diff options
| author | Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> | 2020-04-21 15:13:07 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> | 2020-04-23 01:21:07 +0000 |
| commit | d9f26edfec760ff81f88f164fc0e601fe8e20e3e (patch) | |
| tree | 4c24fd4bf990e93bbb98f49739b6cd588b851112 /src/security | |
| parent | 5feef37de8fa2da9ca0b5df48bdf470c248cc0cb (diff) | |
vboot: Add permission check for kernel space
This patch restores the permission check for the kernel space which
was dropped when read_space_kernel was moved from Depthcharge by
CL:2155429.
BUG=chromium:1045217, chromium:1020578
BRANCH=none
TEST=none
Signed-off-by: dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org>
Change-Id: If6d487940f39865cadc0ca9d5de6e055ad3e017d
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40579
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/security/tpm/tss.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c | 22 |
3 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss.h b/src/security/tpm/tss.h index 5237387a74..57f3b24847 100644 --- a/src/security/tpm/tss.h +++ b/src/security/tpm/tss.h @@ -197,4 +197,9 @@ uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest, */ uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void); +/** + * Get the permission bits for the NVRAM space with |index|. + */ +uint32_t tlcl_get_permissions(uint32_t index, uint32_t *permissions); + #endif /* TSS_H_ */ diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c index 9bc72d2733..ea3f94d5f8 100644 --- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c +++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c @@ -359,3 +359,22 @@ uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest, kPcrDigestLength); return result; } + +uint32_t tlcl_get_permissions(uint32_t index, uint32_t *permissions) +{ + struct s_tpm_getpermissions_cmd cmd; + uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE]; + uint8_t *nvdata; + uint32_t result; + uint32_t size; + + memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_getpermissions_cmd, sizeof(cmd)); + to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_getpermissions_cmd.index, index); + result = tlcl_send_receive(cmd.buffer, response, sizeof(response)); + if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) + return result; + + nvdata = response + kTpmResponseHeaderLength + sizeof(size); + from_tpm_uint32(nvdata + kNvDataPublicPermissionsOffset, permissions); + return result; +} diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c index d666ae8a5e..37665bc23d 100644 --- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c +++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h> #include <string.h> #include <security/tpm/tspi.h> +#include <security/tpm/tss.h> +#include <security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss_structures.h> #include <vb2_api.h> #include <console/console.h> @@ -68,6 +70,26 @@ static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) uint32_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) { + if (!CONFIG(TPM2)) { + /* + * Before reading the kernel space, verify its permissions. If + * the kernel space has the wrong permission, we give up. This + * will need to be fixed by the recovery kernel. We will have + * to worry about this because at any time (even with PP turned + * off) the TPM owner can remove and redefine a PP-protected + * space (but not write to it). + */ + uint32_t perms; + + RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_get_permissions(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, + &perms)); + if (perms != TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE) { + printk(BIOS_ERR, + "TPM: invalid secdata_kernel permissions\n"); + return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; + } + } + uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, |