diff options
| author | dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org> | 2020-04-03 10:56:43 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> | 2020-04-17 22:01:48 +0000 |
| commit | dff56a056c7dadf0d970cfe29f0bc9c1fec69e82 (patch) | |
| tree | f45288b8377774613b0a3deffe689dcd64977af7 /src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c | |
| parent | 622c6b84ab029a366dd09740a24d36ae9fad697f (diff) | |
ec_sync: Run EFS2 in romstage
EFS2 allows EC RO to enable PD for special cases. When doing so, it sets
NO_BOOT flag to avoid booting the OS. AP needs to get NO_BOOT flag from
Cr50 and enforce that.
This patch makes verstage get a boot mode and a mirrored hash stored
in kernel secdata from Cr50.
This patch also makes romstage write an expected EC hash (a.k.a. Hexp) to
Cr50 (if there is an update).
BUG=b:147298634, chromium:1045217, b:148259137
BRANCH=none
TEST=Verify software sync succeeds on Puff.
Signed-off-by: dnojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I1f387b6e920205b9cc4c8536561f2a279c36413d
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40389
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c index 0ae956276c..b60a1bb315 100644 --- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c +++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c @@ -80,6 +80,22 @@ static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } +uint32_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) +{ + uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; + + RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, + size)); + + if (vb2api_secdata_kernel_check(ctx, &size) + == VB2_ERROR_SECDATA_KERNEL_INCOMPLETE) + /* Re-read. vboot will run the check and handle errors. */ + RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, + ctx->secdata_kernel, size)); + + return TPM_SUCCESS; +} + static uint32_t read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data, @@ -440,6 +456,15 @@ uint32_t antirollback_write_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx) VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE); } +uint32_t antirollback_write_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx) +{ + /* Learn the expected size. */ + uint8_t size = VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_MIN_SIZE; + vb2api_secdata_kernel_check(ctx, &size); + + return write_secdata(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_kernel, size); +} + uint32_t antirollback_read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size) { if (size != REC_HASH_NV_SIZE) { |