security/tpm: Unify the coreboot TPM software stack

* Remove 2nd software stack in pc80 drivers directory.
* Create TSPI interface for common usage.
* Refactor TSS / TIS code base.
* Add vendor tss (Cr50) directory.
* Change kconfig options for TPM to TPM1.
* Add user / board configuration with:
  * MAINBOARD_HAS_*_TPM # * BUS driver
  * MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1 or MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
  * Add kconfig TPM user selection (e.g. pluggable TPMs)
* Fix existing headers and function calls.
* Fix vboot for interface usage and antirollback mode.

Change-Id: I7ec277e82a3c20c62a0548a1a2b013e6ce8f5b3f
Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin@das-labor.org>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/24903
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>

25 files changed, 952 insertions, 943 deletions

diff --git a/src/security/tpm/Kconfig b/src/security/tpm/Kconfig
index 111f91a5c1..e6414d385f 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/src/security/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 ## This file is part of the coreboot project.
 ##
-## Copyright (C) 2017 Philipp Deppenwiese, Facebook, Inc.
+## Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+## Copyright (C) 2018 Facebook Inc.
 ##
 ## This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 ## it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -12,58 +13,84 @@
 ## GNU General Public License for more details.
 ##
 
+source "src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Kconfig"
+
 menu "Trusted Platform Module"
 
-config TPM
+config TPM1
 	bool
-	default n
-	select LPC_TPM if MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
-	select I2C_TPM if !MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM && !SPI_TPM
-	help
-	  Enable this option to enable TPM support in coreboot.
-
-	  If unsure, say N.
+	default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1 || USER_TPM1
+	depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL
 
 config TPM2
 	bool
-	select LPC_TPM if MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
-	select I2C_TPM if !MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM && !SPI_TPM
+	default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2 || USER_TPM2
+	depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50 \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM_CR50
+
+config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1
+	bool
+
+config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
+	bool
+
+if !MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1 && !MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
+
+choice
+	prompt "Trusted Platform Module"
+	default USER_NO_TPM
+
+config USER_NO_TPM
+	bool "disabled"
+
+config USER_TPM1
+	bool "1.2"
+	depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL
 	help
-	  Enable this option to enable TPM2 support in coreboot.
+		Enable this option to enable TPM 1.0 - 1.2 support in coreboot.
 
-	  If unsure, say N.
+		If unsure, say N.
 
-config DEBUG_TPM
-	bool "Output verbose TPM debug messages"
-	default n
-	depends on TPM || TPM2
+config USER_TPM2
+	bool "2.0"
+	depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50 \
+						 || MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM_CR50
 	help
-	  This option enables additional TPM related debug messages.
+		Enable this option to enable TPM 2.0 support in coreboot.
 
-config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM_CR50
-	bool
-	default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM_CR50 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50
-	default n
-	select MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
-	select POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE if ARCH_X86
+		If unsure, say N.
 
-config POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE
-	bool
+endchoice
+
+endif
+
+config TPM_DEACTIVATE
+	bool "Deactivate TPM"
+	default n
+	depends on !VBOOT
+	depends on TPM1
 	help
-	  Power off machine while waiting for CR50 update to take effect.
+	  Deactivate TPM by issuing deactivate command.
 
-config MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
-	bool
+config DEBUG_TPM
+	bool "Output verbose TPM debug messages"
 	default n
+	select DRIVER_TPM_DISPLAY_TIS_BYTES if I2C_TPM
+	depends on TPM1 || TPM2
 	help
-	  Board has TPM support
+	  This option enables additional TPM related debug messages.
 
-config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
-	bool
+config TPM_RDRESP_NEED_DELAY
+	bool "Enable Delay Workaround for TPM"
 	default n
+	depends on LPC_TPM
 	help
-	  There is a TPM device installed on the mainboard, and it is
-	  compliant with version 2 TCG TPM specification. Could be connected
-	  over LPC, SPI or I2C.
+	  Certain TPMs seem to need some delay when reading response
+	  to work around a race-condition-related issue, possibly
+	  caused by ill-programmed TPM firmware.
 
 endmenu # Trusted Platform Module (tpm)
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
index 2385635f32..9157fec386 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,14 +1,45 @@
+subdirs-$(CONFIG_TPM_CR50) += tss/vendor/cr50
+
 ## TSS
 
-verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM) += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
-verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
-verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TPM1),y)
+
+ramstage-y += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+romstage-y += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+
+## TSPI
+
+ramstage-y += tspi/tspi.c
+romstage-y += tspi/tspi.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
+
+endif # CONFIG_TPM1
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TPM2),y)
+
+ramstage-y += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
+ramstage-y += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+
+romstage-y += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
+romstage-y += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+
+## TSPI
+
+ramstage-y += tspi/tspi.c
+romstage-y += tspi/tspi.c
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE),y)
-romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM) += tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
-romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
-romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
-endif # CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
+postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
 
-ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
-ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+endif # CONFIG_TPM2
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tis.h b/src/security/tpm/tis.h
index 6906ce33ec..c410838fc2 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tis.h
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tis.h
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ int tis_close(void);
 int tis_sendrecv(const u8 *sendbuf, size_t send_size, u8 *recvbuf,
 			size_t *recv_len);
 
-void init_tpm(int s3resume);
-
 /*
  * tis_plat_irq_status()
  *
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tspi.h b/src/security/tpm/tspi.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fdc9e1c187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tspi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018 Facebook Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TSPI_H_
+#define TSPI_H_
+
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+
+/**
+ * Ask vboot for a digest and extend a TPM PCR with it.
+ * @param pcr sets the pcr index
+ * @param digest sets the hash to extend into the tpm
+ * @param out_digest get extended hash
+ * @return TPM_SUCCESS on success. If not a tpm error is returned
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(int pcr, uint8_t *digest, uint8_t *out_digest);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a TPM_Clear and reenable/reactivate the TPM.
+ * @return TPM_SUCCESS on success. If not a tpm error is returned
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void);
+
+/**
+ * Start the TPM and establish the root of trust.
+ * @param s3flag tells the tpm setup if we wake up from a s3 state on x86
+ * @return TPM_SUCCESS on success. If not a tpm error is returned
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_setup(int s3flag);
+
+#endif /* TSPI_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c b/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..407e1fa1e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017 Facebook Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#include <console/cbmem_console.h>
+#include <console/console.h>
+#include <reset.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM1)
+static uint32_t tpm1_invoke_state_machine(void)
+{
+	uint8_t disable;
+	uint8_t deactivated;
+	uint32_t result = TPM_SUCCESS;
+
+	/* Check that the TPM is enabled and activated. */
+	result = tlcl_get_flags(&disable, &deactivated, NULL);
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't read capabilities.\n");
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	if (!!deactivated != IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM_DEACTIVATE)) {
+		printk(BIOS_INFO,
+		       "TPM: Unexpected TPM deactivated state. Toggling...\n");
+		result = tlcl_set_deactivated(!deactivated);
+		if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+			printk(BIOS_ERR,
+			       "TPM: Can't toggle deactivated state.\n");
+			return result;
+		}
+
+		deactivated = !deactivated;
+		result = TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
+	}
+
+	if (disable && !deactivated) {
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: disabled (%d). Enabling...\n", disable);
+
+		result = tlcl_set_enable();
+		if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
+			return result;
+		}
+
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Must reboot to re-enable\n");
+		result = TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
+	}
+
+	return result;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * tpm_setup starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the
+ * anti-rollback mechanism.  SetupTPM can fail for three reasons.  1 A bug. 2 a
+ * TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack.  In
+ * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is
+ * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases.  The recovery mode calls SetupTPM
+ * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations.  There is a
+ * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the
+ * failure will repeat itself.  (In general this is impossible to guarantee
+ * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the
+ * previous boot.)  In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus
+ * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set
+ * bGlobalLock).  The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a
+ * bricked device.
+ *
+ * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using
+ * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces.  We do this to avoid writing
+ * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about
+ * the durability of the NVRAM.
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_setup(int s3flag)
+{
+	uint32_t result;
+
+	result = tlcl_lib_init();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle special init for S3 resume path */
+	if (s3flag) {
+		result = tlcl_resume();
+		if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT)
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Already initialized.\n");
+
+		return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	result = tlcl_startup();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't run startup command.\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		/*
+		 * It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical
+		 * presence command disabled.  This tries enabling it, then
+		 * tries asserting PP again.
+		 */
+		result = tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable();
+		if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+			printk(
+			    BIOS_ERR,
+			    "TPM: Can't enable physical presence command.\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
+		if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+			printk(BIOS_ERR,
+			       "TPM: Can't assert physical presence.\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM1)
+	result = tpm1_invoke_state_machine();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
+		return result;
+#endif
+
+out:
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
+		post_code(POST_TPM_FAILURE);
+	else
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: setup succeeded\n");
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
+{
+	uint32_t result;
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
+	result = tlcl_force_clear();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initiate a force clear.\n");
+		return result;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM1)
+	result = tlcl_set_enable();
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	result = tlcl_set_deactivated(0);
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set deactivated state.\n");
+		return result;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(int pcr, uint8_t *digest, uint8_t *out_digest)
+{
+	if (!digest)
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+
+	if (out_digest)
+		return tlcl_extend(pcr, digest, out_digest);
+
+	return tlcl_extend(pcr, digest, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss.h b/src/security/tpm/tss.h
index 8f3f1cbff5..c053df960e 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss.h
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss.h
@@ -11,13 +11,70 @@
 
 #ifndef TSS_H_
 #define TSS_H_
+
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <types.h>
 
-#include "tss_constants.h"
+#include <security/tpm/tss/common/tss_common.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss_errors.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM1)
+
+#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h>
+
+/**
+ * Define a space with permission [perm]. [index] is the index for the space,
+ * [size] the usable data size. The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a PhysicalEnable. The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a SetDeactivated. Pass 0 to activate. Returns result code.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag);
+
+/**
+ * Get flags of interest. Pointers for flags you aren't interested in may
+ * be NULL. The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
+			uint8_t *nvlocked);
+
+/**
+ * Get the entire set of permanent flags.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags);
+
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM2)
+
+#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define a TPM2 space. The define space command TPM command used by the tlcl
+ * layer offers the ability to use custom nv attributes and policies.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size,
+			   const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
+			   const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size);
+
+/*
+ * Makes tpm_process_command available for on top implementations of
+ * custom tpm standards like cr50
+ */
+void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body);
+
+#endif
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
-/* Functions implemented in tlcl.c */
+/* Generic Functions implemented in tlcl.c */
 
 /**
  * Call this first.  Returns 0 if success, nonzero if error.
@@ -57,23 +114,6 @@ uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void);
  */
 uint32_t tlcl_continue_self_test(void);
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM)
-/**
- * Define a space with permission [perm].  [index] is the index for the space,
- * [size] the usable data size.  The TPM error code is returned.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size);
-
-#elif IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM2)
-
-/*
- * Define a TPM space. The define space command TPM command used by the tlcl
- * layer is enforcing the policy which would not allow to delete the created
- * space after any PCR0 change from its initial value.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size);
-#endif
-
 /**
  * Write [length] bytes of [data] to space at [index].  The TPM error code is
  * returned.
@@ -113,23 +153,6 @@ uint32_t tlcl_set_nv_locked(void);
 uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void);
 
 /**
- * Issue a PhysicalEnable.  The TPM error code is returned.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void);
-
-/**
- * Issue a SetDeactivated.  Pass 0 to activate.  Returns result code.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag);
-
-/**
- * Get flags of interest.  Pointers for flags you aren't interested in may
- * be NULL.  The TPM error code is returned.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
-			uint8_t *nvlocked);
-
-/**
  * Set the bGlobalLock flag, which only a reboot can clear.  The TPM error
  * code is returned.
  */
@@ -147,31 +170,8 @@ uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
 		     uint8_t *out_digest);
 
 /**
- * Get the entire set of permanent flags.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags);
-
-/**
  * Disable platform hierarchy. Specific to TPM2. The TPM error code is returned.
  */
 uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void);
 
-/**
- * CR50 specific tpm command to enable nvmem commits before internal timeout
- * expires.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void);
-
-/**
- * CR50 specific tpm command to restore header(s) of the dormant RO/RW
- * image(s) and in case there indeed was a dormant image, trigger reboot after
- * the timeout milliseconds. Note that timeout of zero means "NO REBOOT", not
- * "IMMEDIATE REBOOT".
- *
- * Return value indicates success or failure of accessing the TPM; in case of
- * success the number of restored headers is saved in num_restored_headers.
- */
-uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
-				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers);
-
-#endif  /* TSS_H_ */
+#endif /* TSS_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/common/tss_common.h b/src/security/tpm/tss/common/tss_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0cb8d86231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/common/tss_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018 Facebook Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TCG_TSS_COMMON_H_
+#define TCG_TSS_COMMON_H_
+
+#define TPM_PCR_MINIMUM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_SUCCESS ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
+
+#endif /* TCG_TSS_COMMON_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
index 161d29f781..0cb7eaa819 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
 #include <security/tpm/tis.h>
 #include <vb2_api.h>
 #include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+
 #include "tss_internal.h"
-#include "tss_structures.h"
+#include "tss_commands.h"
 
 #ifdef FOR_TEST
 #include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_commands.h b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_commands.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d30bfc2a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_commands.h
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018 Facebook Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+const struct s_tpm_extend_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[34];
+	uint16_t pcrNum;
+	uint16_t inDigest;
+} tpm_extend_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14, },
+10, 14, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_get_random_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[14];
+	uint16_t bytesRequested;
+} tpm_get_random_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x46, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_getownership_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getownership_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x11, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_getpermissions_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+	uint16_t index;
+} tpm_getpermissions_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, },
+18, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_getstclearflags_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getstclearflags_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x9, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_getflags_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getflags_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x8, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[11];
+	uint16_t deactivated;
+} tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicalenable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_physicalenable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicaldisable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_physicaldisable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_forceclear_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_forceclear_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_readpubek_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[30];
+} tpm_readpubek_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_continueselftest_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_continueselftest_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_selftestfull_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_selftestfull_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_resume_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_resume_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x2, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_savestate_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_savestate_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x98, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_startup_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_startup_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x1, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_finalizepp_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_finalizepp_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x2, 0xa0, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_pplock_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_pplock_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x4, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_ppenable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_ppenable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x20, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_ppassert_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_ppassert_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x8, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_pcr_read_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[14];
+	uint16_t pcrNum;
+} tpm_pcr_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_read_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t length;
+} tpm_nv_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf, },
+10, 18, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_write_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[256];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t length;
+	uint16_t data;
+} tpm_nv_write_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd, },
+10, 18, 22, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_definespace_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[101];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t perm;
+	uint16_t size;
+} tpm_nv_definespace_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc,
+	0x0, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x17,
+	},
+	12, 70, 77,
+};
+
+const int kWriteInfoLength = 12;
+const int kNvDataPublicPermissionsOffset = 60;
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h
index 880864ee50..50fa3fbf0c 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h
@@ -1,164 +1,69 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated */
-
-const struct s_tpm_extend_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[34];
-	uint16_t pcrNum;
-	uint16_t inDigest;
-} tpm_extend_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14, },
-10, 14, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_get_random_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[14];
-	uint16_t bytesRequested;
-} tpm_get_random_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x46, },
-10, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_getownership_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[22];
-} tpm_getownership_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
-	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x11, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_getpermissions_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[22];
-	uint16_t index;
-} tpm_getpermissions_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
-	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, },
-18, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_getstclearflags_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[22];
-} tpm_getstclearflags_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
-	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x9, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_getflags_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[22];
-} tpm_getflags_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
-	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x8, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[11];
-	uint16_t deactivated;
-} tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72, },
-10, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_physicalenable_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_physicalenable_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_physicaldisable_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_physicaldisable_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_forceclear_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_forceclear_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_readpubek_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[30];
-} tpm_readpubek_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_continueselftest_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_continueselftest_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_selftestfull_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_selftestfull_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_resume_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_resume_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x2, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_savestate_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[10];
-} tpm_savestate_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x98, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_startup_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_startup_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x1, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_finalizepp_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_finalizepp_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x2, 0xa0, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_pplock_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_pplock_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x4, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_ppenable_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_ppenable_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x20, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_ppassert_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[12];
-} tpm_ppassert_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x8, },
-};
-
-const struct s_tpm_pcr_read_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[14];
-	uint16_t pcrNum;
-} tpm_pcr_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15, },
-10, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_nv_read_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[22];
-	uint16_t index;
-	uint16_t length;
-} tpm_nv_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf, },
-10, 18, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_nv_write_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[256];
-	uint16_t index;
-	uint16_t length;
-	uint16_t data;
-} tpm_nv_write_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd, },
-10, 18, 22, };
-
-const struct s_tpm_nv_definespace_cmd{
-	uint8_t buffer[101];
-	uint16_t index;
-	uint16_t perm;
-	uint16_t size;
-} tpm_nv_definespace_cmd = {
-	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc,
-	0x0, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x17,
-	},
-	12, 70, 77,
-};
-
-const int kWriteInfoLength = 12;
-const int kNvDataPublicPermissionsOffset = 60;
+/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ *
+ * Some TPM constants and type definitions for standalone compilation for use
+ * in the firmware
+ */
+#ifndef TCG1_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_
+#define TCG1_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "../common/tss_common.h"
+
+#define TPM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE 4096
+#define TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE 256  /* saves space in the firmware */
+#define TPM_PUBEK_SIZE 256
+
+#define TPM_NV_INDEX0 ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
+#define TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK ((uint32_t)0xffffffff)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK (((uint32_t)1)<<15)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE (((uint32_t)1)<<0)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<31)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<14)
+
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc1)
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc2)
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc3)
+
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc4)
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc5)
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc6)
+
+typedef uint8_t TSS_BOOL;
+typedef uint16_t TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG;
+
+typedef struct tdTPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS {
+	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
+	TSS_BOOL disable;
+	TSS_BOOL ownership;
+	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
+	TSS_BOOL readPubek;
+	TSS_BOOL disableOwnerClear;
+	TSS_BOOL allowMaintenance;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceHWEnable;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
+	TSS_BOOL CEKPUsed;
+	TSS_BOOL TPMpost;
+	TSS_BOOL TPMpostLock;
+	TSS_BOOL FIPS;
+	TSS_BOOL Operator;
+	TSS_BOOL enableRevokeEK;
+	TSS_BOOL nvLocked;
+	TSS_BOOL readSRKPub;
+	TSS_BOOL tpmEstablished;
+	TSS_BOOL maintenanceDone;
+	TSS_BOOL disableFullDALogicInfo;
+} TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS;
+
+typedef struct tdTPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS {
+	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
+	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
+	TSS_BOOL disableForceClear;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresence;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLock;
+	TSS_BOOL bGlobalLock;
+} TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS;
+
+#endif  /* TCG1_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
index cde9ea2946..7db746f4e1 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <vb2_api.h>
 #include <security/tpm/tis.h>
-#include <security/tpm/antirollback.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
 
 #include "tss_structures.h"
 #include "tss_marshaling.h"
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
  * TPM2 specification.
  */
 
-static void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body)
+void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body)
 {
 	struct obuf ob;
 	struct ibuf ib;
@@ -53,13 +53,6 @@ static void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body)
 	return tpm_unmarshal_response(command, &ib);
 }
 
-
-uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags)
-{
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 static uint32_t tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU type)
 {
 	struct tpm2_startup startup;
@@ -139,30 +132,6 @@ uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void)
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
-			uint8_t *nvlocked)
-{
-	/*
-	 * TPM2 does not map directly into these flags TPM1.2 based firmware
-	 * expects to be able to retrieve.
-	 *
-	 * In any case, if any of these conditions are present, the following
-	 * firmware flow would be interrupted and will have a chance to report
-	 * an error. Let's just hardcode an "All OK" response for now.
-	 */
-
-	if (disable)
-		*disable = 0;
-
-	if (nvlocked)
-		*nvlocked = 1;
-
-	if (deactivated)
-		*deactivated = 0;
-
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 static uint8_t tlcl_init_done CAR_GLOBAL;
 
 /* This function is called directly by vboot, uses vboot return types. */
@@ -247,18 +216,6 @@ uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void)
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag)
-{
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void)
-{
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 uint32_t tlcl_lock_nv_write(uint32_t index)
 {
 	struct tpm2_response *response;
@@ -306,29 +263,12 @@ uint32_t tlcl_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size)
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size,
+			   const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
+			   const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
 {
 	struct tpm2_nv_define_space_cmd nvds_cmd;
 	struct tpm2_response *response;
-	/*
-	 * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
-	 * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
-	 * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
-	 */
-	const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
-		.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
-	};
-	const TPMA_NV default_space_attributes = {
-		.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
-		.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
-	};
 
 	/* Prepare the define space command structure. */
 	memset(&nvds_cmd, 0, sizeof(nvds_cmd));
@@ -336,37 +276,21 @@ uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size)
 	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.dataSize = space_size;
 	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + space_index;
 	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nameAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = nv_attributes;
 
-	/* RO only NV spaces should be impossible to destroy. */
-	if ((space_index == FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX) ||
-	    (space_index == REC_HASH_NV_INDEX)) {
-		/*
-		 * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyPCR
-		 * selecting only PCR_0 with a value of all zeros.
-		 */
-		const uint8_t pcr0_unchanged_policy[] = {
-			0x09, 0x93, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0xEB, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x11,
-			0x18, 0x81, 0x1D, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x78, 0x80, 0x08,
-			0x88, 0x86, 0x62, 0x2D, 0xD7, 0x79, 0x94, 0x46,
-			0x62, 0x26, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x6A, 0xA1
-		};
-
-		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = ro_space_attributes;
-		/*
-		 * Use policy digest based on default pcr0 value. This makes
-		 * sure that the space can not be deleted as soon as PCR0
-		 * value has been extended from default.
-		 */
-		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.buffer = pcr0_unchanged_policy;
-		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.size =
-			sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy);
-	} else {
-		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = default_space_attributes;
+	/*
+	 * Use policy digest based on default pcr0 value. This makes
+	 * sure that the space can not be deleted as soon as PCR0
+	 * value has been extended from default.
+	 */
+	if (nv_policy && nv_policy_size) {
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.buffer = nv_policy;
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.size = nv_policy_size;
 	}
 
 	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_DefineSpace, &nvds_cmd);
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
-	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n", __func__,
+	       response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
 
 	if (!response)
 		return TPM_E_NO_DEVICE;
@@ -397,42 +321,3 @@ uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void)
 
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
-
-uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void)
-{
-	uint16_t sub_command = TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS;
-	struct tpm2_response *response;
-
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Enabling cr50 nvmem commmits\n");
-
-	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, &sub_command);
-
-	if (response == NULL || (response && response->hdr.tpm_code)) {
-		if (response)
-			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed %x\n", __func__,
-				response->hdr.tpm_code);
-		else
-			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed\n", __func__);
-		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
-	}
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
-				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers)
-{
-	struct tpm2_response *response;
-	uint16_t command_body[] = {
-		TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON, timeout_ms
-	};
-
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Checking cr50 for pending updates\n");
-
-	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, command_body);
-
-	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
-		return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
-
-	*num_restored_headers = response->vcr.num_restored_headers;
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
index b1d666362b..86f2231c3f 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include "tss_marshaling.h"
+#include <security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h>
 
 static uint16_t tpm_tag CAR_GLOBAL;  /* Depends on the command type. */
 
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h
index 962e20ca8f..11fb71484c 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-2.0/tss_structures.h
@@ -14,16 +14,18 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <compiler.h>
 #include <types.h>
-
-#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include "../common/tss_common.h"
 
 /* This should be plenty for what firmware needs. */
 #define TPM_BUFFER_SIZE 256
 
+/* Some TPM2 return codes used in this library. */
+#define TPM2_RC_SUCCESS    0
+#define TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED 0x14c
+
 /* Basic TPM2 types. */
 typedef uint16_t TPM_SU;
 typedef uint16_t TPM_ALG_ID;
-typedef uint32_t TPM_CC;
 typedef uint32_t TPM_HANDLE;
 typedef uint32_t TPM_RC;
 typedef uint8_t TPMI_YES_NO;
@@ -47,6 +49,8 @@ typedef TPM_HANDLE TPM_RH;
 #define TPM_RS_PW           0x40000009
 #define TPM_RH_PLATFORM     0x4000000C
 
+typedef uint32_t TPM_CC;
+
 typedef struct {
 	uint16_t      size;
 	uint8_t       *buffer;
@@ -74,13 +78,6 @@ struct tpm_header {
 /* TPM2 specifies vendor commands need to have this bit set. Vendor command
    space is defined by the lower 16 bits. */
 #define TPM_CC_VENDOR_BIT_MASK 0x20000000
-/* FIXME: below is not enough to differentiate between vendors commands
-   of numerous devices. However, the current tpm2 APIs aren't very amenable
-   to extending generically because the marshaling code is assuming all
-   knowledge of all commands. */
-#define TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND ((TPM_CC)(TPM_CC_VENDOR_BIT_MASK | 0))
-#define  TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS (21)
-#define  TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON (24)
 
 /* Startup values. */
 #define TPM_SU_CLEAR 0
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Kconfig b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d40c08da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+## This file is part of the coreboot project.
+##
+## Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+## Copyright (C) 2018 Facebook, Inc.
+##
+## This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+## it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+## the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+##
+## This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+## but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+## MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+## GNU General Public License for more details.
+##
+
+config TPM_CR50
+	bool
+	default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50 || MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM_CR50
+	select POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE if ARCH_X86
+
+if TPM_CR50
+
+config POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Power off machine while waiting for CR50 update to take effect.
+
+endif
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Makefile.inc b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Makefile.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8bacafd023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Makefile.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+ramstage-y += cr50.c
+romstage-y += cr50.c
+postcar-y += cr50.c
+
+verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += cr50.c
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90f796379c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+#include <arch/early_variables.h>
+#include <console/console.h>
+#include <endian.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tis.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+
+#include "../../tcg-2.0/tss_marshaling.h"
+
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void)
+{
+	uint16_t sub_command = TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Enabling cr50 nvmem commmits\n");
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, &sub_command);
+
+	if (response == NULL || (response && response->hdr.tpm_code)) {
+		if (response)
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed %x\n", __func__,
+				response->hdr.tpm_code);
+		else
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed\n", __func__);
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+	}
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
+				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers)
+{
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+	uint16_t command_body[] = {
+		TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON, timeout_ms
+	};
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Checking cr50 for pending updates\n");
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, command_body);
+
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
+
+	*num_restored_headers = response->vcr.num_restored_headers;
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9bf3bd5f79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/cr50.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018 Facebook Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+#ifndef CR50_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_
+#define CR50_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* FIXME: below is not enough to differentiate between vendors commands
+   of numerous devices. However, the current tpm2 APIs aren't very amenable
+   to extending generically because the marshaling code is assuming all
+   knowledge of all commands. */
+#define TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND ((TPM_CC)(TPM_CC_VENDOR_BIT_MASK | 0))
+#define TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS (21)
+#define TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON (24)
+
+/**
+ * CR50 specific tpm command to enable nvmem commits before internal timeout
+ * expires.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void);
+
+/**
+ * CR50 specific tpm command to restore header(s) of the dormant RO/RW
+ * image(s) and in case there indeed was a dormant image, trigger reboot after
+ * the timeout milliseconds. Note that timeout of zero means "NO REBOOT", not
+ * "IMMEDIATE REBOOT".
+ *
+ * Return value indicates success or failure of accessing the TPM; in case of
+ * success the number of restored headers is saved in num_restored_headers.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
+				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers);
+
+#endif /* CR50_TSS_STRUCTURES_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h b/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 937e553969..0000000000
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
- * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
- * found in the LICENSE file.
- *
- * Some TPM constants and type definitions for standalone compilation for use
- * in the firmware
- */
-#ifndef VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_
-#define VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#define TPM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE 4096
-#define TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE 256  /* saves space in the firmware */
-#define TPM_PUBEK_SIZE 256
-#define TPM_PCR_DIGEST 20
-
-#define TPM_E_NON_FATAL 0x800
-
-#define TPM_SUCCESS ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
-
-#define TPM_E_AREA_LOCKED           ((uint32_t)0x0000003c)
-#define TPM_E_BADINDEX              ((uint32_t)0x00000002)
-#define TPM_E_BAD_PRESENCE          ((uint32_t)0x0000002d)
-#define TPM_E_IOERROR               ((uint32_t)0x0000001f)
-#define TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT      ((uint32_t)0x00000026)
-#define TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES           ((uint32_t)0x00000048)
-#define TPM_E_OWNER_SET             ((uint32_t)0x00000014)
-
-#define TPM_E_NEEDS_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 1))
-#define TPM_E_DOING_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 2))
-
-#define TPM_E_ALREADY_INITIALIZED    ((uint32_t)0x00005000)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY ((uint32_t)0x00005001)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT            ((uint32_t)0x00005002)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE        ((uint32_t)0x00005003)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_COMMUNICATION_ERROR    ((uint32_t)0x00005004)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE     ((uint32_t)0x00005005)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_NO_DEVICE              ((uint32_t)0x00005006)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_INPUT_TOO_SMALL        ((uint32_t)0x00005007)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE          ((uint32_t)0x00005008)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_READ_EMPTY             ((uint32_t)0x00005009)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_READ_FAILURE           ((uint32_t)0x0000500a)  /* vboot local */
-#define TPM_E_NV_DEFINED             ((uint32_t)0x0000500b)  /* vboot local */
-
-#define TPM_NV_INDEX0 ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
-#define TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK ((uint32_t)0xffffffff)
-#define TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK (((uint32_t)1)<<15)
-#define TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE (((uint32_t)1)<<0)
-#define TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<31)
-#define TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<14)
-
-#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc1)
-#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc2)
-#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc3)
-
-#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc4)
-#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc5)
-#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc6)
-
-/* Some TPM2 return codes used in this library. */
-#define TPM2_RC_SUCCESS    0
-#define TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED 0x14c
-
-typedef uint8_t TSS_BOOL;
-typedef uint16_t TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG;
-
-typedef struct tdTPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS {
-	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
-	TSS_BOOL disable;
-	TSS_BOOL ownership;
-	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
-	TSS_BOOL readPubek;
-	TSS_BOOL disableOwnerClear;
-	TSS_BOOL allowMaintenance;
-	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
-	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceHWEnable;
-	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
-	TSS_BOOL CEKPUsed;
-	TSS_BOOL TPMpost;
-	TSS_BOOL TPMpostLock;
-	TSS_BOOL FIPS;
-	TSS_BOOL Operator;
-	TSS_BOOL enableRevokeEK;
-	TSS_BOOL nvLocked;
-	TSS_BOOL readSRKPub;
-	TSS_BOOL tpmEstablished;
-	TSS_BOOL maintenanceDone;
-	TSS_BOOL disableFullDALogicInfo;
-} TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS;
-
-typedef struct tdTPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS {
-	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
-	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
-	TSS_BOOL disableForceClear;
-	TSS_BOOL physicalPresence;
-	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLock;
-	TSS_BOOL bGlobalLock;
-} TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS;
-
-#endif  /* VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss_error_messages.h b/src/security/tpm/tss_error_messages.h
deleted file mode 100644
index d5978609c7..0000000000
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss_error_messages.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
- * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
- * found in the LICENSE file.
- */
-
-/* TPM error codes.
- *
- * Copy-pasted and lightly edited from TCG TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures
- * Version 1.2 Level 2 Revision 103 26 October 2006 Draft.
- */
-
-#ifndef TSS_ERROR_MESSAGES_H_
-#define TSS_ERROR_MESSAGES_H_
-
-#define TPM_E_BASE 0x0
-#define TPM_E_NON_FATAL 0x800
-
-typedef struct tpm_error_info {
-	const char *name;
-	uint32_t code;
-	const char *description;
-} tpm_error_info;
-
-tpm_error_info tpm_error_table[] = {
-	{"TPM_AUTHFAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 1,
-	 "Authentication failed"},
-	{"TPM_BADINDEX", TPM_E_BASE + 2,
-	 "The index to a PCR, DIR or other register is incorrect"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_PARAMETER", TPM_E_BASE + 3,
-	 "One or more parameter is bad"},
-	{"TPM_AUDITFAILURE", TPM_E_BASE + 4,
-	 "An operation completed successfully\n\
-but the auditing of that operation failed"},
-	{"TPM_CLEAR_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 5,
-	 "The clear disable flag is set and all clear operations now require\n\
-physical access"},
-	{"TPM_DEACTIVATED", TPM_E_BASE + 6,
-	 "The TPM is deactivated"},
-	{"TPM_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 7,
-	 "The TPM is disabled"},
-	{"TPM_DISABLED_CMD", TPM_E_BASE + 8,
-	 "The target command has been disabled"},
-	{"TPM_FAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 9,
-	 "The operation failed"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_ORDINAL", TPM_E_BASE + 10,
-	 "The ordinal was unknown or inconsistent"},
-	{"TPM_INSTALL_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 11,
-	 "The ability to install an owner is disabled"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_KEYHANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 12,
-	 "The key handle can not be interpreted"},
-	{"TPM_KEYNOTFOUND", TPM_E_BASE + 13,
-	 "The key handle points to an invalid key"},
-	{"TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC", TPM_E_BASE + 14,
-	 "Unacceptable encryption scheme"},
-	{"TPM_MIGRATEFAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 15,
-	 "Migration authorization failed"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO", TPM_E_BASE + 16,
-	 "PCR information could not be interpreted"},
-	{"TPM_NOSPACE", TPM_E_BASE + 17,
-	 "No room to load key"},
-	{"TPM_NOSRK", TPM_E_BASE + 18,
-	 "There is no SRK set"},
-	{"TPM_NOTSEALED_BLOB", TPM_E_BASE + 19,
-	 "An encrypted blob is invalid or was not created by this TPM"},
-	{"TPM_OWNER_SET", TPM_E_BASE + 20,
-	 "There is already an Owner"},
-	{"TPM_RESOURCES", TPM_E_BASE + 21,
-	 "The TPM has insufficient internal resources to perform the requested \
-action"},
-	{"TPM_SHORTRANDOM", TPM_E_BASE + 22,
-	 "A random string was too short"},
-	{"TPM_SIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 23,
-	 "The TPM does not have the space to perform the operation"},
-	{"TPM_WRONGPCRVAL", TPM_E_BASE + 24,
-	 "The named PCR value does not match the current PCR value"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 25,
-	 "The paramSize argument to the command has the incorrect value"},
-	{"TPM_SHA_THREAD", TPM_E_BASE + 26,
-	 "There is no existing SHA-1 thread"},
-	{"TPM_SHA_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 27,
-	 "The calculation is unable to proceed because the existing SHA-1\n\
-thread has already encountered an error"},
-	{"TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + 28,
-	 "Self-test has failed and the TPM has shutdown"},
-	{"TPM_AUTH2FAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 29,
-	 "The authorization for the second key in a 2 key function\n\
-failed authorization"},
-	{"TPM_BADTAG", TPM_E_BASE + 30,
-	 "The tag value sent to for a command is invalid"},
-	{"TPM_IOERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 31,
-	 "An IO error occurred transmitting information to the TPM"},
-	{"TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 32,
-	 "The encryption process had a problem"},
-	{"TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 33,
-	 "The decryption process did not complete"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 34,
-	 "An invalid handle was used"},
-	{"TPM_NO_ENDORSEMENT", TPM_E_BASE + 35,
-	 "The TPM does not a EK installed"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE", TPM_E_BASE + 36,
-	 "The usage of a key is not allowed"},
-	{"TPM_WRONG_ENTITYTYPE", TPM_E_BASE + 37,
-	 "The submitted entity type is not allowed"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_POSTINIT", TPM_E_BASE + 38,
-	 "The command was received in the wrong sequence relative to TPM_Init\n\
-and a subsequent TPM_Startup"},
-	{"TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_SIG", TPM_E_BASE + 39,
-	 "Signed data cannot include additional DER information"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY", TPM_E_BASE + 40,
-	 "The key properties in TPM_KEY_PARMs are not supported by this TPM"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_MIGRATION", TPM_E_BASE + 41,
-	 "The migration properties of this key are incorrect"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_SCHEME", TPM_E_BASE + 42,
-	 "The signature or encryption scheme for this key is incorrect or not\n\
-permitted in this situation"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_DATASIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 43,
-	 "The size of the data (or blob) parameter is bad or inconsistent\n\
-with the referenced key"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_MODE", TPM_E_BASE + 44,
-	 "A mode parameter is bad, such as capArea or subCapArea for\n\
-TPM_GetCapability, physicalPresence parameter for TPM_PhysicalPresence,\n\
-or migrationType for, TPM_CreateMigrationBlob"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_PRESENCE", TPM_E_BASE + 45,
-	 "Either the physicalPresence or physicalPresenceLock bits\n\
-have the wrong value"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_VERSION", TPM_E_BASE + 46,
-	 "The TPM cannot perform this version of the capability"},
-	{"TPM_NO_WRAP_TRANSPORT", TPM_E_BASE + 47,
-	 "The TPM does not allow for wrapped transport sessions"},
-	{"TPM_AUDITFAIL_UNSUCCESSFUL", TPM_E_BASE + 48,
-	 "TPM audit construction failed and the underlying command\n\
-was returning a failure code also"},
-	{"TPM_AUDITFAIL_SUCCESSFUL", TPM_E_BASE + 49,
-	 "TPM audit construction failed and the underlying command\n\
-was returning success"},
-	{"TPM_NOTRESETABLE", TPM_E_BASE + 50,
-	 "Attempt to reset a PCR register that does not have the resettable \
-attribute"},
-	{"TPM_NOTLOCAL", TPM_E_BASE + 51,
-	 "Attempt to reset a PCR register that requires locality\n\
-and locality modifier not part of command transport"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_TYPE", TPM_E_BASE + 52,
-	 "Make identity blob not properly typed"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_RESOURCE", TPM_E_BASE + 53,
-	 "When saving context identified resource type does not match actual \
-resource"},
-	{"TPM_NOTFIPS", TPM_E_BASE + 54,
-	 "The TPM is attempting to execute a command only available when in \
-FIPS mode"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_FAMILY", TPM_E_BASE + 55,
-	 "The command is attempting to use an invalid family ID"},
-	{"TPM_NO_NV_PERMISSION", TPM_E_BASE + 56,
-	 "The permission to manipulate the NV storage is not available"},
-	{"TPM_REQUIRES_SIGN", TPM_E_BASE + 57,
-	 "The operation requires a signed command"},
-	{"TPM_KEY_NOTSUPPORTED", TPM_E_BASE + 58,
-	 "Wrong operation to load an NV key"},
-	{"TPM_AUTH_CONFLICT", TPM_E_BASE + 59,
-	 "NV_LoadKey blob requires both owner and blob authorization"},
-	{"TPM_AREA_LOCKED", TPM_E_BASE + 60,
-	 "The NV area is locked and not writable"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_LOCALITY", TPM_E_BASE + 61,
-	 "The locality is incorrect for the attempted operation"},
-	{"TPM_READ_ONLY", TPM_E_BASE + 62,
-	 "The NV area is read only and can't be written to"},
-	{"TPM_PER_NOWRITE", TPM_E_BASE + 63,
-	 "There is no protection on the write to the NV area"},
-	{"TPM_FAMILYCOUNT", TPM_E_BASE + 64,
-	 "The family count value does not match"},
-	{"TPM_WRITE_LOCKED", TPM_E_BASE + 65,
-	 "The NV area has already been written to"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_ATTRIBUTES", TPM_E_BASE + 66,
-	 "The NV area attributes conflict"},
-	{"TPM_INVALID_STRUCTURE", TPM_E_BASE + 67,
-	 "The structure tag and version are invalid or inconsistent"},
-	{"TPM_KEY_OWNER_CONTROL", TPM_E_BASE + 68,
-	 "The key is under control of the TPM Owner and can only be evicted\n\
-by the TPM Owner"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_COUNTER", TPM_E_BASE + 69,
-	 "The counter handle is incorrect"},
-	{"TPM_NOT_FULLWRITE", TPM_E_BASE + 70,
-	 "The write is not a complete write of the area"},
-	{"TPM_CONTEXT_GAP", TPM_E_BASE + 71,
-	 "The gap between saved context counts is too large"},
-	{"TPM_MAXNVWRITES", TPM_E_BASE + 72,
-	 "The maximum number of NV writes without an owner has been exceeded"},
-	{"TPM_NOOPERATOR", TPM_E_BASE + 73,
-	 "No operator AuthData value is set"},
-	{"TPM_RESOURCEMISSING", TPM_E_BASE + 74,
-	 "The resource pointed to by context is not loaded"},
-	{"TPM_DELEGATE_LOCK", TPM_E_BASE + 75,
-	 "The delegate administration is locked"},
-	{"TPM_DELEGATE_FAMILY", TPM_E_BASE + 76,
-	 "Attempt to manage a family other then the delegated family"},
-	{"TPM_DELEGATE_ADMIN", TPM_E_BASE + 77,
-	 "Delegation table management not enabled"},
-	{"TPM_TRANSPORT_NOTEXCLUSIVE", TPM_E_BASE + 78,
-	 "There was a command executed outside of an exclusive transport \
-session"},
-	{"TPM_OWNER_CONTROL", TPM_E_BASE + 79,
-	 "Attempt to context save a owner evict controlled key"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_RESOURCES", TPM_E_BASE + 80,
-	 "The DAA command has no resources available to execute the command"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA0", TPM_E_BASE + 81,
-	 "The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData0 has failed"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA1", TPM_E_BASE + 82,
-	 "The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData1 has failed"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_ISSUER_SETTINGS", TPM_E_BASE + 83,
-	 "The consistency check on DAA_issuerSettings has failed"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_TPM_SETTINGS", TPM_E_BASE + 84,
-	 "The consistency check on DAA_tpmSpecific has failed"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_STAGE", TPM_E_BASE + 85,
-	 "The atomic process indicated by the submitted DAA command is not\n\
-the expected process"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_ISSUER_VALIDITY", TPM_E_BASE + 86,
-	 "The issuer's validity check has detected an inconsistency"},
-	{"TPM_DAA_WRONG_W", TPM_E_BASE + 87,
-	 "The consistency check on w has failed"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_HANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 88,
-	 "The handle is incorrect"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_DELEGATE", TPM_E_BASE + 89,
-	 "Delegation is not correct"},
-	{"TPM_BADCONTEXT", TPM_E_BASE + 90,
-	 "The context blob is invalid"},
-	{"TPM_TOOMANYCONTEXTS", TPM_E_BASE + 91,
-	 "Too many contexts held by the TPM"},
-	{"TPM_MA_TICKET_SIGNATURE", TPM_E_BASE + 92,
-	 "Migration authority signature validation failure"},
-	{"TPM_MA_DESTINATION", TPM_E_BASE + 93,
-	 "Migration destination not authenticated"},
-	{"TPM_MA_SOURCE", TPM_E_BASE + 94,
-	 "Migration source incorrect"},
-	{"TPM_MA_AUTHORITY", TPM_E_BASE + 95,
-	 "Incorrect migration authority"},
-	{"TPM_PERMANENTEK", TPM_E_BASE + 97,
-	 "Attempt to revoke the EK and the EK is not revocable"},
-	{"TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE", TPM_E_BASE + 98,
-	 "Bad signature of CMK ticket"},
-	{"TPM_NOCONTEXTSPACE", TPM_E_BASE + 99,
-	 "There is no room in the context list for additional contexts"},
-	{"TPM_RETRY", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL,
-	 "The TPM is too busy to respond to the command immediately, but\n\
-the command could be resubmitted at a later time.  The TPM MAY\n\
-return TPM_RETRY for any command at any time"},
-	{"TPM_NEEDS_SELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 1,
-	 "TPM_ContinueSelfTest has not been run"},
-	{"TPM_DOING_SELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 2,
-	 "The TPM is currently executing the actions of TPM_ContinueSelfTest\n\
-because the ordinal required resources that have not been tested"},
-	{"TPM_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 3,
-	 "The TPM is defending against dictionary attacks and is in some\n\
-time-out period"},
-};
-
-#endif				/* TSS_ERROR_MESSAGES_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss_errors.h b/src/security/tpm/tss_errors.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2f1486315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss_errors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+/* TPM error codes.
+ *
+ * Copy-pasted and lightly edited from TCG TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures
+ * Version 1.2 Level 2 Revision 103 26 October 2006 Draft.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TSS_ERRORS_H_
+#define TSS_ERRORS_H_
+
+#define TPM_E_BASE 0x0
+#define TPM_E_NON_FATAL 0x800
+
+#define TPM_E_AREA_LOCKED           ((uint32_t)0x0000003c)
+#define TPM_E_BADINDEX              ((uint32_t)0x00000002)
+#define TPM_E_BAD_PRESENCE          ((uint32_t)0x0000002d)
+#define TPM_E_IOERROR               ((uint32_t)0x0000001f)
+#define TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT      ((uint32_t)0x00000026)
+#define TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES           ((uint32_t)0x00000048)
+#define TPM_E_OWNER_SET             ((uint32_t)0x00000014)
+
+#define TPM_E_NEEDS_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 1))
+#define TPM_E_DOING_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 2))
+
+#define TPM_E_ALREADY_INITIALIZED    ((uint32_t)0x00005000)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY ((uint32_t)0x00005001)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT            ((uint32_t)0x00005002)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE        ((uint32_t)0x00005003)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_COMMUNICATION_ERROR    ((uint32_t)0x00005004)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE     ((uint32_t)0x00005005)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_NO_DEVICE              ((uint32_t)0x00005006)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_INPUT_TOO_SMALL        ((uint32_t)0x00005007)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE          ((uint32_t)0x00005008)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_READ_EMPTY             ((uint32_t)0x00005009)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_READ_FAILURE           ((uint32_t)0x0000500a)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_NV_DEFINED             ((uint32_t)0x0000500b)  /* vboot local */
+
+#endif /* TSS_ERRORS_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/Kconfig b/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
index 0139d25599..e13101b6be 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
+++ b/src/security/vboot/Kconfig
@@ -17,10 +17,7 @@ menu "Verified Boot (vboot)"
 config VBOOT
 	bool "Verify firmware with vboot."
 	default n
-	select TPM if !MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2 && !VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA
-	select TPM2 if MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2 && !VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA
-	select TPM_INIT_FAILURE_IS_FATAL if PC80_SYSTEM && LPC_TPM
-	select SKIP_TPM_STARTUP_ON_NORMAL_BOOT if PC80_SYSTEM && LPC_TPM
+	select VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA if !TPM1 && !TPM2
 	depends on HAVE_HARD_RESET
 	help
 	  Enabling VBOOT will use vboot to verify the components of the firmware
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/antirollback.h b/src/security/vboot/antirollback.h
index d1bc433dcd..be42f009e7 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/antirollback.h
+++ b/src/security/vboot/antirollback.h
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 #ifndef ANTIROLLBACK_H_
 #define ANTIROLLBACK_H_
 
-#include "tss_constants.h"
+#include <types.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
 
 struct vb2_context;
 enum vb2_pcr_digest;
@@ -55,27 +56,11 @@ uint32_t antirollback_write_space_rec_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size);
 /* Lock down recovery hash space in TPM. */
 uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void);
 
-/****************************************************************************/
+/* Start of the root of trust */
+uint32_t vboot_setup_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx);
 
-/*
- * The following functions are internal apis, listed here for use by unit tests
- * only.
- */
-
-/**
- * Ask vboot for a digest and extend a TPM PCR with it.
- */
-uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
+/* vboot_extend_pcr function for vb2 context */
+uint32_t vboot_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
 			enum vb2_pcr_digest which_digest);
 
-/**
- * Issue a TPM_Clear and reenable/reactivate the TPM.
- */
-uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void);
-
-/**
- * Start the TPM and establish the root of trust for the antirollback mechanism.
- */
-uint32_t setup_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx);
-
 #endif  /* ANTIROLLBACK_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_mock.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_mock.c
index 4ea53558f9..3075d335f6 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_mock.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_mock.c
@@ -32,54 +32,50 @@
  * stored in the TPM NVRAM.
  */
 
-#include <security/tpm/antirollback.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
 #include <vb2_api.h>
 
-uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
-			enum vb2_pcr_digest which_digest)
+#include "antirollback.h"
+
+int vb2ex_tpm_clear_owner(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
+uint32_t vboot_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
+			enum vb2_pcr_digest which_digest)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
 	vb2api_secdata_create(ctx);
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_write_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware()
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_write_space_rec_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
 {
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-uint32_t tlcl_lib_init(void)
-{
 	return VB2_SUCCESS;
 }
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
index a757f02f98..57c107bc3a 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@
  * stored in the TPM NVRAM.
  */
 
-#include <security/tpm/antirollback.h>
+#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
 #include <vb2_api.h>
 #include <console/console.h>
 
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 
 static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length);
 
-uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
+uint32_t vboot_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
 			enum vb2_pcr_digest which_digest)
 {
 	uint8_t buffer[VB2_PCR_DIGEST_RECOMMENDED_SIZE];
@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
 	rv = vb2api_get_pcr_digest(ctx, which_digest, buffer, &size);
 	if (rv != VB2_SUCCESS)
 		return rv;
-	if (size < TPM_PCR_DIGEST)
+	if (size < TPM_PCR_MINIMUM_DIGEST_SIZE)
 		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
 
-	return tlcl_extend(pcr, buffer, NULL);
+	return tpm_extend_pcr(pcr, buffer, NULL);
 }
 
 static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
@@ -158,6 +158,35 @@ static const uint8_t secdata_kernel[] = {
 static const uint8_t rec_hash_data[REC_HASH_NV_SIZE] = { };
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM2)
+/*
+ * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
+ * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
+ * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
+ */
+const static TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
+	.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+};
+
+const static TPMA_NV rw_space_attributes = {
+	.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+	.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyPCR
+ * selecting only PCR_0 with a value of all zeros.
+ */
+const static uint8_t pcr0_unchanged_policy[] = {
+	0x09, 0x93, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0xEB, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x11, 0x18, 0x81, 0x1D,
+	0xD4, 0x47, 0x78, 0x80, 0x08, 0x88, 0x86, 0x62, 0x2D, 0xD7, 0x79,
+	0x94, 0x46, 0x62, 0x26, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x6A, 0xA1};
 
 /* Nothing special in the TPM2 path yet. */
 static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
@@ -166,11 +195,13 @@ static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
 }
 
 static uint32_t set_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
-			  uint32_t length)
+			  uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
+			  const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
 {
 	uint32_t rv;
 
-	rv = tlcl_define_space(index, length);
+	rv = tlcl_define_space(index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy,
+			       nv_policy_size);
 	if (rv == TPM_E_NV_DEFINED) {
 		/*
 		 * Continue with writing: it may be defined, but not written
@@ -193,19 +224,22 @@ static uint32_t set_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
 static uint32_t set_firmware_space(const void *firmware_blob)
 {
 	return set_space("firmware", FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, firmware_blob,
-			 VB2_SECDATA_SIZE);
+			 VB2_SECDATA_SIZE, ro_space_attributes,
+			 pcr0_unchanged_policy, sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy));
 }
 
 static uint32_t set_kernel_space(const void *kernel_blob)
 {
 	return set_space("kernel", KERNEL_NV_INDEX, kernel_blob,
-			 sizeof(secdata_kernel));
+			 sizeof(secdata_kernel), rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 static uint32_t set_rec_hash_space(const uint8_t *data)
 {
 	return set_space("MRC Hash", REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data,
-			 REC_HASH_NV_SIZE);
+			 REC_HASH_NV_SIZE,
+			 ro_space_attributes, pcr0_unchanged_policy,
+			 sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy));
 }
 
 static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
@@ -228,13 +262,6 @@ static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
-{
-	VBDEBUG("TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
 {
 	return tlcl_lock_nv_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX);
@@ -247,16 +274,6 @@ uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void)
 
 #else
 
-uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
-{
-	VBDEBUG("TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_enable());
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_deactivated(0));
-
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 /**
  * Like tlcl_write(), but checks for write errors due to hitting the 64-write
  * limit and clears the TPM when that happens.  This can only happen when the
@@ -416,110 +433,22 @@ static uint32_t factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 	return TPM_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-/*
- * SetupTPM starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the
- * anti-rollback mechanism.  SetupTPM can fail for three reasons.  1 A bug. 2 a
- * TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack.  In
- * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is
- * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases.  The recovery mode calls SetupTPM
- * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations.  There is a
- * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the
- * failure will repeat itself.  (In general this is impossible to guarantee
- * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the
- * previous boot.)  In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus
- * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set
- * bGlobalLock).  The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a
- * bricked device.
- *
- * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using
- * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces.  We do this to avoid writing
- * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about
- * the durability of the NVRAM.
- */
-uint32_t setup_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+uint32_t vboot_setup_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
-	uint8_t disable;
-	uint8_t deactivated;
 	uint32_t result;
 
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_lib_init());
-
-	/* Handle special init for S3 resume path */
-	if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_S3_RESUME) {
-		result = tlcl_resume();
-		if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT)
-			printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Already initialized.\n");
-		return TPM_SUCCESS;
-	}
-
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VBOOT_SOFT_REBOOT_WORKAROUND)) {
-		result = tlcl_startup();
-		if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
-			/*
-			 * Some prototype hardware doesn't reset the TPM on a CPU
-			 * reset.  We do a hard reset to get around this.
-			 */
-			VBDEBUG("TPM: soft reset detected\n");
-			ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_WANTS_REBOOT;
-			return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
-		} else if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
-			VBDEBUG("TPM: tlcl_startup returned %08x\n", result);
-			return result;
-		}
-	} else
-		RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_startup());
-
-	/*
-	 * Some TPMs start the self test automatically at power on. In that case
-	 * we don't need to call ContinueSelfTest. On some (other) TPMs,
-	 * continue_self_test may block. In that case, we definitely don't want
-	 * to call it here. For TPMs in the intersection of these two sets, we
-	 * are screwed. (In other words: TPMs that require manually starting the
-	 * self-test AND block will have poor performance until we split
-	 * tlcl_send_receive() into send() and receive(), and have a state
-	 * machine to control setup.)
-	 *
-	 * This comment is likely to become obsolete in the near future, so
-	 * don't trust it. It may have not been updated.
-	 */
-#ifdef TPM_MANUAL_SELFTEST
-#ifdef TPM_BLOCKING_CONTINUESELFTEST
-#warning "lousy TPM!"
-#endif
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_continue_self_test());
-#endif
-	result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
-	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
-		/*
-		 * It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical
-		 * presence command disabled.  This tries enabling it, then
-		 * tries asserting PP again.
-		 */
-		RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable());
-		RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_assert_physical_presence());
-	}
-
-	/* Check that the TPM is enabled and activated. */
-	RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_get_flags(&disable, &deactivated, NULL));
-	if (disable || deactivated) {
-		VBDEBUG("TPM: disabled (%d) or deactivated (%d). Fixing...\n",
-			disable, deactivated);
-		RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_enable());
-		RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_deactivated(0));
-		VBDEBUG("TPM: Must reboot to re-enable\n");
+	result = tpm_setup(ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_S3_RESUME);
+	if (result == TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT)
 		ctx->flags |= VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_WANTS_REBOOT;
-		return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
-	}
 
-	VBDEBUG("TPM: SetupTPM() succeeded\n");
-	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	return result;
 }
 
 uint32_t antirollback_read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
 	uint32_t rv;
 
-	rv = setup_tpm(ctx);
+	rv = vboot_setup_tpm(ctx);
 	if (rv)
 		return rv;
 
@@ -585,3 +514,13 @@ uint32_t antirollback_write_space_rec_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
 
 	return write_secdata(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data, size);
 }
+
+int vb2ex_tpm_clear_owner(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+	uint32_t rv;
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Clearing TPM owner\n");
+	rv = tpm_clear_and_reenable();
+	if (rv)
+		return VB2_ERROR_EX_TPM_CLEAR_OWNER;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c b/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
index 2600f84945..9710ae2e7c 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/vboot_logic.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  */
 
-#include <security/tpm/antirollback.h>
 #include <arch/exception.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <bootmode.h>
@@ -27,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <security/vboot/misc.h>
 #include <security/vboot/vbnv.h>
 
+#include "antirollback.h"
+
 /* The max hash size to expect is for SHA512. */
 #define VBOOT_MAX_HASH_SIZE VB2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
 
@@ -53,16 +54,6 @@ void vb2ex_printf(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
 	return;
 }
 
-int vb2ex_tpm_clear_owner(struct vb2_context *ctx)
-{
-	uint32_t rv;
-	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Clearing TPM owner\n");
-	rv = tpm_clear_and_reenable();
-	if (rv)
-		return VB2_ERROR_EX_TPM_CLEAR_OWNER;
-	return VB2_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 int vb2ex_read_resource(struct vb2_context *ctx,
 			enum vb2_resource_index index,
 			uint32_t offset,
@@ -290,8 +281,8 @@ static void save_if_needed(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 
 static uint32_t extend_pcrs(struct vb2_context *ctx)
 {
-	return tpm_extend_pcr(ctx, 0, BOOT_MODE_PCR) ||
-	       tpm_extend_pcr(ctx, 1, HWID_DIGEST_PCR);
+	return vboot_extend_pcr(ctx, 0, BOOT_MODE_PCR) ||
+	       vboot_extend_pcr(ctx, 1, HWID_DIGEST_PCR);
 }
 
 /**