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This patch introduces support signing and verification of firmware
slots using CBFS metadata hash verification method for faster initial
verification. To have complete verification, CBFS_VERIFICATION should
also be enabled, as metadata hash covers only files metadata, not their
contents.
This patch also adapts mainboards and SoCs to new vboot reset
requirements.
TEST=Google Volteer/Voxel boots with VBOOT_CBFS_INTEGRATION enabled
Signed-off-by: Jakub Czapiga <jacz@semihalf.com>
Change-Id: I40ae01c477c4e4f7a1c90e4026a8a868ae64b5ca
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/66909
Reviewed-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
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The header file `rules.h` is automatically included in the build by the
top level makefile using the command:
`-include src/soc/intel/common/block/scs/early_mmc.c`.
Similar to `config.h` and 'kconfig.h`, this file does not need to be
included manually, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <gaumless@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I23a1876b4b671d8565cf9b391d3babf800c074db
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/67348
Reviewed-by: Elyes Haouas <ehaouas@noos.fr>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
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CL:3825558 changes all vb2_digest and vb2_hash functions to take a new
hwcrypto_allowed argument, to potentially let them try to call the
vb2ex_hwcrypto API for hash calculation. This change will open hardware
crypto acceleration up to all hash calculations in coreboot (most
notably CBFS verification). As part of this change, the
vb2_digest_buffer() function has been removed, so replace existing
instances in coreboot with the newer vb2_hash_calculate() API.
Due to the circular dependency of these changes with vboot, this patch
also needs to update the vboot submodule:
Updating from commit id 18cb85b5:
2load_kernel.c: Expose load kernel as vb2_api
to commit id b827ddb9:
tests: Ensure auxfw sync runs after EC sync
This brings in 15 new commits.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I287d8dac3c49ad7ea3e18a015874ce8d610ec67e
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/66561
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Czapiga <jacz@semihalf.com>
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The ERROR() and LOG() macros both used BIOS_ERR as the error level.
The messages generated by the LOG() macro are informational items.
Change to BIOS_INFO to reflect that.
BUG=N/A
TEST=tested on facebook monolith
Change-Id: I3827a7d65a9d70045a36fb8db4b2c129e1045122
Signed-off-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52019
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Frans Hendriks <fhendriks@eltan.com>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
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This patch adds the first stage of the new CONFIG_CBFS_VERIFICATION
feature. It's not useful to end-users in this stage so it cannot be
selected in menuconfig (and should not be used other than for
development) yet. With this patch coreboot can verify the metadata hash
of the RO CBFS when it starts booting, but it does not verify individual
files yet. Likewise, verifying RW CBFSes with vboot is not yet
supported.
Verification is bootstrapped from a "metadata hash anchor" structure
that is embedded in the bootblock code and marked by a unique magic
number. This anchor contains both the CBFS metadata hash and a separate
hash for the FMAP which is required to find the primary CBFS. Both are
verified on first use in the bootblock (and halt the system on failure).
The CONFIG_TOCTOU_SAFETY option is also added for illustrative purposes
to show some paths that need to be different when full protection
against TOCTOU (time-of-check vs. time-of-use) attacks is desired. For
normal verification it is sufficient to check the FMAP and the CBFS
metadata hash only once in the bootblock -- for TOCTOU verification we
do the same, but we need to be extra careful that we do not re-read the
FMAP or any CBFS metadata in later stages. This is mostly achieved by
depending on the CBFS metadata cache and FMAP cache features, but we
allow for one edge case in case the RW CBFS metadata cache overflows
(which may happen during an RW update and could otherwise no longer be
fixed because mcache size is defined by RO code). This code is added to
demonstrate design intent but won't really matter until RW CBFS
verification can be supported.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I8930434de55eb938b042fdada9aa90218c0b5a34
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41120
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
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This patch hooks coreboot up to the new commonlib/bsd CBFS
implementation. This is intended as the "minimum viable patch" that
makes the new implementation useable with the smallest amount of changes
-- that is why some of this may look a bit roundabout (returning the
whole metadata for a file but then just using that to fill out the rdevs
of the existing struct cbfsf). Future changes will migrate the higher
level CBFS APIs one-by-one to use the new implementation directly
(rather than translated into the results of the old one), at which point
this will become more efficient.
Change-Id: I4d112d1239475920de2d872dac179c245275038d
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38422
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
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