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authorSergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>2022-11-02 00:50:03 +0200
committerMartin L Roth <gaumless@gmail.com>2024-03-28 15:18:04 +0000
commit47e9e8cde1810ee9f249027b14ee9f82a7a52d84 (patch)
tree77771e49f8121bebb1b5904940ff7abf2714dccb /src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
parent094a051732341d20e82c349ea10f85faea6e58d1 (diff)
security/tpm: replace CONFIG(TPMx) checks with runtime check
This prepares the code for enabling both CONFIG_TPM1 and CONFIG_TPM2 during compilation, in which case actual TPM family in use can be determined at runtime. In some places both compile-time and runtime checks are necessary. Yet in places like probe functions runtime state checks don't make sense as runtime state is defined by results of probing. Change-Id: Id9cc25aad8d1d7bfad12b7a92059b1b3641bbfa9 Ticket: https://ticket.coreboot.org/issues/433 Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/69161 Reviewed-by: Jérémy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c')
-rw-r--r--src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c74
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
index 21901bb310..f60a5e2ee0 100644
--- a/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
+++ b/src/security/vboot/secdata_tpm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length
tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_kernel(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
- if (!CONFIG(TPM2)) {
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1) {
/*
* Before reading the kernel space, verify its permissions. If
* the kernel space has the wrong permission, we give up. This
@@ -224,12 +224,6 @@ static uint32_t define_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, uint32_t length,
return rc;
}
-/* Nothing special in the TPM2 path yet. */
-static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
-{
- return tlcl_write(index, data, length);
-}
-
static tpm_result_t setup_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
@@ -376,7 +370,7 @@ static tpm_result_t setup_widevine_counter_spaces(void)
return rc;
}
-static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm2(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
@@ -426,11 +420,6 @@ static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
-tpm_result_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
-{
- return tlcl2_lock_nv_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX);
-}
-
tpm_result_t antirollback_read_space_mrc_hash(uint32_t index, uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
{
if (size != HASH_NV_SIZE) {
@@ -521,25 +510,9 @@ tpm_result_t antirollback_write_space_vbios_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t s
return safe_write(VBIOS_CACHE_NV_INDEX, data, size);
}
-#else
+#endif /* CONFIG(TPM2) */
-/**
- * Like tlcl_write(), but checks for write errors due to hitting the 64-write
- * limit and clears the TPM when that happens. This can only happen when the
- * TPM is unowned, so it is OK to clear it (and we really have no choice).
- * This is not expected to happen frequently, but it could happen.
- */
-
-static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
-{
- tpm_result_t rc = tlcl_write(index, data, length);
- if (rc == TPM_MAXNVWRITES) {
- RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
- return tlcl_write(index, data, length);
- } else {
- return rc;
- }
-}
+#if CONFIG(TPM1)
/**
* Similarly to safe_write(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because
@@ -558,7 +531,7 @@ static tpm_result_t safe_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t si
}
}
-static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm1(struct vb2_context *ctx)
{
TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags;
tpm_result_t rc;
@@ -616,12 +589,45 @@ static tpm_result_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
-tpm_result_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
+#endif /* CONFIG(TPM1) */
+
+static tpm_result_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
{
- return tlcl1_set_global_lock();
+ tpm_result_t rc = tlcl_write(index, data, length);
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1 && rc == TPM_MAXNVWRITES) {
+ /**
+ * Clear the TPM on write error due to hitting the 64-write
+ * limit. This can only happen when the TPM is unowned, so it
+ * is OK to clear it (and we really have no choice). This is
+ * not expected to happen frequently, but it could happen.
+ */
+ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
+ rc = tlcl_write(index, data, length);
+ }
+ return rc;
}
+static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
+{
+#if CONFIG(TPM1)
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1)
+ return _factory_initialize_tpm1(ctx);
+#endif
+#if CONFIG(TPM2)
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_2)
+ return _factory_initialize_tpm2(ctx);
#endif
+ return TPM_CB_CORRUPTED_STATE;
+}
+
+uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
+{
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_1)
+ return tlcl1_set_global_lock();
+ if (tlcl_get_family() == TPM_2)
+ return tlcl2_lock_nv_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX);
+ return TPM_CB_CORRUPTED_STATE;
+}
/**
* Perform one-time initializations.