security/tpm: Move tpm TSS and TSPI layer to security section

* Move code from src/lib and src/include into src/security/tpm
* Split TPM TSS 1.2 and 2.0
* Fix header includes
* Add a new directory structure with kconfig and makefile includes

Change-Id: Id15a9aa6bd367560318dfcfd450bf5626ea0ec2b
Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin@das-labor.org>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/22103
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Reinauer <stefan.reinauer@coreboot.org>

14 files changed, 2794 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/security/tpm/Kconfig b/src/security/tpm/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..111f91a5c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+## This file is part of the coreboot project.
+##
+## Copyright (C) 2017 Philipp Deppenwiese, Facebook, Inc.
+##
+## This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+## it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+## the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+##
+## This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+## but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+## MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+## GNU General Public License for more details.
+##
+
+menu "Trusted Platform Module"
+
+config TPM
+	bool
+	default n
+	select LPC_TPM if MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
+	select I2C_TPM if !MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM && !SPI_TPM
+	help
+	  Enable this option to enable TPM support in coreboot.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config TPM2
+	bool
+	select LPC_TPM if MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
+	select I2C_TPM if !MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM && !SPI_TPM
+	help
+	  Enable this option to enable TPM2 support in coreboot.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config DEBUG_TPM
+	bool "Output verbose TPM debug messages"
+	default n
+	depends on TPM || TPM2
+	help
+	  This option enables additional TPM related debug messages.
+
+config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM_CR50
+	bool
+	default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM_CR50 || MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50
+	default n
+	select MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
+	select POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE if ARCH_X86
+
+config POWER_OFF_ON_CR50_UPDATE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Power off machine while waiting for CR50 update to take effect.
+
+config MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
+	bool
+	default n
+	help
+	  Board has TPM support
+
+config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
+	bool
+	default n
+	help
+	  There is a TPM device installed on the mainboard, and it is
+	  compliant with version 2 TCG TPM specification. Could be connected
+	  over LPC, SPI or I2C.
+
+endmenu # Trusted Platform Module (tpm)
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..48e70107e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM) += tcg-1.2/tlcl.c
+verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c
+verstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE),y)
+romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM) += tcg-1.2/tlcl.c
+romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c
+romstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c
+endif # CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE
+
+ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c
+ramstage-$(CONFIG_TPM2) += tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/antirollback.h b/src/security/tpm/antirollback.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d1bc433dcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/antirollback.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ *
+ * Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices
+ * stored in the TPM NVRAM.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANTIROLLBACK_H_
+#define ANTIROLLBACK_H_
+
+#include "tss_constants.h"
+
+struct vb2_context;
+enum vb2_pcr_digest;
+
+/* TPM NVRAM location indices. */
+#define FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX               0x1007
+#define KERNEL_NV_INDEX                 0x1008
+/* 0x1009 used to be used as a backup space. Think of conflicts if you
+ * want to use 0x1009 for something else. */
+#define BACKUP_NV_INDEX                 0x1009
+#define FWMP_NV_INDEX                   0x100a
+#define REC_HASH_NV_INDEX               0x100b
+#define REC_HASH_NV_SIZE                VB2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/* Structure definitions for TPM spaces */
+
+/* Flags for firmware space */
+
+/*
+ * Last boot was developer mode.  TPM ownership is cleared when transitioning
+ * to/from developer mode.
+ */
+#define FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER 0x01
+
+/* All functions return TPM_SUCCESS (zero) if successful, non-zero if error */
+
+uint32_t antirollback_read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * Write may be called if the versions change.
+ */
+uint32_t antirollback_write_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * Lock must be called.
+ */
+uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void);
+
+/* Read recovery hash data from TPM. */
+uint32_t antirollback_read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size);
+/* Write new hash data to recovery space in TPM. */
+uint32_t antirollback_write_space_rec_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size);
+/* Lock down recovery hash space in TPM. */
+uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void);
+
+/****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are internal apis, listed here for use by unit tests
+ * only.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Ask vboot for a digest and extend a TPM PCR with it.
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(struct vb2_context *ctx, int pcr,
+			enum vb2_pcr_digest which_digest);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a TPM_Clear and reenable/reactivate the TPM.
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void);
+
+/**
+ * Start the TPM and establish the root of trust for the antirollback mechanism.
+ */
+uint32_t setup_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx);
+
+#endif  /* ANTIROLLBACK_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl.c b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7fcfcb7d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+/* A lightweight TPM command library.
+ *
+ * The general idea is that TPM commands are array of bytes whose
+ * fields are mostly compile-time constant.  The goal is to build much
+ * of the commands at compile time (or build time) and change some of
+ * the fields at run time as needed.  The code in
+ * utility/tlcl_generator.c builds structures containing the commands,
+ * as well as the offsets of the fields that need to be set at run
+ * time.
+ */
+
+#include <arch/early_variables.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tpm.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+#include "tlcl_internal.h"
+#include "tlcl_structures.h"
+#include "../tlcl.h"
+
+#ifdef FOR_TEST
+#include <stdio.h>
+#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) printf(format, ## args)
+#else
+#include <console/console.h>
+#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) printk(BIOS_DEBUG, format, ## args)
+#endif
+
+static int tpm_send_receive(const uint8_t *request,
+				uint32_t request_length,
+				uint8_t *response,
+				uint32_t *response_length)
+{
+	size_t len = *response_length;
+	if (tis_sendrecv(request, request_length, response, &len))
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+	/* check 64->32bit overflow and (re)check response buffer overflow */
+	if (len > *response_length)
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+	*response_length = len;
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Sets the size field of a TPM command. */
+static inline void set_tpm_command_size(uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t size)
+{
+	to_tpm_uint32(buffer + sizeof(uint16_t), size);
+}
+
+/* Gets the size field of a TPM command. */
+__attribute__((unused))
+static inline int tpm_command_size(const uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	uint32_t size;
+	from_tpm_uint32(buffer + sizeof(uint16_t), &size);
+	return (int) size;
+}
+
+/* Gets the code field of a TPM command. */
+static inline int tpm_command_code(const uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	uint32_t code;
+	from_tpm_uint32(buffer + sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint32_t), &code);
+	return code;
+}
+
+/* Gets the return code field of a TPM result. */
+static inline int tpm_return_code(const uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	return tpm_command_code(buffer);
+}
+
+/* Like TlclSendReceive below, but do not retry if NEEDS_SELFTEST or
+ * DOING_SELFTEST errors are returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t tlcl_send_receive_no_retry(const uint8_t *request,
+					   uint8_t *response, int max_length)
+{
+	uint32_t response_length = max_length;
+	uint32_t result;
+
+	result = tpm_send_receive(request, tpm_command_size(request),
+					response, &response_length);
+	if (result != 0) {
+		/* Communication with TPM failed, so response is garbage */
+		VBDEBUG("TPM: command 0x%x send/receive failed: 0x%x\n",
+			tpm_command_code(request), result);
+		return result;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise, use the result code from the response */
+	result = tpm_return_code(response);
+
+	/* TODO: add paranoia about returned response_length vs. max_length
+	 * (and possibly expected length from the response header).  See
+	 * crosbug.com/17017 */
+
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: command 0x%x returned 0x%x\n",
+		tpm_command_code(request), result);
+
+return result;
+}
+
+
+/* Sends a TPM command and gets a response.  Returns 0 if success or the TPM
+ * error code if error. Waits for the self test to complete if needed. */
+uint32_t tlcl_send_receive(const uint8_t *request, uint8_t *response,
+			   int max_length)
+{
+	uint32_t result = tlcl_send_receive_no_retry(request, response,
+						     max_length);
+	/* If the command fails because the self test has not completed, try it
+	 * again after attempting to ensure that the self test has completed. */
+	if (result == TPM_E_NEEDS_SELFTEST || result == TPM_E_DOING_SELFTEST) {
+		result = tlcl_continue_self_test();
+		if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
+			return result;
+#if defined(TPM_BLOCKING_CONTINUESELFTEST) || defined(VB_RECOVERY_MODE)
+		/* Retry only once */
+		result = tlcl_send_receive_no_retry(request, response,
+						    max_length);
+#else
+		/* This needs serious testing. The TPM specification says: "iii.
+		 * The caller MUST wait for the actions of TPM_ContinueSelfTest
+		 * to complete before reissuing the command C1."  But, if
+		 * ContinueSelfTest is non-blocking, how do we know that the
+		 * actions have completed other than trying again? */
+		do {
+			result = tlcl_send_receive_no_retry(request, response,
+							    max_length);
+		} while (result == TPM_E_DOING_SELFTEST);
+#endif
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* Sends a command and returns the error code. */
+static uint32_t send(const uint8_t *command)
+{
+	uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE];
+	return tlcl_send_receive(command, response, sizeof(response));
+}
+
+/* Exported functions. */
+
+static uint8_t tlcl_init_done CAR_GLOBAL;
+
+uint32_t tlcl_lib_init(void)
+{
+	uint8_t done = car_get_var(tlcl_init_done);
+	if (done)
+		return VB2_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (tis_init())
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+	if (tis_open())
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+
+	car_set_var(tlcl_init_done, 1);
+
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_startup(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Startup\n");
+	return send(tpm_startup_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_resume(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Resume\n");
+	return send(tpm_resume_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Self test full\n");
+	return send(tpm_selftestfull_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_continue_self_test(void)
+{
+	uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE];
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Continue self test\n");
+	/* Call the No Retry version of SendReceive to avoid recursion. */
+	return tlcl_send_receive_no_retry(tpm_continueselftest_cmd.buffer,
+					  response, sizeof(response));
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size)
+{
+	struct s_tpm_nv_definespace_cmd cmd;
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: TlclDefineSpace(0x%x, 0x%x, %d)\n", index, perm, size);
+	memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_nv_definespace_cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_definespace_cmd.index, index);
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_definespace_cmd.perm, perm);
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_definespace_cmd.size, size);
+	return send(cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
+{
+	struct s_tpm_nv_write_cmd cmd;
+	uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE];
+	const int total_length =
+			kTpmRequestHeaderLength + kWriteInfoLength + length;
+
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: tlcl_write(0x%x, %d)\n", index, length);
+	memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_nv_write_cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	assert(total_length <= TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE);
+	set_tpm_command_size(cmd.buffer, total_length);
+
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_write_cmd.index, index);
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_write_cmd.length, length);
+	memcpy(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_write_cmd.data, data, length);
+
+	return tlcl_send_receive(cmd.buffer, response, sizeof(response));
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_read(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t length)
+{
+	struct s_tpm_nv_read_cmd cmd;
+	uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE];
+	uint32_t result_length;
+	uint32_t result;
+
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: tlcl_read(0x%x, %d)\n", index, length);
+	memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_nv_read_cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_read_cmd.index, index);
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_nv_read_cmd.length, length);
+
+	result = tlcl_send_receive(cmd.buffer, response, sizeof(response));
+	if (result == TPM_SUCCESS && length > 0) {
+		uint8_t *nv_read_cursor = response + kTpmResponseHeaderLength;
+		from_tpm_uint32(nv_read_cursor, &result_length);
+		nv_read_cursor += sizeof(uint32_t);
+		memcpy(data, nv_read_cursor, result_length);
+	}
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+uint32_t tlcl_assert_physical_presence(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Asserting physical presence\n");
+	return send(tpm_ppassert_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Enable the physical presence command\n");
+	return send(tpm_ppenable_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_finalize_physical_presence(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Enable PP cmd, disable HW pp, and set lifetime lock\n");
+	return send(tpm_finalizepp_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_nv_locked(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Set NV locked\n");
+	return tlcl_define_space(TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK, 0, 0);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Force clear\n");
+	return send(tpm_forceclear_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void)
+{
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Enabling TPM\n");
+	return send(tpm_physicalenable_cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag)
+{
+	struct s_tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd cmd;
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: SetDeactivated(%d)\n", flag);
+	memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	*(cmd.buffer + cmd.deactivated) = flag;
+	return send(cmd.buffer);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags)
+{
+	uint8_t response[TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE];
+	uint32_t size;
+	uint32_t result = tlcl_send_receive(tpm_getflags_cmd.buffer, response,
+					    sizeof(response));
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
+		return result;
+	from_tpm_uint32(response + kTpmResponseHeaderLength, &size);
+	assert(size == sizeof(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS));
+	memcpy(pflags, response + kTpmResponseHeaderLength + sizeof(size),
+	       sizeof(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS));
+	return result;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
+			uint8_t *nvlocked)
+{
+	TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags;
+	uint32_t result = tlcl_get_permanent_flags(&pflags);
+	if (result == TPM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (disable)
+			*disable = pflags.disable;
+		if (deactivated)
+			*deactivated = pflags.deactivated;
+		if (nvlocked)
+			*nvlocked = pflags.nvLocked;
+		VBDEBUG("TPM: flags disable=%d, deactivated=%d, nvlocked=%d\n",
+			pflags.disable, pflags.deactivated, pflags.nvLocked);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_global_lock(void)
+{
+	uint32_t x;
+	VBDEBUG("TPM: Set global lock\n");
+	return tlcl_write(TPM_NV_INDEX0, (uint8_t *) &x, 0);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
+		     uint8_t *out_digest)
+{
+	struct s_tpm_extend_cmd cmd;
+	uint8_t response[kTpmResponseHeaderLength + kPcrDigestLength];
+	uint32_t result;
+
+	memcpy(&cmd, &tpm_extend_cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	to_tpm_uint32(cmd.buffer + tpm_extend_cmd.pcrNum, pcr_num);
+	memcpy(cmd.buffer + cmd.inDigest, in_digest, kPcrDigestLength);
+
+	result = tlcl_send_receive(cmd.buffer, response, sizeof(response));
+	if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
+		return result;
+
+	if (out_digest)
+		memcpy(out_digest, response + kTpmResponseHeaderLength,
+		       kPcrDigestLength);
+	return result;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_internal.h b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3648be622a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TPM_LITE_TLCL_INTERNAL_H_
+#define TPM_LITE_TLCL_INTERNAL_H_
+
+/*
+ * These numbers derive from adding the sizes of command fields as shown in the
+ * TPM commands manual.
+ */
+#define kTpmRequestHeaderLength 10
+#define kTpmResponseHeaderLength 10
+#define kTpmReadInfoLength 12
+#define kEncAuthLength 20
+#define kPcrDigestLength 20
+
+
+/*
+ * Conversion functions.  to_tpm_TYPE puts a value of type TYPE into a TPM
+ * command buffer. from_tpm_TYPE gets a value of type TYPE from a TPM command
+ * buffer into a variable.
+ */
+__attribute__((unused))
+static inline void to_tpm_uint32(uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t x)
+{
+	buffer[0] = (uint8_t)(x >> 24);
+	buffer[1] = (uint8_t)((x >> 16) & 0xff);
+	buffer[2] = (uint8_t)((x >> 8) & 0xff);
+	buffer[3] = (uint8_t)(x & 0xff);
+}
+
+/*
+ * See comment for above function.
+ */
+__attribute__((unused))
+static inline void from_tpm_uint32(const uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t *x)
+{
+	*x = ((buffer[0] << 24) |
+	      (buffer[1] << 16) |
+	      (buffer[2] << 8) |
+	      buffer[3]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * See comment for above function.
+ */
+__attribute__((unused))
+static inline void to_tpm_uint16(uint8_t *buffer, uint16_t x)
+{
+	buffer[0] = (uint8_t)(x >> 8);
+	buffer[1] = (uint8_t)(x & 0xff);
+}
+
+/*
+ * See comment for above function.
+ */
+__attribute__((unused))
+static inline void from_tpm_uint16(const uint8_t *buffer, uint16_t *x)
+{
+	*x = (buffer[0] << 8) | buffer[1];
+}
+
+#endif  /* TPM_LITE_TLCL_INTERNAL_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_structures.h b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_structures.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..880864ee50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-1.2/tlcl_structures.h
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated */
+
+const struct s_tpm_extend_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[34];
+	uint16_t pcrNum;
+	uint16_t inDigest;
+} tpm_extend_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14, },
+10, 14, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_get_random_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[14];
+	uint16_t bytesRequested;
+} tpm_get_random_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x46, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_getownership_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getownership_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x11, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_getpermissions_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+	uint16_t index;
+} tpm_getpermissions_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, },
+18, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_getstclearflags_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getstclearflags_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x9, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_getflags_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+} tpm_getflags_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65,
+	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x8, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[11];
+	uint16_t deactivated;
+} tpm_physicalsetdeactivated_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicalenable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_physicalenable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_physicaldisable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_physicaldisable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_forceclear_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_forceclear_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_readpubek_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[30];
+} tpm_readpubek_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_continueselftest_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_continueselftest_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_selftestfull_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_selftestfull_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_resume_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_resume_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x2, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_savestate_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[10];
+} tpm_savestate_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x98, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_startup_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_startup_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x1, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_finalizepp_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_finalizepp_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x2, 0xa0, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_pplock_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_pplock_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x4, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_ppenable_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_ppenable_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x20, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_ppassert_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[12];
+} tpm_ppassert_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x8, },
+};
+
+const struct s_tpm_pcr_read_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[14];
+	uint16_t pcrNum;
+} tpm_pcr_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15, },
+10, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_read_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[22];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t length;
+} tpm_nv_read_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf, },
+10, 18, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_write_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[256];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t length;
+	uint16_t data;
+} tpm_nv_write_cmd = {{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd, },
+10, 18, 22, };
+
+const struct s_tpm_nv_definespace_cmd{
+	uint8_t buffer[101];
+	uint16_t index;
+	uint16_t perm;
+	uint16_t size;
+} tpm_nv_definespace_cmd = {
+	{0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc,
+	0x0, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0x0, 0x3, 0, 0, 0, 0x1f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0, 0x17,
+	},
+	12, 70, 77,
+};
+
+const int kWriteInfoLength = 12;
+const int kNvDataPublicPermissionsOffset = 60;
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ce09a4f8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.c
@@ -0,0 +1,559 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+#include <arch/early_variables.h>
+#include <commonlib/iobuf.h>
+#include <console/console.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "tpm2_marshaling.h"
+
+static uint16_t tpm_tag CAR_GLOBAL;  /* Depends on the command type. */
+
+#define unmarshal_TPM_CAP(a, b) ibuf_read_be32(a, b)
+#define unmarshal_TPM_CC(a, b) ibuf_read_be32(a, b)
+#define unmarshal_TPM_PT(a, b) ibuf_read_be32(a, b)
+#define unmarshal_TPM_HANDLE(a, b) ibuf_read_be32(a, b)
+
+#define marshal_TPM_HANDLE(a, b) obuf_write_be32(a, b)
+#define marshal_TPMI_ALG_HASH(a, b) obuf_write_be16(a, b)
+
+static int marshal_startup(struct obuf *ob, struct tpm2_startup *cmd_body)
+{
+	return obuf_write_be16(ob, cmd_body->startup_type);
+}
+
+static int marshal_get_capability(struct obuf *ob,
+				   struct tpm2_get_capability *cmd_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, cmd_body->capability);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, cmd_body->property);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, cmd_body->propertyCount);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_TPM2B(struct obuf *ob, TPM2B *data)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, data->size);
+	rc |= obuf_write(ob, data->buffer, data->size);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_TPMA_NV(struct obuf *ob, TPMA_NV *nv)
+{
+	uint32_t v;
+
+	memcpy(&v, nv, sizeof(v));
+	return obuf_write_be32(ob, v);
+}
+
+static int marshal_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC(struct obuf *ob, TPMS_NV_PUBLIC *nvpub)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= marshal_TPM_HANDLE(ob, nvpub->nvIndex);
+	rc |= marshal_TPMI_ALG_HASH(ob, nvpub->nameAlg);
+	rc |= marshal_TPMA_NV(ob, &nvpub->attributes);
+	rc |= marshal_TPM2B(ob, &nvpub->authPolicy.b);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, nvpub->dataSize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_TPMT_HA(struct obuf *ob, TPMT_HA *tpmtha)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= marshal_TPMI_ALG_HASH(ob, tpmtha->hashAlg);
+	rc |= obuf_write(ob, tpmtha->digest.sha256,
+			sizeof(tpmtha->digest.sha256));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_TPML_DIGEST_VALUES(struct obuf *ob,
+				       TPML_DIGEST_VALUES *dvalues)
+{
+	int i;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, dvalues->count);
+	for (i = 0; i < dvalues->count; i++)
+		rc |= marshal_TPMT_HA(ob, &dvalues->digests[i]);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_session_header(struct obuf *ob,
+				   struct tpm2_session_header *session_header)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct obuf ob_sz;
+	size_t prev_written;
+
+	/* Snapshot current location to place size of header. */
+	if (obuf_splice_current(ob, &ob_sz, sizeof(uint32_t)) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Write a size placeholder. */
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, 0);
+
+	/* Keep track of session header data size by tracking num written. */
+	prev_written = obuf_nr_written(ob);
+
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, session_header->session_handle);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, session_header->nonce_size);
+	rc |= obuf_write(ob, session_header->nonce, session_header->nonce_size);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be8(ob, session_header->session_attrs);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, session_header->auth_size);
+	rc |= obuf_write(ob, session_header->auth, session_header->auth_size);
+
+	/* Fill back in proper size of session header. */
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(&ob_sz, obuf_nr_written(ob) - prev_written);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common session header can include one or two handles and an empty
+ * session_header structure.
+ */
+static int marshal_common_session_header(struct obuf *ob,
+					  const uint32_t *handles,
+					  size_t handle_count)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	struct tpm2_session_header session_header;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	car_set_var(tpm_tag, TPM_ST_SESSIONS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < handle_count; i++)
+		rc |= marshal_TPM_HANDLE(ob, handles[i]);
+
+	memset(&session_header, 0, sizeof(session_header));
+	session_header.session_handle = TPM_RS_PW;
+	rc |= marshal_session_header(ob, &session_header);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_nv_define_space(struct obuf *ob,
+				    struct tpm2_nv_define_space_cmd *nvd_in)
+{
+	const uint32_t handle[] = { TPM_RH_PLATFORM };
+	struct obuf ob_sz;
+	size_t prev_written;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= marshal_common_session_header(ob, handle, ARRAY_SIZE(handle));
+	rc |= marshal_TPM2B(ob, &nvd_in->auth.b);
+
+	/* Snapshot current location to place size field. */
+	if (obuf_splice_current(ob, &ob_sz, sizeof(uint16_t)) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Put placeholder for size */
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, 0);
+
+	/* Keep track of nv define space data size by tracking num written. */
+	prev_written = obuf_nr_written(ob);
+
+	rc |= marshal_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC(ob, &nvd_in->publicInfo);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(&ob_sz, obuf_nr_written(ob) - prev_written);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_nv_write(struct obuf *ob,
+			     struct tpm2_nv_write_cmd *command_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	uint32_t handles[] = { TPM_RH_PLATFORM, command_body->nvIndex };
+
+	rc |= marshal_common_session_header(ob, handles, ARRAY_SIZE(handles));
+	rc |= marshal_TPM2B(ob, &command_body->data.b);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, command_body->offset);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_nv_write_lock(struct obuf *ob,
+				  struct tpm2_nv_write_lock_cmd *command_body)
+{
+	uint32_t handles[] = { TPM_RH_PLATFORM, command_body->nvIndex };
+
+	return marshal_common_session_header(ob, handles, ARRAY_SIZE(handles));
+}
+
+static int marshal_pcr_extend(struct obuf *ob,
+			       struct tpm2_pcr_extend_cmd *command_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	uint32_t handles[] = { command_body->pcrHandle };
+
+	rc |= marshal_common_session_header(ob, handles, ARRAY_SIZE(handles));
+	rc |= marshal_TPML_DIGEST_VALUES(ob, &command_body->digests);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_nv_read(struct obuf *ob,
+			    struct tpm2_nv_read_cmd *command_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	uint32_t handles[] = { TPM_RH_PLATFORM, command_body->nvIndex };
+
+	rc |= marshal_common_session_header(ob, handles, ARRAY_SIZE(handles));
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, command_body->size);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, command_body->offset);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* TPM2_Clear command does not require paramaters. */
+static int marshal_clear(struct obuf *ob)
+{
+	const uint32_t handle[] = { TPM_RH_PLATFORM };
+
+	return marshal_common_session_header(ob, handle, ARRAY_SIZE(handle));
+}
+
+static int marshal_selftest(struct obuf *ob,
+			     struct tpm2_self_test *command_body)
+{
+	return obuf_write_be8(ob, command_body->yes_no);
+}
+
+static int marshal_hierarchy_control(struct obuf *ob,
+			struct tpm2_hierarchy_control_cmd *command_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct tpm2_session_header session_header;
+
+	car_set_var(tpm_tag, TPM_ST_SESSIONS);
+
+	rc |= marshal_TPM_HANDLE(ob, TPM_RH_PLATFORM);
+	memset(&session_header, 0, sizeof(session_header));
+	session_header.session_handle = TPM_RS_PW;
+	rc |= marshal_session_header(ob, &session_header);
+
+	rc |= marshal_TPM_HANDLE(ob, command_body->enable);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be8(ob, command_body->state);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int marshal_cr50_vendor_command(struct obuf *ob, void *command_body)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	uint16_t *sub_command = command_body;
+
+	switch (*sub_command) {
+	case TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS:
+		rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, *sub_command);
+		break;
+	case TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON:
+		rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, sub_command[0]);
+		rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, sub_command[1]);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Unsupported subcommand. */
+		printk(BIOS_WARNING, "Unsupported cr50 subcommand: 0x%04x\n",
+			*sub_command);
+		rc = -1;
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int tpm_marshal_command(TPM_CC command, void *tpm_command_body, struct obuf *ob)
+{
+	struct obuf ob_hdr;
+	const size_t hdr_sz = sizeof(uint16_t) + 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	car_set_var(tpm_tag, TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+
+	if (obuf_splice_current(ob, &ob_hdr, hdr_sz) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Write TPM command header with placeholder field values. */
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(ob, 0);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, 0);
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(ob, command);
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (command) {
+	case TPM2_Startup:
+		rc |= marshal_startup(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_GetCapability:
+		rc |= marshal_get_capability(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_NV_Read:
+		rc |= marshal_nv_read(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_NV_DefineSpace:
+		rc |= marshal_nv_define_space(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_NV_Write:
+		rc |= marshal_nv_write(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_NV_WriteLock:
+		rc |= marshal_nv_write_lock(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_SelfTest:
+		rc |= marshal_selftest(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_Hierarchy_Control:
+		rc |= marshal_hierarchy_control(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_Clear:
+		rc |= marshal_clear(ob);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_PCR_Extend:
+		rc |= marshal_pcr_extend(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND:
+		rc |= marshal_cr50_vendor_command(ob, tpm_command_body);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%d:Request to marshal unsupported command %#x\n",
+		       __FILE__, __LINE__, command);
+		rc = -1;
+	}
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Fix up the command header with known values. */
+	rc |= obuf_write_be16(&ob_hdr, car_get_var(tpm_tag));
+	rc |= obuf_write_be32(&ob_hdr, obuf_nr_written(ob));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int unmarshal_get_capability(struct ibuf *ib,
+				     struct get_cap_response *gcr)
+{
+	int i;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= ibuf_read_be8(ib, &gcr->more_data);
+	rc |= unmarshal_TPM_CAP(ib, &gcr->cd.capability);
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (gcr->cd.capability) {
+	case TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES:
+		if (ibuf_read_be32(ib, &gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.count))
+			return -1;
+		if (gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.count > ARRAY_SIZE
+		    (gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.tpmProperty)) {
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d - %d - too many properties\n",
+			       __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__,
+			       gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.count);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.count; i++) {
+			TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY *pp;
+
+			pp = gcr->cd.data.tpmProperties.tpmProperty + i;
+			rc |= unmarshal_TPM_PT(ib, &pp->property);
+			rc |= ibuf_read_be32(ib, &pp->value);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(BIOS_ERR,
+		       "%s:%d - unable to unmarshal capability response",
+		       __func__, __LINE__);
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, " for %d\n", gcr->cd.capability);
+		rc = -1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int unmarshal_TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER(struct ibuf *ib,
+					  TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER *nv_buffer)
+{
+	if (ibuf_read_be16(ib, &nv_buffer->t.size))
+		return -1;
+
+	nv_buffer->t.buffer = ibuf_oob_drain(ib, nv_buffer->t.size);
+
+	if (nv_buffer->t.buffer == NULL) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "%s:%d - "
+		       "size mismatch: expected %d, remaining %zd\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, nv_buffer->t.size,
+			ibuf_remaining(ib));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unmarshal_nv_read(struct ibuf *ib, struct nv_read_response *nvr)
+{
+	/* Total size of the parameter field. */
+	if (ibuf_read_be32(ib, &nvr->params_size))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (unmarshal_TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER(ib, &nvr->buffer))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (nvr->params_size !=
+	    (nvr->buffer.t.size + sizeof(nvr->buffer.t.size))) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR,
+		       "%s:%d - parameter/buffer %d/%d size mismatch",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, nvr->params_size,
+		       nvr->buffer.t.size);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Let's ignore the authorisation section. It should be 5 bytes total,
+	 * just confirm that this is the case and report any discrepancy.
+	 */
+	if (ibuf_remaining(ib) != 5)
+		printk(BIOS_ERR,
+		       "%s:%d - unexpected authorisation seciton size %zd\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, ibuf_remaining(ib));
+
+	ibuf_oob_drain(ib, ibuf_remaining(ib));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unmarshal_vendor_command(struct ibuf *ib,
+				     struct vendor_command_response *vcr)
+{
+	if (ibuf_read_be16(ib, &vcr->vc_subcommand))
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (vcr->vc_subcommand) {
+	case TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS:
+		break;
+	case TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON:
+		return ibuf_read_be8(ib, &vcr->num_restored_headers);
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(BIOS_ERR,
+		       "%s:%d - unsupported vendor command %#04x!\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, vcr->vc_subcommand);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_response *tpm_unmarshal_response(TPM_CC command, struct ibuf *ib)
+{
+	static struct tpm2_response tpm2_static_resp CAR_GLOBAL;
+	struct tpm2_response *tpm2_resp = car_get_var_ptr(&tpm2_static_resp);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc |= ibuf_read_be16(ib, &tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_tag);
+	rc |= ibuf_read_be32(ib, &tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_size);
+	rc |= unmarshal_TPM_CC(ib, &tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_code);
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (ibuf_remaining(ib) == 0) {
+		if (tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_size != ibuf_nr_read(ib))
+			printk(BIOS_ERR,
+			       "%s: size mismatch in response to command %#x\n",
+			       __func__, command);
+		return tpm2_resp;
+	}
+
+	switch (command) {
+	case TPM2_Startup:
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_GetCapability:
+		rc |= unmarshal_get_capability(ib, &tpm2_resp->gc);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_NV_Read:
+		rc |= unmarshal_nv_read(ib, &tpm2_resp->nvr);
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_Hierarchy_Control:
+	case TPM2_Clear:
+	case TPM2_NV_DefineSpace:
+	case TPM2_NV_Write:
+	case TPM2_NV_WriteLock:
+	case TPM2_PCR_Extend:
+		/* Session data included in response can be safely ignored. */
+		ibuf_oob_drain(ib, ibuf_remaining(ib));
+		break;
+
+	case TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND:
+		rc |= unmarshal_vendor_command(ib, &tpm2_resp->vcr);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		{
+			size_t i;
+			size_t sz_left;
+			const uint8_t *data;
+
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%d:"
+			       "Request to unmarshal unexpected command %#x,"
+			       " code %#x",
+			       __func__, __LINE__, command,
+			       tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_code);
+
+			sz_left = ibuf_remaining(ib);
+			data = ibuf_oob_drain(ib, sz_left);
+
+			for (i = 0; i < sz_left; i++) {
+				if (!(i % 16))
+					printk(BIOS_INFO, "\n");
+				printk(BIOS_INFO, "%2.2x ", data[i]);
+			}
+		}
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (ibuf_remaining(ib)) {
+		printk(BIOS_INFO,
+		       "%s:%d got %d bytes back in response to %#x,"
+		       " failed to parse (%zd)\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, tpm2_resp->hdr.tpm_size,
+		       command, ibuf_remaining(ib));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* The entire message have been parsed. */
+	return tpm2_resp;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.h b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5802044378
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_marshaling.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+#ifndef __SRC_LIB_TPM2_MARSHALING_H
+#define __SRC_LIB_TPM2_MARSHALING_H
+
+#include <commonlib/iobuf.h>
+#include "tpm2_tlcl_structures.h"
+
+/* The below functions are used to serialize/deserialize TPM2 commands. */
+
+/**
+ * tpm_marshal_command
+ *
+ * Given a structure containing a TPM2 command, serialize the structure for
+ * sending it to the TPM.
+ *
+ * @command: code of the TPM2 command to marshal
+ * @tpm_command_body: a pointer to the command specific structure
+ * @ob: output buffer where command is marshaled to
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on error.
+ *
+ */
+int tpm_marshal_command(TPM_CC command, void *tpm_command_body,
+			struct obuf *ob);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_unmarshal_response
+ *
+ * Given a buffer received from the TPM in response to a certain command,
+ * deserialize the buffer into the expeced response structure.
+ *
+ * struct tpm2_response is a union of all possible responses.
+ *
+ * @command: code of the TPM2 command for which a response is unmarshaled
+ * @ib: input buffer containing the serialized response.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the deserialized response or NULL in case of
+ * unmarshaling problems.
+ */
+struct tpm2_response *tpm_unmarshal_response(TPM_CC command, struct ibuf *ib);
+
+#endif // __SRC_LIB_TPM2_MARSHALING_H
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e111b89ae2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+#include <arch/early_variables.h>
+#include <console/console.h>
+#include <endian.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <vb2_api.h>
+
+#include "tpm2_tlcl_structures.h"
+#include "tpm2_marshaling.h"
+#include "../tpm.h"
+#include "../antirollback.h"
+
+/*
+ * This file provides interface between firmware and TPM2 device. The TPM1.2
+ * API was copied as is and relevant functions modified to comply with the
+ * TPM2 specification.
+ */
+
+static void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body)
+{
+	struct obuf ob;
+	struct ibuf ib;
+	size_t out_size;
+	size_t in_size;
+	const uint8_t *sendb;
+	/* Command/response buffer. */
+	static uint8_t cr_buffer[TPM_BUFFER_SIZE] CAR_GLOBAL;
+
+	uint8_t *cr_buffer_ptr = car_get_var_ptr(cr_buffer);
+
+	obuf_init(&ob, cr_buffer_ptr, sizeof(cr_buffer));
+
+	if (tpm_marshal_command(command, command_body, &ob) < 0) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "command %#x\n", command);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	sendb = obuf_contents(&ob, &out_size);
+
+	in_size = sizeof(cr_buffer);
+	if (tis_sendrecv(sendb, out_size, cr_buffer_ptr, &in_size)) {
+		printk(BIOS_ERR, "tpm transaction failed\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ibuf_init(&ib, cr_buffer_ptr, in_size);
+
+	return tpm_unmarshal_response(command, &ib);
+}
+
+
+uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags)
+{
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static uint32_t tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU type)
+{
+	struct tpm2_startup startup;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	startup.startup_type = type;
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Startup, &startup);
+
+	if (response && response->hdr.tpm_code &&
+	    (response->hdr.tpm_code != TPM_RC_INITIALIZE)) {
+		printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: Startup return code is %x\n",
+		       __func__, response->hdr.tpm_code);
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+	}
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_resume(void)
+{
+	return tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU_STATE);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_assert_physical_presence(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Nothing to do on TPM2 for this, use platform hierarchy availability
+	 * instead.
+	 */
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The caller will provide the digest in a 32 byte buffer, let's consider it a
+ * sha256 digest.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
+		     uint8_t *out_digest)
+{
+	struct tpm2_pcr_extend_cmd pcr_ext_cmd;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	pcr_ext_cmd.pcrHandle = HR_PCR + pcr_num;
+	pcr_ext_cmd.digests.count = 1;
+	pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].hashAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+	memcpy(pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].digest.sha256, in_digest,
+	       sizeof(pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].digest.sha256));
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_PCR_Extend, &pcr_ext_cmd);
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_finalize_physical_presence(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing needs to be done with tpm2. */
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void)
+{
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Clear, NULL);
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
+			uint8_t *nvlocked)
+{
+	/*
+	 * TPM2 does not map directly into these flags TPM1.2 based firmware
+	 * expects to be able to retrieve.
+	 *
+	 * In any case, if any of these conditions are present, the following
+	 * firmware flow would be interrupted and will have a chance to report
+	 * an error. Let's just hardcode an "All OK" response for now.
+	 */
+
+	if (disable)
+		*disable = 0;
+
+	if (nvlocked)
+		*nvlocked = 1;
+
+	if (deactivated)
+		*deactivated = 0;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static uint8_t tlcl_init_done CAR_GLOBAL;
+
+/* This function is called directly by vboot, uses vboot return types. */
+uint32_t tlcl_lib_init(void)
+{
+	uint8_t done = car_get_var(tlcl_init_done);
+	if (done)
+		return VB2_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (tis_init())
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+	if (tis_open())
+		return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
+
+	car_set_var(tlcl_init_done, 1);
+
+	return VB2_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable(void)
+{
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_read(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t length)
+{
+	struct tpm2_nv_read_cmd nv_readc;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	memset(&nv_readc, 0, sizeof(nv_readc));
+
+	nv_readc.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index;
+	nv_readc.size = length;
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_Read, &nv_readc);
+
+	/* Need to map tpm error codes into internal values. */
+	if (!response)
+		return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%d index %#x return code %x\n",
+	       __FILE__, __LINE__, index, response->hdr.tpm_code);
+	switch (response->hdr.tpm_code) {
+	case 0:
+		break;
+
+		/* Uninitialized, returned if the space hasn't been written. */
+	case TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED:
+		/*
+		 * Bad index, cr50 specific value, returned if the space
+		 * hasn't been defined.
+		 */
+	case TPM_RC_CR50_NV_UNDEFINED:
+		return TPM_E_BADINDEX;
+
+	default:
+		return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (length > response->nvr.buffer.t.size)
+		return TPM_E_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE;
+
+	if (length < response->nvr.buffer.t.size)
+		return TPM_E_READ_EMPTY;
+
+	memcpy(data, response->nvr.buffer.t.buffer, length);
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void)
+{
+	struct tpm2_self_test st;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	st.yes_no = 1;
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_SelfTest, &st);
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag)
+{
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void)
+{
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_lock_nv_write(uint32_t index)
+{
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+	/* TPM Wll reject attempts to write at non-defined index. */
+	struct tpm2_nv_write_lock_cmd nv_wl = {
+		.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index,
+	};
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_WriteLock, &nv_wl);
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_startup(void)
+{
+	return tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR);
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
+{
+	struct tpm2_nv_write_cmd nv_writec;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	memset(&nv_writec, 0, sizeof(nv_writec));
+
+	nv_writec.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index;
+	nv_writec.data.t.size = length;
+	nv_writec.data.t.buffer = data;
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_Write, &nv_writec);
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+
+	/* Need to map tpm error codes into internal values. */
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size)
+{
+	struct tpm2_nv_define_space_cmd nvds_cmd;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+	/*
+	 * Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
+	 * i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
+	 * the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
+	 */
+	const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
+		.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
+	};
+	const TPMA_NV default_space_attributes = {
+		.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
+		.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
+	};
+
+	/* Prepare the define space command structure. */
+	memset(&nvds_cmd, 0, sizeof(nvds_cmd));
+
+	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.dataSize = space_size;
+	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + space_index;
+	nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nameAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+
+	/* RO only NV spaces should be impossible to destroy. */
+	if ((space_index == FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX) ||
+	    (space_index == REC_HASH_NV_INDEX)) {
+		/*
+		 * This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyPCR
+		 * selecting only PCR_0 with a value of all zeros.
+		 */
+		const uint8_t pcr0_unchanged_policy[] = {
+			0x09, 0x93, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0xEB, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x11,
+			0x18, 0x81, 0x1D, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x78, 0x80, 0x08,
+			0x88, 0x86, 0x62, 0x2D, 0xD7, 0x79, 0x94, 0x46,
+			0x62, 0x26, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x6A, 0xA1
+		};
+
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = ro_space_attributes;
+		/*
+		 * Use policy digest based on default pcr0 value. This makes
+		 * sure that the space can not be deleted as soon as PCR0
+		 * value has been extended from default.
+		 */
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.buffer = pcr0_unchanged_policy;
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.size =
+			sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy);
+	} else {
+		nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = default_space_attributes;
+	}
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_DefineSpace, &nvds_cmd);
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
+	       __func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
+
+	if (!response)
+		return TPM_E_NO_DEVICE;
+
+	/* Map TPM2 retrun codes into common vboot represenation. */
+	switch (response->hdr.tpm_code) {
+	case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS:
+		return TPM_SUCCESS;
+	case TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED:
+		return TPM_E_NV_DEFINED;
+	default:
+		return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
+	}
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void)
+{
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+	struct tpm2_hierarchy_control_cmd hc = {
+		.enable = TPM_RH_PLATFORM,
+		.state = 0,
+	};
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Hierarchy_Control, &hc);
+
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
+
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void)
+{
+	uint16_t sub_command = TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS;
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Enabling cr50 nvmem commmits\n");
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, &sub_command);
+
+	if (response == NULL || (response && response->hdr.tpm_code)) {
+		if (response)
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed %x\n", __func__,
+				response->hdr.tpm_code);
+		else
+			printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed\n", __func__);
+		return TPM_E_IOERROR;
+	}
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
+				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers)
+{
+	struct tpm2_response *response;
+	uint16_t command_body[] = {
+		TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON, timeout_ms
+	};
+
+	printk(BIOS_INFO, "Checking cr50 for pending updates\n");
+
+	response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, command_body);
+
+	if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
+		return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
+
+	*num_restored_headers = response->vcr.num_restored_headers;
+	return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl_structures.h b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl_structures.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..acd9e74aec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tcg-2.0/tpm2_tlcl_structures.h
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SRC_LIB_TPM2_TLCL_STRUCTURES_H
+#define __SRC_LIB_TPM2_TLCL_STRUCTURES_H
+
+/*
+ * This file includes a subset of definitions of TPM protocol version 2.x
+ * constants and structures needed for functions used in coreboot.
+ */
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <compiler.h>
+#include <types.h>
+
+#include "../tlcl.h"
+
+/* This should be plenty for what firmware needs. */
+#define TPM_BUFFER_SIZE 256
+
+/* Basic TPM2 types. */
+typedef uint16_t TPM_SU;
+typedef uint16_t TPM_ALG_ID;
+typedef uint32_t TPM_CC;
+typedef uint32_t TPM_HANDLE;
+typedef uint32_t TPM_RC;
+typedef uint8_t TPMI_YES_NO;
+typedef TPM_ALG_ID TPMI_ALG_HASH;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_DH_PCR;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_RH_ENABLES;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPM_RH;
+
+/* Some hardcoded algorithm values. */
+#define TPM_ALG_HMAC   ((TPM_ALG_ID)0x0005)
+#define TPM_ALG_NULL   ((TPM_ALG_ID)0x0010)
+#define TPM_ALG_SHA1   ((TPM_ALG_ID)0x0004)
+#define TPM_ALG_SHA256 ((TPM_ALG_ID)0x000b)
+
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+
+/* Some hardcoded hierarchies. */
+#define TPM_RH_NULL         0x40000007
+#define TPM_RS_PW           0x40000009
+#define TPM_RH_PLATFORM     0x4000000C
+
+typedef struct {
+	uint16_t      size;
+	uint8_t       *buffer;
+} TPM2B;
+
+/* Relevant TPM Command's structures. */
+/* Common command/response header. */
+struct tpm_header {
+	uint16_t tpm_tag;
+	uint32_t tpm_size;
+	TPM_CC tpm_code;
+} __packed;
+
+/* TPM command codes. */
+#define TPM2_Hierarchy_Control ((TPM_CC)0x00000121)
+#define TPM2_Clear             ((TPM_CC)0x00000126)
+#define TPM2_NV_DefineSpace    ((TPM_CC)0x0000012A)
+#define TPM2_NV_Write          ((TPM_CC)0x00000137)
+#define TPM2_NV_WriteLock      ((TPM_CC)0x00000138)
+#define TPM2_SelfTest          ((TPM_CC)0x00000143)
+#define TPM2_Startup           ((TPM_CC)0x00000144)
+#define TPM2_NV_Read           ((TPM_CC)0x0000014E)
+#define TPM2_GetCapability     ((TPM_CC)0x0000017A)
+#define TPM2_PCR_Extend        ((TPM_CC)0x00000182)
+/* TPM2 specifies vendor commands need to have this bit set. Vendor command
+   space is defined by the lower 16 bits. */
+#define TPM_CC_VENDOR_BIT_MASK 0x20000000
+/* FIXME: below is not enough to differentiate between vendors commands
+   of numerous devices. However, the current tpm2 APIs aren't very amenable
+   to extending generically because the marshaling code is assuming all
+   knowledge of all commands. */
+#define TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND ((TPM_CC)(TPM_CC_VENDOR_BIT_MASK | 0))
+#define  TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS (21)
+#define  TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON (24)
+
+/* Startup values. */
+#define TPM_SU_CLEAR 0
+#define TPM_SU_STATE 1
+
+#define TPM_HT_PCR             0x00
+#define TPM_HT_NV_INDEX        0x01
+#define TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION    0x02
+#define TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION  0x03
+
+#define HR_SHIFT               24
+#define HR_PCR                (TPM_HT_PCR <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_HMAC_SESSION       (TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_POLICY_SESSION     (TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_TRANSIENT          (TPM_HT_TRANSIENT <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_PERSISTENT         (TPM_HT_PERSISTENT <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_NV_INDEX           (TPM_HT_NV_INDEX <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define HR_PERMANENT          (TPM_HT_PERMANENT <<  HR_SHIFT)
+#define PCR_FIRST             (HR_PCR + 0)
+#define PCR_LAST              (PCR_FIRST + IMPLEMENTATION_PCR-1)
+#define HMAC_SESSION_FIRST    (HR_HMAC_SESSION + 0)
+#define HMAC_SESSION_LAST     (HMAC_SESSION_FIRST+MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS-1)
+#define LOADED_SESSION_FIRST  HMAC_SESSION_FIRST
+#define LOADED_SESSION_LAST   HMAC_SESSION_LAST
+#define POLICY_SESSION_FIRST  (HR_POLICY_SESSION + 0)
+#define POLICY_SESSION_LAST   (POLICY_SESSION_FIRST + MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS-1)
+#define TRANSIENT_FIRST       (HR_TRANSIENT + 0)
+#define ACTIVE_SESSION_FIRST  POLICY_SESSION_FIRST
+#define ACTIVE_SESSION_LAST   POLICY_SESSION_LAST
+#define TRANSIENT_LAST        (TRANSIENT_FIRST+MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS-1)
+#define PERSISTENT_FIRST      (HR_PERSISTENT + 0)
+#define PERSISTENT_LAST       (PERSISTENT_FIRST + 0x00FFFFFF)
+#define PLATFORM_PERSISTENT   (PERSISTENT_FIRST + 0x00800000)
+#define NV_INDEX_FIRST        (HR_NV_INDEX + 0)
+#define NV_INDEX_LAST         (NV_INDEX_FIRST + 0x00FFFFFF)
+#define PERMANENT_FIRST       TPM_RH_FIRST
+#define PERMANENT_LAST        TPM_RH_LAST
+
+/* Tpm2 command tags. */
+#define TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS 0x8001
+#define TPM_ST_SESSIONS    0x8002
+
+/* Values copied from tpm2/tpm_types.h */
+#define RC_VER1                                         0x100
+#define TPM_RC_INITIALIZE         ((TPM_RC)(RC_VER1 + 0x000))
+#define TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED	  ((TPM_RC)(RC_VER1 + 0x04A))
+
+/*
+ * Cr50 returns this code when an attempt is made to read an NV location which
+ * has not yet been defined. This is an aggregation of various return code
+ * extensions which may or may not match if a different TPM2 device is
+ * used.
+ */
+#define TPM_RC_CR50_NV_UNDEFINED  0x28b
+
+/* TPM command structures. */
+
+struct tpm2_startup {
+	TPM_SU  startup_type;
+};
+
+/* Various TPM capability types to use when querying the device. */
+typedef uint32_t TPM_CAP;
+#define TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES   ((TPM_CAP)0x00000006)
+
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH;
+typedef TPM_HANDLE TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX;
+
+/* TPM Property capability constants. */
+typedef uint32_t TPM_PT;
+#define PT_GROUP                                   0x00000100
+#define PT_VAR                                 (PT_GROUP * 2)
+#define TPM_PT_PERMANENT               ((TPM_PT)(PT_VAR + 0))
+
+/* Structures of payloads of various TPM2 commands. */
+struct tpm2_get_capability {
+	TPM_CAP capability;
+	uint32_t property;
+	uint32_t propertyCount;
+};
+
+/* get_capability response when PT_PERMANENT is requested. */
+typedef struct {
+	uint32_t ownerAuthSet       : 1;
+	uint32_t endorsementAuthSet : 1;
+	uint32_t lockoutAuthSet     : 1;
+	uint32_t reserved3_7        : 5;
+	uint32_t disableClear       : 1;
+	uint32_t inLockout          : 1;
+	uint32_t tpmGeneratedEPS    : 1;
+	uint32_t reserved11_31      : 21;
+} TPMA_PERMANENT;
+
+typedef struct {
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_PPWRITE        : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE     : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE      : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE    : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_COUNTER        : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_BITS           : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_EXTEND         : 1;
+	uint32_t reserved7_9            : 3;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE  : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED    : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_WRITEALL       : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE    : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR  : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK     : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_PPREAD         : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD      : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD       : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD     : 1;
+	uint32_t reserved20_24          : 5;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_NO_DA          : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_ORDERLY        : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR  : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_READLOCKED     : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_WRITTEN        : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE : 1;
+	uint32_t TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR   : 1;
+} TPMA_NV;
+
+typedef union {
+	struct {
+		uint16_t  size;
+		const uint8_t   *buffer;
+	} t;
+	TPM2B b;
+} TPM2B_DIGEST;
+
+typedef TPM2B_DIGEST TPM2B_AUTH;
+typedef TPM2B_DIGEST TPM2B_NONCE;
+
+typedef struct {
+	TPM_PT  property;
+	uint32_t  value;
+} TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY;
+
+#define MAX_CAP_DATA (TPM_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct tpm_header) - \
+		      sizeof(TPMI_YES_NO) - sizeof(TPM_CAP) - sizeof(uint32_t))
+#define MAX_TPM_PROPERTIES  (MAX_CAP_DATA/sizeof(TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY))
+
+/* Somewhat arbitrary, leave enough room for command wrappers. */
+#define MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE (TPM_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct tpm_header) - 50)
+
+typedef struct {
+	uint32_t              count;
+	TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY  tpmProperty[MAX_TPM_PROPERTIES];
+} TPML_TAGGED_TPM_PROPERTY;
+
+typedef union {
+	TPML_TAGGED_TPM_PROPERTY  tpmProperties;
+} TPMU_CAPABILITIES;
+
+typedef struct {
+	TPM_CAP            capability;
+	TPMU_CAPABILITIES  data;
+} TPMS_CAPABILITY_DATA;
+
+struct get_cap_response {
+	TPMI_YES_NO more_data;
+	TPMS_CAPABILITY_DATA cd;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+	TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX  nvIndex;
+	TPMI_ALG_HASH     nameAlg;
+	TPMA_NV           attributes;
+	TPM2B_DIGEST      authPolicy;
+	uint16_t          dataSize;
+} TPMS_NV_PUBLIC;
+
+typedef union {
+	struct {
+		uint16_t        size;
+		TPMS_NV_PUBLIC  nvPublic;
+	} t;
+	TPM2B b;
+} TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC;
+
+typedef union {
+	struct {
+		uint16_t  size;
+		const uint8_t   *buffer;
+	} t;
+	TPM2B b;
+} TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER;
+
+/*
+ * This is a union, but as of now we support just one digest - sha256, so
+ * there is just one element.
+ */
+typedef union {
+	uint8_t  sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} TPMU_HA;
+
+typedef struct {
+	TPMI_ALG_HASH  hashAlg;
+	TPMU_HA        digest;
+} TPMT_HA;
+
+typedef struct {
+	uint32_t   count;
+	TPMT_HA  digests[1];  /* Limit max number of hashes to 1. */
+} TPML_DIGEST_VALUES;
+
+struct nv_read_response {
+	uint32_t params_size;
+	TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER buffer;
+};
+
+struct vendor_command_response {
+	uint16_t vc_subcommand;
+	union {
+		uint8_t num_restored_headers;
+	};
+};
+
+struct tpm2_session_attrs {
+	uint8_t continueSession : 1;
+	uint8_t auditExclusive  : 1;
+	uint8_t auditReset      : 1;
+	uint8_t reserved3_4     : 2;
+	uint8_t decrypt         : 1;
+	uint8_t encrypt         : 1;
+	uint8_t audit           : 1;
+};
+
+/*
+ * TPM session header for commands requiring session information. Also
+ * included in the responses to those commands.
+ */
+struct tpm2_session_header {
+	uint32_t session_handle;
+	uint16_t nonce_size;
+	uint8_t *nonce;
+	union {
+		struct tpm2_session_attrs session_attr_bits;
+		uint8_t session_attrs;
+	}  __packed;
+	uint16_t auth_size;
+	uint8_t *auth;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_response {
+	struct tpm_header hdr;
+	union {
+		struct get_cap_response gc;
+		struct nv_read_response nvr;
+		struct tpm2_session_header def_space;
+		struct vendor_command_response vcr;
+	};
+};
+
+struct tpm2_nv_define_space_cmd {
+	TPM2B_AUTH auth;
+	TPMS_NV_PUBLIC publicInfo;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_nv_write_cmd {
+	TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nvIndex;
+	TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER data;
+	uint16_t offset;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_self_test {
+	TPMI_YES_NO yes_no;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_nv_read_cmd {
+	TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nvIndex;
+	uint16_t size;
+	uint16_t offset;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_nv_write_lock_cmd {
+	TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nvIndex;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_pcr_extend_cmd {
+	TPMI_DH_PCR pcrHandle;
+	TPML_DIGEST_VALUES digests;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_hierarchy_control_cmd {
+	TPMI_RH_ENABLES enable;
+	TPMI_YES_NO state;
+};
+
+#endif // __SRC_LIB_TPM2_TLCL_STRUCTURES_H
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tlcl.h b/src/security/tpm/tlcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8dd5d80685
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tlcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * TPM Lightweight Command Library.
+ *
+ * A low-level library for interfacing to TPM hardware or an emulator.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TPM_LITE_TLCL_H_
+#define TPM_LITE_TLCL_H_
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <types.h>
+
+#include "tss_constants.h"
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+/* Functions implemented in tlcl.c */
+
+/**
+ * Call this first.  Returns 0 if success, nonzero if error.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_lib_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * Perform a raw TPM request/response transaction.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_send_receive(const uint8_t *request, uint8_t *response,
+			   int max_length);
+
+/* Commands */
+
+/**
+ * Send a TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR).  The TPM error code is returned (0 for
+ * success).
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_startup(void);
+
+/**
+ * Resume by sending a TPM_Startup(ST_STATE).  The TPM error code is returned
+ * (0 for success).
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_resume(void);
+
+/**
+ * Run the self test.
+ *
+ * Note---this is synchronous.  To run this in parallel with other firmware,
+ * use ContinueSelfTest().  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void);
+
+/**
+ * Run the self test in the background.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_continue_self_test(void);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM)
+/**
+ * Define a space with permission [perm].  [index] is the index for the space,
+ * [size] the usable data size.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size);
+
+#elif IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TPM2)
+
+/*
+ * Define a TPM space. The define space command TPM command used by the tlcl
+ * layer is enforcing the policy which would not allow to delete the created
+ * space after any PCR0 change from its initial value.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Write [length] bytes of [data] to space at [index].  The TPM error code is
+ * returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length);
+
+/**
+ * Read [length] bytes from space at [index] into [data].  The TPM error code
+ * is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_read(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t length);
+
+/**
+ * Assert physical presence in software.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_assert_physical_presence(void);
+
+/**
+ * Enable the physical presence command.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable(void);
+
+/**
+ * Finalize the physical presence settings: sofware PP is enabled, hardware PP
+ * is disabled, and the lifetime lock is set.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_finalize_physical_presence(void);
+
+/**
+ * Set the nvLocked bit.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_nv_locked(void);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a ForceClear.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a PhysicalEnable.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void);
+
+/**
+ * Issue a SetDeactivated.  Pass 0 to activate.  Returns result code.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag);
+
+/**
+ * Get flags of interest.  Pointers for flags you aren't interested in may
+ * be NULL.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
+			uint8_t *nvlocked);
+
+/**
+ * Set the bGlobalLock flag, which only a reboot can clear.  The TPM error
+ * code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_set_global_lock(void);
+
+/**
+ * Make an NV Ram location read_only.  The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_lock_nv_write(uint32_t index);
+
+/**
+ * Perform a TPM_Extend.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
+		     uint8_t *out_digest);
+
+/**
+ * Get the entire set of permanent flags.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags);
+
+/**
+ * Disable platform hierarchy. Specific to TPM2. The TPM error code is returned.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void);
+
+/**
+ * CR50 specific tpm command to enable nvmem commits before internal timeout
+ * expires.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void);
+
+/**
+ * CR50 specific tpm command to restore header(s) of the dormant RO/RW
+ * image(s) and in case there indeed was a dormant image, trigger reboot after
+ * the timeout milliseconds. Note that timeout of zero means "NO REBOOT", not
+ * "IMMEDIATE REBOOT".
+ *
+ * Return value indicates success or failure of accessing the TPM; in case of
+ * success the number of restored headers is saved in num_restored_headers.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
+				 uint8_t *num_restored_headers);
+
+#endif  /* TPM_LITE_TLCL_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tpm.h b/src/security/tpm/tpm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32a44c17eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * This file is part of the coreboot project.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TPM_H_
+#define TPM_H_
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+enum tis_access {
+	TPM_ACCESS_VALID = (1 << 7),
+	TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY = (1 << 5),
+	TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_PENDING = (1 << 2),
+	TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE = (1 << 1),
+	TPM_ACCESS_ESTABLISHMENT = (1 << 0),
+};
+
+enum tis_status {
+	TPM_STS_FAMILY_SHIFT = 26,
+	TPM_STS_FAMILY_MASK = (0x3 << TPM_STS_FAMILY_SHIFT),
+	TPM_STS_FAMILY_TPM_2_0 = (1 << TPM_STS_FAMILY_SHIFT),
+	TPM_STS_FAMILY_TPM_1_2 = (0 << TPM_STS_FAMILY_SHIFT),
+	TPM_STS_RESET_ESTABLISHMENT = (1 << 25),
+	TPM_STS_COMMAND_CANCEL = (1 << 24),
+	TPM_STS_BURST_COUNT_SHIFT = 8,
+	TPM_STS_BURST_COUNT_MASK = (0xFFFF << TPM_STS_BURST_COUNT_SHIFT),
+	TPM_STS_VALID = (1 << 7),
+	TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY = (1 << 6),
+	TPM_STS_GO = (1 << 5),
+	TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL = (1 << 4),
+	TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT = (1 << 3),
+	TPM_STS_SELF_TEST_DONE = (1 << 2),
+	TPM_STS_RESPONSE_RETRY = (1 << 1),
+};
+
+/*
+ * tis_init()
+ *
+ * Initialize the TPM device. Returns 0 on success or -1 on
+ * failure (in case device probing did not succeed).
+ */
+int tis_init(void);
+
+/*
+ * tis_open()
+ *
+ * Requests access to locality 0 for the caller. After all commands have been
+ * completed the caller is supposed to call tis_close().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int tis_open(void);
+
+/*
+ * tis_close()
+ *
+ * terminate the currect session with the TPM by releasing the locked
+ * locality. Returns 0 on success of -1 on failure (in case lock
+ * removal did not succeed).
+ */
+int tis_close(void);
+
+/*
+ * tis_sendrecv()
+ *
+ * Send the requested data to the TPM and then try to get its response
+ *
+ * @sendbuf - buffer of the data to send
+ * @send_size size of the data to send
+ * @recvbuf - memory to save the response to
+ * @recv_len - pointer to the size of the response buffer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success (and places the number of response bytes at recv_len)
+ * or -1 on failure.
+ */
+int tis_sendrecv(const u8 *sendbuf, size_t send_size, u8 *recvbuf,
+			size_t *recv_len);
+
+void init_tpm(int s3resume);
+
+/*
+ * tis_plat_irq_status()
+ *
+ * Check tpm irq and clear it.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when irq pending or 0 when not.
+ */
+int tis_plat_irq_status(void);
+
+#endif /* TPM_H_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tpm_error_messages.h b/src/security/tpm/tpm_error_messages.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac7cd4e859
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tpm_error_messages.h
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+/* TPM error codes.
+ *
+ * Copy-pasted and lightly edited from TCG TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures
+ * Version 1.2 Level 2 Revision 103 26 October 2006 Draft.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TPM_ERROR_MESSAGES_H
+#define TPM_ERROR_MESSAGES_H
+
+#define TPM_E_BASE 0x0
+#define TPM_E_NON_FATAL 0x800
+
+typedef struct tpm_error_info {
+	const char *name;
+	uint32_t code;
+	const char *description;
+} tpm_error_info;
+
+tpm_error_info tpm_error_table[] = {
+	{"TPM_AUTHFAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 1,
+	 "Authentication failed"},
+	{"TPM_BADINDEX", TPM_E_BASE + 2,
+	 "The index to a PCR, DIR or other register is incorrect"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_PARAMETER", TPM_E_BASE + 3,
+	 "One or more parameter is bad"},
+	{"TPM_AUDITFAILURE", TPM_E_BASE + 4,
+	 "An operation completed successfully\n\
+but the auditing of that operation failed"},
+	{"TPM_CLEAR_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 5,
+	 "The clear disable flag is set and all clear operations now require\n\
+physical access"},
+	{"TPM_DEACTIVATED", TPM_E_BASE + 6,
+	 "The TPM is deactivated"},
+	{"TPM_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 7,
+	 "The TPM is disabled"},
+	{"TPM_DISABLED_CMD", TPM_E_BASE + 8,
+	 "The target command has been disabled"},
+	{"TPM_FAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 9,
+	 "The operation failed"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_ORDINAL", TPM_E_BASE + 10,
+	 "The ordinal was unknown or inconsistent"},
+	{"TPM_INSTALL_DISABLED", TPM_E_BASE + 11,
+	 "The ability to install an owner is disabled"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_KEYHANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 12,
+	 "The key handle can not be interpreted"},
+	{"TPM_KEYNOTFOUND", TPM_E_BASE + 13,
+	 "The key handle points to an invalid key"},
+	{"TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC", TPM_E_BASE + 14,
+	 "Unacceptable encryption scheme"},
+	{"TPM_MIGRATEFAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 15,
+	 "Migration authorization failed"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO", TPM_E_BASE + 16,
+	 "PCR information could not be interpreted"},
+	{"TPM_NOSPACE", TPM_E_BASE + 17,
+	 "No room to load key"},
+	{"TPM_NOSRK", TPM_E_BASE + 18,
+	 "There is no SRK set"},
+	{"TPM_NOTSEALED_BLOB", TPM_E_BASE + 19,
+	 "An encrypted blob is invalid or was not created by this TPM"},
+	{"TPM_OWNER_SET", TPM_E_BASE + 20,
+	 "There is already an Owner"},
+	{"TPM_RESOURCES", TPM_E_BASE + 21,
+	 "The TPM has insufficient internal resources to perform the requested \
+action"},
+	{"TPM_SHORTRANDOM", TPM_E_BASE + 22,
+	 "A random string was too short"},
+	{"TPM_SIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 23,
+	 "The TPM does not have the space to perform the operation"},
+	{"TPM_WRONGPCRVAL", TPM_E_BASE + 24,
+	 "The named PCR value does not match the current PCR value"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 25,
+	 "The paramSize argument to the command has the incorrect value"},
+	{"TPM_SHA_THREAD", TPM_E_BASE + 26,
+	 "There is no existing SHA-1 thread"},
+	{"TPM_SHA_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 27,
+	 "The calculation is unable to proceed because the existing SHA-1\n\
+thread has already encountered an error"},
+	{"TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + 28,
+	 "Self-test has failed and the TPM has shutdown"},
+	{"TPM_AUTH2FAIL", TPM_E_BASE + 29,
+	 "The authorization for the second key in a 2 key function\n\
+failed authorization"},
+	{"TPM_BADTAG", TPM_E_BASE + 30,
+	 "The tag value sent to for a command is invalid"},
+	{"TPM_IOERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 31,
+	 "An IO error occurred transmitting information to the TPM"},
+	{"TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 32,
+	 "The encryption process had a problem"},
+	{"TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR", TPM_E_BASE + 33,
+	 "The decryption process did not complete"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 34,
+	 "An invalid handle was used"},
+	{"TPM_NO_ENDORSEMENT", TPM_E_BASE + 35,
+	 "The TPM does not a EK installed"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE", TPM_E_BASE + 36,
+	 "The usage of a key is not allowed"},
+	{"TPM_WRONG_ENTITYTYPE", TPM_E_BASE + 37,
+	 "The submitted entity type is not allowed"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_POSTINIT", TPM_E_BASE + 38,
+	 "The command was received in the wrong sequence relative to TPM_Init\n\
+and a subsequent TPM_Startup"},
+	{"TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_SIG", TPM_E_BASE + 39,
+	 "Signed data cannot include additional DER information"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY", TPM_E_BASE + 40,
+	 "The key properties in TPM_KEY_PARMs are not supported by this TPM"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_MIGRATION", TPM_E_BASE + 41,
+	 "The migration properties of this key are incorrect"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_SCHEME", TPM_E_BASE + 42,
+	 "The signature or encryption scheme for this key is incorrect or not\n\
+permitted in this situation"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_DATASIZE", TPM_E_BASE + 43,
+	 "The size of the data (or blob) parameter is bad or inconsistent\n\
+with the referenced key"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_MODE", TPM_E_BASE + 44,
+	 "A mode parameter is bad, such as capArea or subCapArea for\n\
+TPM_GetCapability, physicalPresence parameter for TPM_PhysicalPresence,\n\
+or migrationType for, TPM_CreateMigrationBlob"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_PRESENCE", TPM_E_BASE + 45,
+	 "Either the physicalPresence or physicalPresenceLock bits\n\
+have the wrong value"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_VERSION", TPM_E_BASE + 46,
+	 "The TPM cannot perform this version of the capability"},
+	{"TPM_NO_WRAP_TRANSPORT", TPM_E_BASE + 47,
+	 "The TPM does not allow for wrapped transport sessions"},
+	{"TPM_AUDITFAIL_UNSUCCESSFUL", TPM_E_BASE + 48,
+	 "TPM audit construction failed and the underlying command\n\
+was returning a failure code also"},
+	{"TPM_AUDITFAIL_SUCCESSFUL", TPM_E_BASE + 49,
+	 "TPM audit construction failed and the underlying command\n\
+was returning success"},
+	{"TPM_NOTRESETABLE", TPM_E_BASE + 50,
+	 "Attempt to reset a PCR register that does not have the resettable \
+attribute"},
+	{"TPM_NOTLOCAL", TPM_E_BASE + 51,
+	 "Attempt to reset a PCR register that requires locality\n\
+and locality modifier not part of command transport"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_TYPE", TPM_E_BASE + 52,
+	 "Make identity blob not properly typed"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_RESOURCE", TPM_E_BASE + 53,
+	 "When saving context identified resource type does not match actual \
+resource"},
+	{"TPM_NOTFIPS", TPM_E_BASE + 54,
+	 "The TPM is attempting to execute a command only available when in \
+FIPS mode"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_FAMILY", TPM_E_BASE + 55,
+	 "The command is attempting to use an invalid family ID"},
+	{"TPM_NO_NV_PERMISSION", TPM_E_BASE + 56,
+	 "The permission to manipulate the NV storage is not available"},
+	{"TPM_REQUIRES_SIGN", TPM_E_BASE + 57,
+	 "The operation requires a signed command"},
+	{"TPM_KEY_NOTSUPPORTED", TPM_E_BASE + 58,
+	 "Wrong operation to load an NV key"},
+	{"TPM_AUTH_CONFLICT", TPM_E_BASE + 59,
+	 "NV_LoadKey blob requires both owner and blob authorization"},
+	{"TPM_AREA_LOCKED", TPM_E_BASE + 60,
+	 "The NV area is locked and not writable"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_LOCALITY", TPM_E_BASE + 61,
+	 "The locality is incorrect for the attempted operation"},
+	{"TPM_READ_ONLY", TPM_E_BASE + 62,
+	 "The NV area is read only and can't be written to"},
+	{"TPM_PER_NOWRITE", TPM_E_BASE + 63,
+	 "There is no protection on the write to the NV area"},
+	{"TPM_FAMILYCOUNT", TPM_E_BASE + 64,
+	 "The family count value does not match"},
+	{"TPM_WRITE_LOCKED", TPM_E_BASE + 65,
+	 "The NV area has already been written to"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_ATTRIBUTES", TPM_E_BASE + 66,
+	 "The NV area attributes conflict"},
+	{"TPM_INVALID_STRUCTURE", TPM_E_BASE + 67,
+	 "The structure tag and version are invalid or inconsistent"},
+	{"TPM_KEY_OWNER_CONTROL", TPM_E_BASE + 68,
+	 "The key is under control of the TPM Owner and can only be evicted\n\
+by the TPM Owner"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_COUNTER", TPM_E_BASE + 69,
+	 "The counter handle is incorrect"},
+	{"TPM_NOT_FULLWRITE", TPM_E_BASE + 70,
+	 "The write is not a complete write of the area"},
+	{"TPM_CONTEXT_GAP", TPM_E_BASE + 71,
+	 "The gap between saved context counts is too large"},
+	{"TPM_MAXNVWRITES", TPM_E_BASE + 72,
+	 "The maximum number of NV writes without an owner has been exceeded"},
+	{"TPM_NOOPERATOR", TPM_E_BASE + 73,
+	 "No operator AuthData value is set"},
+	{"TPM_RESOURCEMISSING", TPM_E_BASE + 74,
+	 "The resource pointed to by context is not loaded"},
+	{"TPM_DELEGATE_LOCK", TPM_E_BASE + 75,
+	 "The delegate administration is locked"},
+	{"TPM_DELEGATE_FAMILY", TPM_E_BASE + 76,
+	 "Attempt to manage a family other then the delegated family"},
+	{"TPM_DELEGATE_ADMIN", TPM_E_BASE + 77,
+	 "Delegation table management not enabled"},
+	{"TPM_TRANSPORT_NOTEXCLUSIVE", TPM_E_BASE + 78,
+	 "There was a command executed outside of an exclusive transport \
+session"},
+	{"TPM_OWNER_CONTROL", TPM_E_BASE + 79,
+	 "Attempt to context save a owner evict controlled key"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_RESOURCES", TPM_E_BASE + 80,
+	 "The DAA command has no resources available to execute the command"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA0", TPM_E_BASE + 81,
+	 "The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData0 has failed"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA1", TPM_E_BASE + 82,
+	 "The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData1 has failed"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_ISSUER_SETTINGS", TPM_E_BASE + 83,
+	 "The consistency check on DAA_issuerSettings has failed"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_TPM_SETTINGS", TPM_E_BASE + 84,
+	 "The consistency check on DAA_tpmSpecific has failed"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_STAGE", TPM_E_BASE + 85,
+	 "The atomic process indicated by the submitted DAA command is not\n\
+the expected process"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_ISSUER_VALIDITY", TPM_E_BASE + 86,
+	 "The issuer's validity check has detected an inconsistency"},
+	{"TPM_DAA_WRONG_W", TPM_E_BASE + 87,
+	 "The consistency check on w has failed"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_HANDLE", TPM_E_BASE + 88,
+	 "The handle is incorrect"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_DELEGATE", TPM_E_BASE + 89,
+	 "Delegation is not correct"},
+	{"TPM_BADCONTEXT", TPM_E_BASE + 90,
+	 "The context blob is invalid"},
+	{"TPM_TOOMANYCONTEXTS", TPM_E_BASE + 91,
+	 "Too many contexts held by the TPM"},
+	{"TPM_MA_TICKET_SIGNATURE", TPM_E_BASE + 92,
+	 "Migration authority signature validation failure"},
+	{"TPM_MA_DESTINATION", TPM_E_BASE + 93,
+	 "Migration destination not authenticated"},
+	{"TPM_MA_SOURCE", TPM_E_BASE + 94,
+	 "Migration source incorrect"},
+	{"TPM_MA_AUTHORITY", TPM_E_BASE + 95,
+	 "Incorrect migration authority"},
+	{"TPM_PERMANENTEK", TPM_E_BASE + 97,
+	 "Attempt to revoke the EK and the EK is not revocable"},
+	{"TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE", TPM_E_BASE + 98,
+	 "Bad signature of CMK ticket"},
+	{"TPM_NOCONTEXTSPACE", TPM_E_BASE + 99,
+	 "There is no room in the context list for additional contexts"},
+	{"TPM_RETRY", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL,
+	 "The TPM is too busy to respond to the command immediately, but\n\
+the command could be resubmitted at a later time.  The TPM MAY\n\
+return TPM_RETRY for any command at any time"},
+	{"TPM_NEEDS_SELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 1,
+	 "TPM_ContinueSelfTest has not been run"},
+	{"TPM_DOING_SELFTEST", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 2,
+	 "The TPM is currently executing the actions of TPM_ContinueSelfTest\n\
+because the ordinal required resources that have not been tested"},
+	{"TPM_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING", TPM_E_BASE + TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 3,
+	 "The TPM is defending against dictionary attacks and is in some\n\
+time-out period"},
+};
+
+#endif				/* TPM_ERROR_MESSAGES_H */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h b/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..937e553969
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss_constants.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ *
+ * Some TPM constants and type definitions for standalone compilation for use
+ * in the firmware
+ */
+#ifndef VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_
+#define VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define TPM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE 4096
+#define TPM_LARGE_ENOUGH_COMMAND_SIZE 256  /* saves space in the firmware */
+#define TPM_PUBEK_SIZE 256
+#define TPM_PCR_DIGEST 20
+
+#define TPM_E_NON_FATAL 0x800
+
+#define TPM_SUCCESS ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
+
+#define TPM_E_AREA_LOCKED           ((uint32_t)0x0000003c)
+#define TPM_E_BADINDEX              ((uint32_t)0x00000002)
+#define TPM_E_BAD_PRESENCE          ((uint32_t)0x0000002d)
+#define TPM_E_IOERROR               ((uint32_t)0x0000001f)
+#define TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT      ((uint32_t)0x00000026)
+#define TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES           ((uint32_t)0x00000048)
+#define TPM_E_OWNER_SET             ((uint32_t)0x00000014)
+
+#define TPM_E_NEEDS_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 1))
+#define TPM_E_DOING_SELFTEST ((uint32_t)(TPM_E_NON_FATAL + 2))
+
+#define TPM_E_ALREADY_INITIALIZED    ((uint32_t)0x00005000)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY ((uint32_t)0x00005001)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT            ((uint32_t)0x00005002)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE        ((uint32_t)0x00005003)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_COMMUNICATION_ERROR    ((uint32_t)0x00005004)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE     ((uint32_t)0x00005005)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_NO_DEVICE              ((uint32_t)0x00005006)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_INPUT_TOO_SMALL        ((uint32_t)0x00005007)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE          ((uint32_t)0x00005008)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_READ_EMPTY             ((uint32_t)0x00005009)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_READ_FAILURE           ((uint32_t)0x0000500a)  /* vboot local */
+#define TPM_E_NV_DEFINED             ((uint32_t)0x0000500b)  /* vboot local */
+
+#define TPM_NV_INDEX0 ((uint32_t)0x00000000)
+#define TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK ((uint32_t)0xffffffff)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK (((uint32_t)1)<<15)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE (((uint32_t)1)<<0)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<31)
+#define TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR (((uint32_t)1)<<14)
+
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc1)
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc2)
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc3)
+
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND       ((uint16_t) 0xc4)
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc5)
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND ((uint16_t) 0xc6)
+
+/* Some TPM2 return codes used in this library. */
+#define TPM2_RC_SUCCESS    0
+#define TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED 0x14c
+
+typedef uint8_t TSS_BOOL;
+typedef uint16_t TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG;
+
+typedef struct tdTPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS {
+	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
+	TSS_BOOL disable;
+	TSS_BOOL ownership;
+	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
+	TSS_BOOL readPubek;
+	TSS_BOOL disableOwnerClear;
+	TSS_BOOL allowMaintenance;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceHWEnable;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
+	TSS_BOOL CEKPUsed;
+	TSS_BOOL TPMpost;
+	TSS_BOOL TPMpostLock;
+	TSS_BOOL FIPS;
+	TSS_BOOL Operator;
+	TSS_BOOL enableRevokeEK;
+	TSS_BOOL nvLocked;
+	TSS_BOOL readSRKPub;
+	TSS_BOOL tpmEstablished;
+	TSS_BOOL maintenanceDone;
+	TSS_BOOL disableFullDALogicInfo;
+} TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS;
+
+typedef struct tdTPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS {
+	TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG tag;
+	TSS_BOOL deactivated;
+	TSS_BOOL disableForceClear;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresence;
+	TSS_BOOL physicalPresenceLock;
+	TSS_BOOL bGlobalLock;
+} TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS;
+
+#endif  /* VBOOT_REFERENCE_TSS_CONSTANTS_H_ */