBlock, in this case the bootblock. After that a pointer to the BPM, Boot Policy Manifest, containing the IBB digest needs to be added to the FIT table. If the fit table is inside the IBB, updating it with a pointer to the BPM, would make the digest invalid. The proper solution is to move the FIT table out of the bootblock. The FIT table itself does not need to be covered by the digest as it just contains pointers to structures that can by verified by the hardware itself, such as microcode and ACMs (Authenticated Code Modules). Change-Id: I352e11d5f7717147a877be16a87e9ae35ae14856 Signed-off-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50926 Reviewed-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Walter <christian.walter@9elements.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-03-16cbfs: Remove prog_locate() for stages and rmodulesJulius Werner
This patch removes the prog_locate() step for stages and rmodules. Instead, the stage and rmodule loading functions will now perform the locate step directly together with the actual loading. The long-term goal of this is to eliminate prog_locate() (and the rdev member in struct prog that it fills) completely in order to make CBFS verification code safer and its security guarantees easier to follow. prog_locate() is the main remaining use case where a raw rdev of CBFS file data "leaks" out of cbfs.c into other code, and that other code needs to manually make sure that the contents of the rdev get verified during loading. By eliminating this step and moving all code that directly deals with file data into cbfs.c, we can concentrate the code that needs to worry about file data hashing (and needs access to cbfs_private.h APIs) into one file, making it easier to keep track of and reason about. This patch is the first step of this move, later patches will do the same for SELFs and other program types. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: Ia600e55f77c2549a00e2606f09befc1f92594a3a Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/49335 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-02-27vboot: update GBB flags to use altfw terminologyJoel Kitching
As per CL:2641346, update GBB flag names: GBB_FLAG_FORCE_DEV_BOOT_LEGACY -> GBB_FLAG_FORCE_DEV_BOOT_ALTFW GBB_FLAG_DEFAULT_DEV_BOOT_LEGACY -> GBB_FLAG_DEFAULT_DEV_BOOT_ALTFW BUG=b:179458327 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Change-Id: I0ac5c9fde5a175f8844e9006bb18f792923f4f6d Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50906 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2021-02-15src/security: Remove unused <console/console.h>Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I2b81a57ded80ef9c5cbdff06d8ca9d6b4f599777 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50526 Reviewed-by: Kyösti Mälkki <kyosti.malkki@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-02-09security/vboot/bootmode: Add weak fill_lb_gpiosRaul E Rangel
This change allows VBOOT to build when the mainboard hasn't implemented any of the VBOOT functions yet. Signed-off-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Change-Id: I42ca8f0dba9fd4a868bc7b636e4ed04cbf8dfab0 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50341 Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Felix Held <felix-coreboot@felixheld.de> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-02-09src: Add missing <cbmem.h>Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I75a816c594b326df8a4aa5458bb055fca35e1741 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50379 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Marshall Dawson <marshalldawson3rd@gmail.com>
2021-02-04coreboot_table: Move VBOOT_VBNV supportKyösti Mälkki
The guard changes from (CHROMEOS && PC80_SYSTEM) to VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS here. Change-Id: I653285c04e864aa6a3494ba1400787fa184ba187 Signed-off-by: Kyösti Mälkki <kyosti.malkki@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50250 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2021-02-03src: Remove unused <cbmem.h>Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I2279e2d7e6255a88953b2485c1f1a3b51a72c65e Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50182 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
2021-02-01security/vboot: Add config for GBB_FLAG_ENABLE_UDCEric Lai
This change adds the missing `GBB_FLAG_ENABLE_UDC` as a config in vboot/Kconfig (just like the other GBB flags) and uses its value to configure GBB_FLAGS Makefile variable. This is done to allow the mainboard to configure GBB flags by selecting appropriate configs in Kconfig. Signed-off-by: Eric Lai <ericr_lai@compal.corp-partner.google.com> Change-Id: I6b397713d643cf9461294e6928596dc847ace6bd Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/50110 Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2021-01-18security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c: Remove repeated wordElyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: Idc17a4305398defd19e7f6ba2fc00bf69af34c4b Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/49526 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Jacob Garber <jgarber1@ualberta.ca>
2020-12-03cbfs: Add verification for RO CBFS metadata hashJulius Werner
This patch adds the first stage of the new CONFIG_CBFS_VERIFICATION feature. It's not useful to end-users in this stage so it cannot be selected in menuconfig (and should not be used other than for development) yet. With this patch coreboot can verify the metadata hash of the RO CBFS when it starts booting, but it does not verify individual files yet. Likewise, verifying RW CBFSes with vboot is not yet supported. Verification is bootstrapped from a "metadata hash anchor" structure that is embedded in the bootblock code and marked by a unique magic number. This anchor contains both the CBFS metadata hash and a separate hash for the FMAP which is required to find the primary CBFS. Both are verified on first use in the bootblock (and halt the system on failure). The CONFIG_TOCTOU_SAFETY option is also added for illustrative purposes to show some paths that need to be different when full protection against TOCTOU (time-of-check vs. time-of-use) attacks is desired. For normal verification it is sufficient to check the FMAP and the CBFS metadata hash only once in the bootblock -- for TOCTOU verification we do the same, but we need to be extra careful that we do not re-read the FMAP or any CBFS metadata in later stages. This is mostly achieved by depending on the CBFS metadata cache and FMAP cache features, but we allow for one edge case in case the RW CBFS metadata cache overflows (which may happen during an RW update and could otherwise no longer be fixed because mcache size is defined by RO code). This code is added to demonstrate design intent but won't really matter until RW CBFS verification can be supported. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I8930434de55eb938b042fdada9aa90218c0b5a34 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41120 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
2020-12-02cbfs: Simplify load/map API names, remove type argumentsJulius Werner
This patch renames cbfs_boot_map_with_leak() and cbfs_boot_load_file() to cbfs_map() and cbfs_load() respectively. This is supposed to be the start of a new, better organized CBFS API where the most common operations have the most simple and straight-forward names. Less commonly used variants of these operations (e.g. cbfs_ro_load() or cbfs_region_load()) can be introduced later. It seems unnecessary to keep carrying around "boot" in the names of most CBFS APIs if the vast majority of accesses go to the boot CBFS (instead, more unusual operations should have longer names that describe how they diverge from the common ones). cbfs_map() is paired with a new cbfs_unmap() to allow callers to cleanly reap mappings when desired. A few new cbfs_unmap() calls are added to generic code where it makes sense, but it seems unnecessary to introduce this everywhere in platform or architecture specific code where the boot medium is known to be memory-mapped anyway. In fact, even for non-memory-mapped platforms, sometimes leaking a mapping to the CBFS cache is a much cleaner solution than jumping through hoops to provide some other storage for some long-lived file object, and it shouldn't be outright forbidden when it makes sense. Additionally, remove the type arguments from these function signatures. The goal is to eventually remove type arguments for lookup from the whole CBFS API. Filenames already uniquely identify CBFS files. The type field is just informational, and there should be APIs to allow callers to check it when desired, but it's not clear what we gain from forcing this as a parameter into every single CBFS access when the vast majority of the time it provides no additional value and is just clutter. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: Ib24325400815a9c3d25f66c61829a24a239bb88e Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39304 Reviewed-by: Hung-Te Lin <hungte@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com> Reviewed-by: Mariusz Szafrański <mariuszx.szafranski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-11-21cbfs: Add metadata cacheJulius Werner
This patch adds a new CBFS "mcache" (metadata cache) -- a memory buffer that stores the headers of all CBFS files. Similar to the existing FMAP cache, this cache should reduce the amount of SPI accesses we need to do every boot: rather than having to re-read all CBFS headers from SPI flash every time we're looking for a file, we can just walk the same list in this in-memory copy and finally use it to directly access the flash at the right position for the file data. This patch adds the code to support the cache but doesn't enable it on any platform. The next one will turn it on by default. Change-Id: I5b1084bfdad1c6ab0ee1b143ed8dd796827f4c65 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38423 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-11-18vboot: stop implementing VbExDisplayScreenJoel Kitching
This function is no longer required to be implemented since EC/AUXFW sync was decoupled from vboot UI. (See CL:2087016.) BUG=b:172343019 TEST=Compile locally BRANCH=none Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Change-Id: I43e8160a4766a38c4fa14bcf4495fc719fbcd6c2 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/47233 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com>
2020-11-17src: Add missing 'include <console/console.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
"printk()" needs <console/console.h>. Change-Id: Iac6b7000bcd8b1335fa3a0ba462a63aed2dc85b8 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/45539 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Marshall Dawson <marshalldawson3rd@gmail.com>
2020-11-06security/vboot: Add Kconfig symbol to set hashing block sizeMartin Roth
Generally, this size probably doesn't matter very much, but in the case of picasso's psp_verstage, the hash is being calculated by hardware using relatively expensive system calls. By increasing the block size, we can save roughly 140ms of boot and resume time. TEST=Build & boot see that boot time has decreased. BRANCH=Zork BUG=b:169217270 - Zork: SHA calculation in vboot takes too long Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Change-Id: I68eecbbdfadcbf14288dc6e849397724fb66e0b2 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46901 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kangheui Won <khwon@chromium.org>
2020-10-28security/vboot: fix policy digest for nvmem spacesAndrey Pronin
This CL fixes the policy digest that restricts deleting the nvmem spaces to specific PCR0 states. BRANCH=none BUG=b:140958855 TEST=verified that nvmem spaces created with this digest can be deleted in the intended states, and cannot be deleted in other states (test details for ChromeOS - in BUG comments). Change-Id: I3cb7d644fdebda71cec3ae36de1dc76387e61ea7 Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46772 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-10-26vboot: Disable vboot functions in SMMJulius Werner
SMM does not have access to CBMEM and therefore cannot access any persistent state like the vboot context. This makes it impossible to query vboot state like the developer mode switch or the currently active RW CBFS. However some code (namely the PC80 option table) does CBFS accesses in SMM. This is currently worked around by directly using cbfs_locate_file_in_region() with the COREBOOT region. By disabling vboot functions explicitly in SMM, we can get rid of that and use normal CBFS APIs in this code. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I4b1baa73681fc138771ad8384d12c0a04b605377 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46645 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-10-22security/vboot: Remove all tpm 1.2 functions for mrc hash in the tpmShelley Chen
Since MRC_SAVE_HASH_IN_TPM depends on TPM2, we can now remove the tpm 1.2 versions of functions that deal with mrc hash in the tpm as it will not be used by tpm 1.2 boards. Also move all antirollback functions that deal with mrc hash in the tpm under CONFIG(TPM2). BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=make sure boards are still compiling on coreboot Jenkins Change-Id: I446dde36ce2233fc40687892da1fb515ce35b82b Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46615 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-10-20mrc_cache: Add tpm_hash_index field to cache_region structShelley Chen
Pull selection of tpm hash index logic into cache_region struct. This CL also enables the storing of the MRC hash into the TPM NVRAM space for both recovery and non-recovery cases. This will affect all platforms with TPM2 enabled and use the MRC_CACHE driver. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=make sure memory training still works on nami and lazor Change-Id: I1a744d6f40f062ca3aab6157b3747e6c1f6977f9 Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46514 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-10-20security/vboot: Add new TPM NVRAM index MRC_RW_HASH_NV_INDEXShelley Chen
Add new index for MRC_CACHE data in RW. Also update antirollback functions to handle this new index where necessary. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=make sure memory training still works on nami Change-Id: I2de3c23aa56d3b576ca54dbd85c75e5b80199560 Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46511 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-10-20security/vboot: Make mrc_cache hash functions genericShelley Chen
We need to extend the functionality of the mrc_cache hash functions to work for both recovery and normal mrc_cache data. Updating the API of these functions to pass in an index to identify the hash indices for recovery and normal mode. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=make sure memory training still works on nami Change-Id: I9c0bb25eafc731ca9c7a95113ab940f55997fc0f Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46432 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-10-20mrc_cache: Move mrc_cache_*_hash functions into mrc_cache driverShelley Chen
This CL would remove these calls from fsp 2.0. Platforms that select MRC_STASH_TO_CBMEM, updating the TPM NVRAM space is moved from romstage (when data stashed to CBMEM) to ramstage (when data is written back to SPI flash. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=make sure memory training still works on nami Change-Id: I3088ca6927c7dbc65386c13e868afa0462086937 Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46510 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-10-20mrc_cache: Add config MRC_SAVE_HASH_IN_TPMShelley Chen
Use this config to specify whether we want to save a hash of the MRC_CACHE in the TPM NVRAM space. Replace all uses of FSP2_0_USES_TPM_MRC_HASH with MRC_SAVE_HASH_IN_TPM and remove the FSP2_0_USES_TPM_MRC_HASH config. Note that TPM1 platforms will not select MRC_SAVE_HASH_IN_TPM as none of them use FSP2.0 and have recovery MRC_CACHE. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=emerge-nami coreboot chromeos-bootimage Change-Id: Ic5ffcdba27cb1f09c39c3835029c8d9cc3453af1 Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46509 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-10-19security/vboot: Rename mem_init.h to mrc_cache_hash_tpm.hShelley Chen
As ongoing work for generalizing mrc_cache to be used by all platforms, we are pulling it out from fsp 2.0 and renaming it as mrc_cache_hash_tpm.h in security/vboot. BUG=b:150502246 BRANCH=None TEST=emerge-nami coreboot chromeos-bootimage Change-Id: I5a204bc3342a3462f177c3ed6b8443e31816091c Signed-off-by: Shelley Chen <shchen@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/46508 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-09-21src/security: Drop unneeded empty linesElyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: Icb6057ac73fcc038981ef95a648420ac00b3c106 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/44808 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Niewöhner <foss@mniewoehner.de>
2020-08-18src: Remove unused 'include <boot_device.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I5589fdeade7f69995adf1c983ced13773472be74 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/42349 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-08-13security/vboot/Makefile.inc: Update regions-for-file functionSridhar Siricilla
This patch updates regions-for-file function in the security/vboot/Makefile.inc to support adding a CBFS file into required FMAP REGIONs in a flexible manner. The file that needs to be added to specific REGIONs, those regions list should be specified in the regions-for-file-{CBFS_FILE_TO_BE_ADDED} variable. For example, if a file foo.bin needs to be added in FW_MAIN_B and COREBOOT, then below code needs to be added in a Makefile.inc. regions-for-file-foo := FW_MAIN_B,COREBOOT cbfs-file-y := foo foo-file := foo.bin foo-type := raw TEST=Verified on hatch Signed-off-by: Sridhar Siricilla <sridhar.siricilla@intel.com> Change-Id: I1f5c22b3d9558ee3c5daa2781a115964f8d2d83b Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43766 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org>
2020-07-26src: Change BOOL CONFIG_ to CONFIG() in comments & stringsMartin Roth
The Kconfig lint tool checks for cases of the code using BOOL type Kconfig options directly instead of with CONFIG() and will print out warnings about it. It gets confused by these references in comments and strings. To fix it so that it can find the real issues, just update these as we would with real issues. Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martin@coreboot.org> Change-Id: I5c37f0ee103721c97483d07a368c0b813e3f25c0 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43824 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2020-07-26src: Remove unused 'include <cbmem.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: Ib41341b42904dc3050a97b70966dde7e46057d6b Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43362 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2020-07-15security/vboot: ensure that NVMEM is saved on every kernel space writeJett Rink
If the AP actually needs to write to the TPM, then it is important and the TPM should commit those changes to NVMEM immediately in case there is an unexpected power loss (e.g. from a USB-C port partner reset upon cold reboot request). BRANCH=none BUG=b:160913048 TEST=Verify that puff will no longer reboot loop when coreboot writes a new Hmir (Hash mirror) in the TPM Change-Id: I9597a55891d11bdf040d70f38b4c5a59c7888b8a Signed-off-by: Jett Rink <jettrink@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43414 Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-07-14src: Remove unused 'include <stdint.h>Elyes HAOUAS
Found using: diff <(git grep -l '#include <stdint.h>' -- src/) <(git grep -l 'int8_t\|int16_t\|int32_t\|int64_t\|intptr_t\|intmax_t\|s8\|u8\|s16\|u16\|s32\|u32\|s64\|u64\|INT8_MIN\|INT8_MAX\|INT16_MIN\|INT16_MAX\|INT32_MIN\|INT32_MAX\|INT64_MIN\|INT64_MAX\|INTMAX_MIN\|INTMAX_MAX' -- src/) |grep -v vendorcode |grep '<' Change-Id: I5e14bf4887c7d2644a64f4d58c6d8763eb74d2ed Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41827 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-07-09security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c: Drop dead codeAngel Pons
This code is not even being build-tested. Drop it before it grows moss. Change-Id: Ie01d65f80caf32a8318d5109ad48321661c5a87b Signed-off-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43213 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Niewöhner Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-07-08security/vboot: Allow files to go into only RW-A or RW-B regionMartin Roth
The AMD firmware package created by amdfwtool contains pointers to the various binaries and settings. This means that we need different copies of the package in each region. This change allows for the different files in each of the 3 vboot regions. BUG=b:158124527 TEST=Build trembyle; see the correct versions of the files getting built into the RW-A & RW-B regions. Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martin@coreboot.org> Change-Id: I45ff69dbc2266a67e05597bbe721fbf95cf41777 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/42822 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Raul Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org>
2020-06-19Kconfig: Escape variable to accommodate new Kconfig versionsPatrick Georgi
Kconfig 4.17 started using the $(..) syntax for environment variable expansion while we want to keep expansion to the build system. Older Kconfig versions (like ours) simply drop the escapes, not changing the behavior. While we could let Kconfig expand some of the variables, that only splits the handling in two places, making debugging harder and potentially messing with reproducible builds (e.g. when paths end up in configs), so escape them all. Change-Id: Ibc4087fdd76089352bd8dd0edb1351ec79ea4faa Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/42481 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Frans Hendriks <fhendriks@eltan.com> Reviewed-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com>
2020-06-15security/vboot: Add option to run verstage before bootblockMartin Roth
For AMD's family 17h, verstage can run as a userspace app in the PSP before the X86 is released. The flags for this have been made generic to support any other future systems that might run verstage before the main processor starts. Although an attempt has been made to make things somewhat generic, since this is the first and currently only chip to support verstage before bootblock, there are a number of options which might ultimately be needed which have currently been left out for simplicity. Examples of this are: - PCI is not currently supported - this is currently just a given instead of making a separate Kconfig option for it. - The PSP uses an ARM v7 processor, so that's the only processor that is getting updated for the verstage-before-bootblock option. BUG=b:158124527 TEST=Build with following patches Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martin@coreboot.org> Change-Id: I4849777cb7ba9f90fe8428b82c21884d1e662b96 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41814 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Raul Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org>
2020-06-02src: Remove unused 'include <fmap.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I79eea0a00c2de54f82b372229381534707a295bb Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41681 Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-06-02src: Remove unused 'include <symbols.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: Ica355292eeda9c386b49db97f021566d52943d40 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41673 Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-18src: Remove unused 'include <string.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Unused includes found using following commande: diff <(git grep -l '#include <string.h>' -- src/) <(git grep -l 'memcpy\|memmove\|memset\|memcmp\|memchr\|strdup\|strconcat\|strnlen\|strlen\|strchr\|strncpy\|strcpy\|strcmp\|strncmp\|strspn\|strcspn\|atol\|strrchr\|skip_atoi\|STRINGIFY' -- src/) |grep -v vendorcode |grep '<' Change-Id: Ibaeec213b6019dfa9c45e3424b38af0e094d0c51 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41242 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com>
2020-05-18src: Remove leading blank lines from SPDX headerElyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I8a207e30a73d10fe67c0474ff11324ae99e2cec6 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41360 Reviewed-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-13src: Remove unused '#include <stddef.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
Unused includes found using following commande: diff <(git grep -l '#include <stddef.h>' -- src/) <(git grep -l 'size_t\|ssize_t\|wchar_t\|wint_t\|NULL\|DEVTREE_EARLY\|DEVTREE_CONST\ |MAYBE_STATIC_NONZERO\|MAYBE_STATIC_BSS\|zeroptr' -- src/)|grep '<' |grep -v vendor |grep -vF '.h' Change-Id: Ic54b1db995fe7c61b416fa5e1c4022238e4a6ad5 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41150 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-13src: Remove unused '#include <stdint.h>'Elyes HAOUAS
unused includes of <stdin.h> found using following commande: diff <(git grep -l '#include <stdint.h>' -- src/) <(git grep -l 'int8_t\|uint8_t\|int16_t\|uint16_t\|int32_t\|uint32_t\|int64_t\| uint64_t\|intptr_t\|uintptr_t\|intmax_t\|uintmax_t\|s8\|u8\|s16\| u16\|s32\|u32\|s64\|u64\|INT8_MIN\|INT8_MAX\|UINT8_MAX\|INT16_MIN\ |INT16_MAX\|UINT16_MAX\|INT32_MIN\|INT32_MAX\|UINT32_MAX\|INT64_MIN\ |INT64_MAX\|UINT64_MAX\|INTMAX_MIN\|INTMAX_MAX\|UINTMAX_MAX' -- src/) |grep '<' |grep -v vendor |grep -vF '.h' Change-Id: Icb9b54c6abfb18d1e263665981968a4d7cccabeb Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41148 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-11treewide: Convert more license headers to SPDX stylePatrick Georgi
Change-Id: Ia3de79c7d71049da00ed108829eac6cb49ff3ed6 Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41205 Reviewed-by: HAOUAS Elyes <ehaouas@noos.fr> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-11treewide: Remove "this file is part of" linesPatrick Georgi
Stefan thinks they don't add value. Command used: sed -i -e '/file is part of /d' $(git grep "file is part of " |egrep ":( */\*.*\*/\$|#|;#|-- | *\* )" | cut -d: -f1 |grep -v crossgcc |grep -v gcov | grep -v /elf.h |grep -v nvramtool) The exceptions are for: - crossgcc (patch file) - gcov (imported from gcc) - elf.h (imported from GNU's libc) - nvramtool (more complicated header) The removed lines are: - fmt.Fprintln(f, "/* This file is part of the coreboot project. */") -# This file is part of a set of unofficial pre-commit hooks available -/* This file is part of coreboot */ -# This file is part of msrtool. -/* This file is part of msrtool. */ - * This file is part of ncurses, designed to be appended after curses.h.in -/* This file is part of pgtblgen. */ - * This file is part of the coreboot project. - /* This file is part of the coreboot project. */ -# This file is part of the coreboot project. -# This file is part of the coreboot project. -## This file is part of the coreboot project. --- This file is part of the coreboot project. -/* This file is part of the coreboot project */ -/* This file is part of the coreboot project. */ -;## This file is part of the coreboot project. -# This file is part of the coreboot project. It originated in the - * This file is part of the coreinfo project. -## This file is part of the coreinfo project. - * This file is part of the depthcharge project. -/* This file is part of the depthcharge project. */ -/* This file is part of the ectool project. */ - * This file is part of the GNU C Library. - * This file is part of the libpayload project. -## This file is part of the libpayload project. -/* This file is part of the Linux kernel. */ -## This file is part of the superiotool project. -/* This file is part of the superiotool project */ -/* This file is part of uio_usbdebug */ Change-Id: I82d872b3b337388c93d5f5bf704e9ee9e53ab3a9 Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41194 Reviewed-by: HAOUAS Elyes <ehaouas@noos.fr> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-09src/: Replace GPL boilerplate with SPDX headersPatrick Georgi
Used commands: perl -i -p0e 's|\/\*[\s*]*.*is free software[:;][\s*]*you[\s*]*can[\s*]*redistribute[\s*]*it[\s*]*and\/or[\s*]*modify[\s*]*it[\s*]*under[\s*]*the[\s*]*terms[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*as[\s*]*published[\s*]*by[\s*]*the[\s*]*Free[\s*]*Software[\s*]*Foundation[;,][\s*]*version[\s*]*2[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*License.[\s*]*This[\s*]*program[\s*]*is[\s*]*distributed[\s*]*in[\s*]*the[\s*]*hope[\s*]*that[\s*]*it[\s*]*will[\s*]*be[\s*]*useful,[\s*]*but[\s*]*WITHOUT[\s*]*ANY[\s*]*WARRANTY;[\s*]*without[\s*]*even[\s*]*the[\s*]*implied[\s*]*warranty[\s*]*of[\s*]*MERCHANTABILITY[\s*]*or[\s*]*FITNESS[\s*]*FOR[\s*]*A[\s*]*PARTICULAR[\s*]*PURPOSE.[\s*]*See[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*for[\s*]*more[\s*]*details.[\s*]*\*\/|/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */|' $(cat filelist) perl -i -p0e 's|\/\*[\s*]*.*is[\s*]*free[\s*]*software[:;][\s*]*you[\s*]*can[\s*]*redistribute[\s*]*it[\s*]*and/or[\s*]*modify[\s*]*it[\s*]*under[\s*]*the[\s*]*terms[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*as[\s*]*published[\s*]*by[\s*]*the[\s*]*Free[\s*]*Software[\s*]*Foundation[;,][\s*]*either[\s*]*version[\s*]*2[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*License,[\s*]*or[\s*]*.at[\s*]*your[\s*]*option.[\s*]*any[\s*]*later[\s*]*version.[\s*]*This[\s*]*program[\s*]*is[\s*]*distributed[\s*]*in[\s*]*the[\s*]*hope[\s*]*that[\s*]*it[\s*]*will[\s*]*be[\s*]*useful,[\s*]*but[\s*]*WITHOUT[\s*]*ANY[\s*]*WARRANTY;[\s*]*without[\s*]*even[\s*]*the[\s*]*implied[\s*]*warranty[\s*]*of[\s*]*MERCHANTABILITY[\s*]*or[\s*]*FITNESS[\s*]*FOR[\s*]*A[\s*]*PARTICULAR[\s*]*PURPOSE.[\s*]*See[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*for[\s*]*more[\s*]*details.[\s*]*\*\/|/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */|' $(cat filelist) perl -i -p0e 's|\/\*[\s*]*.*is[\s*#]*free[\s*#]*software[;:,][\s*#]*you[\s*#]*can[\s*#]*redistribute[\s*#]*it[\s*#]*and/or[\s*#]*modify[\s*#]*it[\s*#]*under[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*terms[\s*#]*of[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*GNU[\s*#]*General[\s*#]*Public[\s*#]*License[\s*#]*as[\s*#]*published[\s*#]*by[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*Free[\s*#]*Software[\s*#]*Foundation[;:,][\s*#]*either[\s*#]*version[\s*#]*3[\s*#]*of[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*License[;:,][\s*#]*or[\s*#]*.at[\s*#]*your[\s*#]*option.[\s*#]*any[\s*#]*later[\s*#]*version.[\s*#]*This[\s*#]*program[\s*#]*is[\s*#]*distributed[\s*#]*in[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*hope[\s*#]*that[\s*#]*it[\s*#]*will[\s*#]*be[\s*#]*useful[;:,][\s*#]*but[\s*#]*WITHOUT[\s*#]*ANY[\s*#]*WARRANTY[;:,][\s*#]*without[\s*#]*even[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*implied[\s*#]*warranty[\s*#]*of[\s*#]*MERCHANTABILITY[\s*#]*or[\s*#]*FITNESS[\s*#]*FOR[\s*#]*A[\s*#]*PARTICULAR[\s*#]*PURPOSE.[\s*#]*See[\s*#]*the[\s*#]*GNU[\s*#]*General[\s*#]*Public[\s*#]*License[\s*#]*for[\s*#]*more[\s*#]*details.[\s*]*\*\/|/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later */|' $(cat filelist) perl -i -p0e 's|(\#\#*)[\w]*.*is free software[:;][\#\s]*you[\#\s]*can[\#\s]*redistribute[\#\s]*it[\#\s]*and\/or[\#\s]*modify[\#\s]*it[\s\#]*under[\s \#]*the[\s\#]*terms[\s\#]*of[\s\#]*the[\s\#]*GNU[\s\#]*General[\s\#]*Public[\s\#]*License[\s\#]*as[\s\#]*published[\s\#]*by[\s\#]*the[\s\#]*Free[\s\#]*Software[\s\#]*Foundation[;,][\s\#]*version[\s\#]*2[\s\#]*of[\s\#]*the[\s\#]*License.*[\s\#]*This[\s\#]*program[\s\#]*is[\s\#]*distributed[\s\#]*in[\s\#]*the[\s\#]*hope[\s\#]*that[\s\#]*it[\s\#]*will[\#\s]*be[\#\s]*useful,[\#\s]*but[\#\s]*WITHOUT[\#\s]*ANY[\#\s]*WARRANTY;[\#\s]*without[\#\s]*even[\#\s]*the[\#\s]*implied[\#\s]*warranty[\#\s]*of[\#\s]*MERCHANTABILITY[\#\s]*or[\#\s]*FITNESS[\#\s]*FOR[\#\s]*A[\#\s]*PARTICULAR[\#\s]*PURPOSE.[\#\s]*See[\#\s]*the[\#\s]*GNU[\#\s]*General[\#\s]*Public[\#\s]*License[\#\s]*for[\#\s]*more[\#\s]*details.\s(#* *\n)*|\1 SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n\n|' $(cat filelist) perl -i -p0e 's|(\#\#*)[\w*]*.*is free software[:;][\s*]*you[\s*]*can[\s*]*redistribute[\s*]*it[\s*]*and\/or[\s*]*modify[\s*]*it[\s*]*under[\s*]*the[\s*]*terms[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*as[\s*]*published[\s*]*by[\s*]*the[\s*]*Free[\s*]*Software[\s*]*Foundation[;,][\s*]*version[\s*]*2[\s*]*of[\s*]*the[\s*]*License.[\s*]*This[\s*]*program[\s*]*is[\s*]*distributed[\s*]*in[\s*]*the[\s*]*hope[\s*]*that[\s*]*it[\s*]*will[\s*]*be[\s*]*useful,[\s*]*but[\s*]*WITHOUT[\s*]*ANY[\s*]*WARRANTY;[\s*]*without[\s*]*even[\s*]*the[\s*]*implied[\s*]*warranty[\s*]*of[\s*]*MERCHANTABILITY[\s*]*or[\s*]*FITNESS[\s*]*FOR[\s*]*A[\s*]*PARTICULAR[\s*]*PURPOSE.[\s*]*See[\s*]*the[\s*]*GNU[\s*]*General[\s*]*Public[\s*]*License[\s*]*for[\s*]*more[\s*]*details.\s(#* *\n)*|\1 SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n\n|' $(cat filelist) Change-Id: Ia01908544f4b92a2e06ea621eca548e582728280 Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41178 Reviewed-by: HAOUAS Elyes <ehaouas@noos.fr> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-05-08{security,soc}/*/Kconfig: Replace GPLv2 long form headers with SPDX headerElyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: Ie3721f6a93dacb8014f93aa86780d51a659a68df Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41145 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-05-08vboot: Provide declaration for verstage_mainboard_early_init()Furquan Shaikh
Similar to bootblock, provide declaration for verstage_mainboard_early_init() to support early mainboard initialization if verstage is run before bootblock. BUG=b:155824234 TEST=Verified that trembyle still builds Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Change-Id: I106213ecc1c44100f1f74071189518563ac08121 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41137 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-05-04security/vboot: Limit vboot verification code access to only verstageSridhar Siricilla
Make vboot verification code accessible in only verstage. Vboot verification code in vboot_logic.c is being used in verstage. Due to support function vboot_save_data(), so core functionality in vboot_logic.c is made available in romstage. The patch decouples the support function frm vboot_logic.c to limit itself to verstage. BUG=b:155544643 TEST=Verified on hatch Signed-off-by: Sridhar Siricilla <sridhar.siricilla@intel.com> Change-Id: Id1ede45c4dffe90afcef210eabaa657cf92a9335 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40562 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Rizwan Qureshi <rizwan.qureshi@intel.com>
2020-05-01security/vboot: Convert reboot-related errors to vboot2-styleYu-Ping Wu
Error codes are renamed as follows: VBERROR_SHUTDOWN_REQUESTED --> VB2_REQUEST_SHUTDOWN VBERROR_REBOOT_REQUIRED --> VB2_REQUEST_REBOOT VBERROR_EC_REBOOT_TO_SWITCH_RW --> VB2_REQUEST_REBOOT_EC_SWITCH_RW VBERROR_EC_REBOOT_TO_RO_REQUIRED --> VB2_REQUEST_REBOOT_EC_TO_RO BRANCH=none BUG=b:124141368, chromium:988410 TEST=emerge-nami coreboot Cq-Depend: chromium:2143030 Change-Id: Id82cf85f49dfb63a9c3d41aacd3969786bffcac7 Signed-off-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40749 Reviewed-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-04-28vboot: Always build secdata functions for romstageJulius Werner
Since CB:40389, all platforms with CONFIG_VBOOT_EARLY_EC_SYNC need to write back secdata in romstage. Those platforms currently all happen to have CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE set as well, but there's no official dependency between those options. Change the Makefile to unconditionally build the secdata access routines for romstage so that this would work on other platforms as well. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I0b3c79e9bb8af9d09ef91f5749953ca109dd2a40 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40760 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-04-28security/lockdown: Write-protect WP_ROPatrick Rudolph
Allow to write protect only the WP_RO region in case of enabled VBOOT. One can either lock the boot device in VERSTAGE early if VBOOT is enabled, or late in RAMSTAGE. Both options have their downsides as explained below. Lock early if you don't trust the code that's stored in the writeable flash partition. This prevents write-protecting the MRC cache, which is written in ramstage. In case the contents of the MRC cache are corrupted this can lead to system instability or trigger unwanted code flows inside the firmware. Lock late if you trust the code that's stored in the writeable flash partition. This allows write-protecting the MRC cache, but if a vulnerability is found in the code of the writeable partition an attacker might be able to overwrite the whole flash as it hasn't been locked yet. Change-Id: I72c3e1a0720514b9b85b0433944ab5fb7109b2a2 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Walter <christian.walter@9elements.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32705 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com>
2020-04-23rules.h: Rename ENV_VERSTAGE to ENV_SEPARATE_VERSTAGEJulius Werner
When CONFIG_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE=n, all verstage code gets linked into the appropriate calling stage (bootblock or romstage). This means that ENV_VERSTAGE is actually 0, and instead ENV_BOOTBLOCK or ENV_ROMSTAGE are 1. This keeps tripping up people who are just trying to write a simple "are we in verstage (i.e. wherever the vboot init logic runs)" check, e.g. for TPM init functions which may run in "verstage" or ramstage depending on whether vboot is enabled. Those checks will not work as intended for CONFIG_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE=n. This patch renames ENV_VERSTAGE to ENV_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE to try to clarify that this macro can really only be used to check whether code is running in a *separate* verstage, and clue people in that they may need to cover the linked-in verstage case as well. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I2ff3a3c3513b3db44b3cff3d93398330cd3632ea Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40582 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2020-04-23vboot: Add permission check for kernel spaceDaisuke Nojiri
This patch restores the permission check for the kernel space which was dropped when read_space_kernel was moved from Depthcharge by CL:2155429. BUG=chromium:1045217, chromium:1020578 BRANCH=none TEST=none Signed-off-by: dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Change-Id: If6d487940f39865cadc0ca9d5de6e055ad3e017d Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40579 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-04-20security/vboot, mb/google: Fix build errorsPatrick Georgi
There have been two cases of incompatibilities between overlapping changes, and they need to be resolved in a single commit to unbreak the tree: 1. CB:40389 introduced a new use of write_secdata while CB:40359 removed that function in favor of safe_write. Follow the refactor of the latter in the code introduced by the former. 2. CB:39849 changed google_chromeec_get_usb_pd_power_info()'s interface and adapted all its users. Except for duffy and kaisa which were only added in CB:40223 and CB:40393 respectively, so reapply the patch to puff's mainboard.c to their mainboard.c files. Change-Id: Ib8dfcd61bb79e0a487eaa60e719bd93561f2d97a Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40518 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Walter <christian.walter@9elements.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Kyösti Mälkki <kyosti.malkki@gmail.com>
2020-04-20vboot/secdata: remove retries, readback, and CRC checkJoel Kitching
Depthcharge trusts that our TPM driver is working reliably, and so should we. Also remove CRC check -- the value returned by antirollback_read_space_firmware() is dropped in vboot_logic.c verstage_main(), and vboot handles this check internally. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:972956 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I5d3f3823fca8507fd58087bb0f7b78cfa49417ab Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40359 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-04-20vboot: remove leftover TPM_PCR_GBB constantsJoel Kitching
These constants were left behind after the code using them was relocated in CB:34510. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:972956 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I6ce7c969a9e9bdf6cdce3343ba666a08b3521f27 Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40358 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-04-17ec_sync: Run EFS2 in romstagednojiri
EFS2 allows EC RO to enable PD for special cases. When doing so, it sets NO_BOOT flag to avoid booting the OS. AP needs to get NO_BOOT flag from Cr50 and enforce that. This patch makes verstage get a boot mode and a mirrored hash stored in kernel secdata from Cr50. This patch also makes romstage write an expected EC hash (a.k.a. Hexp) to Cr50 (if there is an update). BUG=b:147298634, chromium:1045217, b:148259137 BRANCH=none TEST=Verify software sync succeeds on Puff. Signed-off-by: dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Change-Id: I1f387b6e920205b9cc4c8536561f2a279c36413d Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40389 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-04-10assert.h: Simplify dead_code()Nico Huber
It turns out the linker's error message already includes the line number of the dead_code() invocation. If we don't include the line number in the identifier for our undefined reference, we don't need individual identifiers at all and can work with a single, global declaration. Change-Id: Ib63868ce3114c3f839867a3bfb1b03bdb6facf16 Signed-off-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40240 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Felix Held <felix-coreboot@felixheld.de> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2020-04-04assert.h: Add a tag parameter to dead_code()Nico Huber
When dead_code() is used in inline functions in a header file, the generated function names (based on the line number) may collide with a dead_code() in the code file. Now that we are hit by such a case, we need a quick solution: Add a tag argument for all invocations in header files. Change-Id: I0c548ce998cf8e28ae9f76b5c0ea5630b4e91ae2 Signed-off-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40140 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Felix Held <felix-coreboot@felixheld.de> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
2020-04-04src/security: Use SPDX for GPL-2.0-only filesAngel Pons
Done with sed and God Lines. Only done for C-like code for now. Change-Id: I51f5764b57fb8b62e3a4b3d41bd32e5330a2983c Signed-off-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40057 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: HAOUAS Elyes <ehaouas@noos.fr>
2020-03-31security/vboot: relocate and rename vboot_platform_is_resuming()Bill XIE
After measured boot is decoupled from verified boot in CB:35077, vboot_platform_is_resuming() is never vboot-specific, thus it is renamed to platform_is_resuming() and declared in bootmode.h. Change-Id: I29b5b88af0576c34c10cfbd99659a5cdc0c75842 Signed-off-by: Bill XIE <persmule@hardenedlinux.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39103 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-03-31security/vboot: Decouple measured boot from verified bootBill XIE
Currently, those who want to use measured boot implemented within vboot should enable verified boot first, along with sections such as GBB and RW slots defined with manually written fmd files, even if they do not actually want to verify anything. As discussed in CB:34977, measured boot should be decoupled from verified boot and make them two fully independent options. Crypto routines necessary for measurement could be reused, and TPM and CRTM init should be done somewhere other than vboot_logic_executed() if verified boot is not enabled. In this revision, only TCPA log is initialized during bootblock. Before TPM gets set up, digests are not measured into tpm immediately, but cached in TCPA log, and measured into determined PCRs right after TPM is up. This change allows those who do not want to use the verified boot scheme implemented by vboot as well as its requirement of a more complex partition scheme designed for chromeos to make use of the measured boot functionality implemented within vboot library to measure the boot process. TODO: Measure MRC Cache somewhere, as MRC Cache has never resided in CBFS any more, so it cannot be covered by tspi_measure_cbfs_hook(). Change-Id: I1fb376b4a8b98baffaee4d574937797bba1f8aee Signed-off-by: Bill XIE <persmule@hardenedlinux.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/35077 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com>
2020-03-17src (minus soc and mainboard): Remove copyright noticesPatrick Georgi
They're listed in AUTHORS and often incorrect anyway, for example: - What's a "Copyright $year-present"? - Which incarnation of Google (Inc, LLC, ...) is the current copyright holder? - People sometimes have their editor auto-add themselves to files even though they only deleted stuff - Or they let the editor automatically update the copyright year, because why not? - Who is the copyright holder "The coreboot project Authors"? - Or "Generated Code"? Sidestep all these issues by simply not putting these notices in individual files, let's list all copyright holders in AUTHORS instead and use the git history to deal with the rest. Change-Id: I89b10076e0f4a4b3acd59160fb7abe349b228321 Signed-off-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39611 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Hendricks <david.hendricks@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-03-12vboot: remove extraneous vboot_recovery_mode_memory_retrainJoel Kitching
Just call get_recovery_mode_retrain_switch() directly. BUG=b:124141368 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: Icb88d6862db1782e0218276984e527638b21fd3a Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39343 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2020-03-07vboot: Upgrade kernel space to v1.0dnojiri
This patch upgrades the kernel space to v1.0 to accommodate EC hash, which is used for CrOS EC's early firmware selection. BUG=chromium:1045217 BRANCH=none TEST=Boot Helios. Verify software sync works. Cq-Depend: chromium:2041695 Change-Id: I525f1551afd1853cae826e87198057410167b239 Signed-off-by: dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39137 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-03-06security/vboot: Support enabling EC EFS with EC software syncSam McNally
If the ChromeOS EC uses EC early firmware selection (EFS), the AP vboot build must also enable EC EFS. Add an option to control this, passing it through to vboot. BUG=b:150742950 TEST=none BRANCH=none Signed-off-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org> Change-Id: I697e90748e19d15af154011413b30c0f2a0bf52e Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39272 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Edward O'Callaghan <quasisec@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Tim Wawrzynczak <twawrzynczak@chromium.org>
2020-02-24treewide: Capitalize 'CMOS'Elyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I1d36e554618498d70f33f6c425b0abc91d4fb952 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38928 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Lemenkov <lemenkov@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-02-24vboot: remove rogue vboot_struct.h includeJoel Kitching
As part of vboot1 deprecation, remove an unused vboot_struct.h include. coreboot is now free of vboot1 data structure use. One vboot_api.h include remains as part of security/vboot/ec_sync.c. BUG=b:124141368 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I042d692aa252f8f859d4005455eb6a2eabc24a87 Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39024 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-02-19vboot: use vb2api_get_recovery_reason functionJoel Kitching
Use vb2api_get_recovery_reason() API function rather than accessing vb2_shared_data internals. Of all the vanilla verified boot code in coreboot, this is the last remaining use of vboot's internal data structures in coreboot. There remains only one sole instance in Eltan's code. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:957880 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I845c9b14ffa830bc7de28e9a38188f7066871803 Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Cq-Depend: chromium:2055662 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38886 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-02-18security/vboot: Correct help text of VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGEYu-Ping Wu
Since CB:37231 [1], the vboot working data has been replaced with vboot work buffer, so corrrect the help text of option VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGE accordingly. [1] security/vboot: Remove struct vboot_working_data BRANCH=none BUG=chromium:1021452 TEST=none Change-Id: I80783274179ae7582bbb4c8f9d392895623badce Signed-off-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38900 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com>
2020-02-17vboot: rename GBB flag FAFT_KEY_OVERIDE to FLAG_RUNNING_FAFTJoel Kitching
This was renamed in vboot_reference CL:1977902. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:965914 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I79af304e9608a30c6839cd616378c7330c3de00a Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/37462 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-02-17vboot: remove VBOOT_SAVE_RECOVERY_REASON_ON_REBOOT optionJoel Kitching
With CL:1940398, this option is no longer needed. Recovery requests are not cleared until kernel verification stage is reached. If the FSP triggers any reboots, recovery requests will be preserved. In particular: - Manual requests will be preserved via recovery switch state, whose behaviour is modified in CB:38779. - Other recovery requests will remain in nvdata across reboot. These functions now only work after verstage has run: int vboot_check_recovery_request(void) int vboot_recovery_mode_enabled(void) int vboot_developer_mode_enabled(void) BUG=b:124141368, b:35576380 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I52d17a3c6730be5c04c3c0ae020368d11db6ca3c Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38780 Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-02-17vboot: push clear recovery mode switch until BS_WRITE_TABLESJoel Kitching
Serves two purposes: (1) On some platforms, FSP initialization may cause a reboot. Push clearing the recovery mode switch until after FSP code runs, so that a manual recovery request (three-finger salute) will function correctly under this condition. (2) The recovery mode switch value is needed at BS_WRITE_TABLES for adding an event to elog. (Previously this was done by stashing the value in CBMEM_ID_EC_HOSTEVENT.) BUG=b:124141368, b:35576380 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I30c02787c620b937e5a50a5ed94ac906e3112dad Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38779 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
2020-02-14vboot: fix up some includesJoel Kitching
These header files need to make use of vb2_shared_data. Remove the last vestiges of vboot1 data structures in coreboot. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:1038260 TEST=Build locally with CL:2054269 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: I61b27e33751c11aac9f8af261a75d83b003b5f92 Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38884 Reviewed-by: Hung-Te Lin <hungte@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-02-10vboot: correct workbuf size when VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGEJoel Kitching
Part of the design of vboot persistent context is that the workbuf gets placed in CBMEM and stays there for depthcharge to use in kernel verification. As such, the space allocated in CBMEM needs to be at least VB2_KERNEL_WORKBUF_RECOMMENDED_SIZE. In the VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGE case, prior to this CL, vboot_get_context() would get invoked for the first time after CBMEM comes up, and it would only allocate VB2_FIRMWARE_WORKBUF_RECOMMENDED_SIZE. Initialize the workbuf directly in vboot_setup_cbmem() instead with the correct VB2_KERNEL_WORKBUF_RECOMMENDED_SIZE. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:994060 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild TEST=boot on GOOGLE_EVE with VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGE set BRANCH=none Change-Id: Ie09c39f960b3f14f3a64c648eee6ca3f23214d9a Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38778 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Raul Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-02-07security/vboot: relocate vb2ex_abort and vb2ex_printfJoel Kitching
Enabling an assertion in vb2_member_of() results in coreboot linking vb2ex_abort() and vb2ex_printf() in ramstage. Move these two functions from vboot_logic.c to vboot_lib.c, which is should be enabled in all stages if CONFIG_VBOOT_LIB is enabled. Note that CONFIG_VBOOT_LIB is implied by CONFIG_VBOOT. Relevant vboot_reference commit: CL:2037263. BUG=b:124141368, chromium:1005700 TEST=make clean && make test-abuild BRANCH=none Change-Id: Ica0103c5684b3d50ba7dc1b4c39559cb192efa81 Signed-off-by: Joel Kitching <kitching@google.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38706 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@google.com>
2020-02-05vendorcode/eltan/security: Switch to vb2 vboot libraryWim Vervoorn
The eltan verified_boot is using the vboot 2.1 data structures and code, as well as the fwlib21 build target, they are all deprecated. Refer to CB:37654 for more information. The verified_boot code is updated to use the vb2 structures and code and make sure only public functions are used. BUG=N/A TEST=build Change-Id: I1e1a7bce6110fe35221a4d7a47c1eb7c7074c318 Signed-off-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38590 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Frans Hendriks <fhendriks@eltan.com>
2020-01-25vboot: Remove hard dependency on MISSING_BOARD_RESETJulius Werner
Having a working board reset is certainly better when you're running vboot (because otherwise you'll hang when transitioning into recovery mode), but I don't think it should be strictly required, since it's still somewhat usable without. This is particularly important for certain test platforms that don't have a good way to reset but might still be useful for vboot testing/prototyping. Change-Id: Ia765f54b6e2e176e2d54478fb1e0839d8cab9849 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38417 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
2020-01-18security/vboot: Allow UDC regardless of vboot stateWim Vervoorn
When a VBOOT enabled system is used without ChromeOS it may be valid to allow the UDC independent of the vboot state. Provide the option to always allow UDC when CHROMEOS is not selected. BUG=N/A TEST=build Change-Id: I6142c4a74ca6930457b16f62f32e1199b8baaff8 Signed-off-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38403 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Frans Hendriks <fhendriks@eltan.com> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2020-01-18cbfs: Remove locator conceptJulius Werner
When vboot was first integrated into CBFS it was still part of Google vendorcode. So to not directly tie custom vendorcode into the core CBFS library, the concept of cbfs_locator was introduced to decouple core code from an arbitrary amount of platform-specific implementations that want to decide where the CBFS can be found. Nowadays vboot is a core coreboot feature itself, and the locator concept isn't used by anything else anymore. This patch simplifies the code by removing it and just calling vboot from the CBFS library directly. That should make it easier to more closely integrate vboot into CBFS in the future. Change-Id: I7b9112adc7b53aa218c58b8cb5c85982dcc1dbc0 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38419 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
2020-01-10src/security: Fix typosElyes HAOUAS
Change-Id: I238fce2d48cf62003a701f972a87974415419538 Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38198 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-15 12:45:20 +0000