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Change-Id: I9031dad52581e77aa56014b1fede884f2cdeb6de
Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/49882
Reviewed-by: Felix Singer <felixsinger@posteo.net>
Reviewed-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
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This patch addresses the same problem as CB:48429, but hopefully this
time correctly. Since the mcache is not guaranteed to be available on
the first CBFS lookup for some special cases, we can no longer treat it
as a one-time fire-and-forget initialization. Instead, we test
cbd->mcache_size to check if the mcache has been initialized yet, and
keep trying on every lookup if we don't find it the first time.
Since the mcache is a hard requirement for TOCTOU safety, also make it
more clear in Kconfig that configurations known to do CBFS accesses
before CBMEM init are incompatbile with that, and make sure we die()
rather than do something unsafe if there's a case that Kconfig didn't
catch.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I4e01e9a9905f7dcba14eaf05168495201ed5de60
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/48482
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Christian Walter <christian.walter@9elements.com>
Reviewed-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com>
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This patch adds the first stage of the new CONFIG_CBFS_VERIFICATION
feature. It's not useful to end-users in this stage so it cannot be
selected in menuconfig (and should not be used other than for
development) yet. With this patch coreboot can verify the metadata hash
of the RO CBFS when it starts booting, but it does not verify individual
files yet. Likewise, verifying RW CBFSes with vboot is not yet
supported.
Verification is bootstrapped from a "metadata hash anchor" structure
that is embedded in the bootblock code and marked by a unique magic
number. This anchor contains both the CBFS metadata hash and a separate
hash for the FMAP which is required to find the primary CBFS. Both are
verified on first use in the bootblock (and halt the system on failure).
The CONFIG_TOCTOU_SAFETY option is also added for illustrative purposes
to show some paths that need to be different when full protection
against TOCTOU (time-of-check vs. time-of-use) attacks is desired. For
normal verification it is sufficient to check the FMAP and the CBFS
metadata hash only once in the bootblock -- for TOCTOU verification we
do the same, but we need to be extra careful that we do not re-read the
FMAP or any CBFS metadata in later stages. This is mostly achieved by
depending on the CBFS metadata cache and FMAP cache features, but we
allow for one edge case in case the RW CBFS metadata cache overflows
(which may happen during an RW update and could otherwise no longer be
fixed because mcache size is defined by RO code). This code is added to
demonstrate design intent but won't really matter until RW CBFS
verification can be supported.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I8930434de55eb938b042fdada9aa90218c0b5a34
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41120
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
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