/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */

#include <console/console.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi/crtm.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi/logs.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <security/vboot/misc.h>
#include <vb2_api.h>
#include <vb2_sha.h>

#if CONFIG(TPM1)
static uint32_t tpm1_invoke_state_machine(void)
{
	uint8_t disabled;
	uint8_t deactivated;
	uint32_t rc = TPM_SUCCESS;

	/* Check that the TPM is enabled and activated. */
	rc = tlcl_get_flags(&disabled, &deactivated, NULL);
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't read capabilities.\n");
		return rc;
	}

	if (disabled) {
		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: is disabled. Enabling...\n");

		rc = tlcl_set_enable();
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
			return rc;
		}
	}

	if (!!deactivated != CONFIG(TPM_DEACTIVATE)) {
		printk(BIOS_INFO,
		       "TPM: Unexpected TPM deactivated state. Toggling...\n");
		rc = tlcl_set_deactivated(!deactivated);
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR,
			       "TPM: Can't toggle deactivated state.\n");
			return rc;
		}

		deactivated = !deactivated;
		rc = TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
	}

	return rc;
}
#endif

static uint32_t tpm_setup_s3_helper(void)
{
	uint32_t rc;

	rc = tlcl_resume();
	switch (rc) {
	case TPM_SUCCESS:
		break;

	case TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT:
		/*
		 * We're on a platform where the TPM maintains power
		 * in S3, so it's already initialized.
		 */
		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Already initialized.\n");
		rc = TPM_SUCCESS;
		break;

	default:
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Resume failed (%#x).\n", rc);
		break;
	}

	return rc;
}

static uint32_t tpm_setup_epilogue(uint32_t rc)
{
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS)
		post_code(POSTCODE_TPM_FAILURE);
	else
		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: setup succeeded\n");

	return rc;
}

static int tpm_is_setup;
static inline int tspi_tpm_is_setup(void)
{
	/*
	 * vboot_logic_executed() only starts returning true at the end of
	 * verstage, but the vboot logic itself already wants to extend PCRs
	 * before that. So in the stage where verification actually runs, we
	 * need to check tpm_is_setup. Skip that check in all other stages so
	 * this whole function can be evaluated at compile time.
	 */
	if (CONFIG(VBOOT)) {
		if (verification_should_run())
			return tpm_is_setup;
		return vboot_logic_executed();
	}

	if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT_INIT_BOOTBLOCK))
		return ENV_BOOTBLOCK ? tpm_is_setup : 1;

	if (ENV_RAMSTAGE)
		return tpm_is_setup;

	return 0;
}

/*
 * tpm_setup starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the
 * anti-rollback mechanism.  tpm_setup can fail for three reasons.  1 A bug.
 * 2 a TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack.  In
 * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is
 * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases.  The recovery mode calls tpm_setup
 * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations.  There is a
 * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the
 * failure will repeat itself.  (In general this is impossible to guarantee
 * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the
 * previous boot.)  In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus
 * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set
 * bGlobalLock).  The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a
 * bricked device.
 *
 * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using
 * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces.  We do this to avoid writing
 * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about
 * the durability of the NVRAM.
 */
uint32_t tpm_setup(int s3flag)
{
	uint32_t rc;

	rc = tlcl_lib_init();
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize.\n");
		return tpm_setup_epilogue(rc);
	}

	/* Handle special init for S3 resume path */
	if (s3flag) {
		printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Handle S3 resume.\n");
		return tpm_setup_epilogue(tpm_setup_s3_helper());
	}

	rc = tlcl_startup();
	if (CONFIG(TPM_STARTUP_IGNORE_POSTINIT)
	    && rc == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
		printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: ignoring invalid POSTINIT\n");
		rc = TPM_SUCCESS;
	}
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't run startup command.\n");
		return tpm_setup_epilogue(rc);
	}

	rc = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		/*
		 * It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical
		 * presence command disabled.  This tries enabling it, then
		 * tries asserting PP again.
		 */
		rc = tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable();
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't enable physical presence command.\n");
			return tpm_setup_epilogue(rc);
		}

		rc = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't assert physical presence.\n");
			return tpm_setup_epilogue(rc);
		}
	}

#if CONFIG(TPM1)
	rc = tpm1_invoke_state_machine();
#endif
	if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT))
		rc = tspi_measure_cache_to_pcr();

	tpm_is_setup = 1;
	return tpm_setup_epilogue(rc);
}

uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
{
	uint32_t rc;

	printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
	rc = tlcl_force_clear();
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initiate a force clear.\n");
		return rc;
	}

#if CONFIG(TPM1)
	rc = tlcl_set_enable();
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
		return rc;
	}

	rc = tlcl_set_deactivated(0);
	if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set deactivated state.\n");
		return rc;
	}
#endif

	return TPM_SUCCESS;
}

uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(int pcr, enum vb2_hash_algorithm digest_algo,
			const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const char *name)
{
	uint32_t rc;

	if (!digest)
		return TPM_E_IOERROR;

	if (tspi_tpm_is_setup()) {
		rc = tlcl_lib_init();
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize library.\n");
			return rc;
		}

		printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Extending digest for `%s` into PCR %d\n", name, pcr);
		rc = tlcl_extend(pcr, digest, digest_algo);
		if (rc != TPM_SUCCESS) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Extending hash for `%s` into PCR %d failed.\n",
			       name, pcr);
			return rc;
		}
	}

	if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT))
		tpm_log_add_table_entry(name, pcr, digest_algo, digest, digest_len);

	printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Digest of `%s` to PCR %d %s\n",
	       name, pcr, tspi_tpm_is_setup() ? "measured" : "logged");

	return TPM_SUCCESS;
}

#if CONFIG(VBOOT_LIB)
uint32_t tpm_measure_region(const struct region_device *rdev, uint8_t pcr,
			    const char *rname)
{
	uint8_t digest[TPM_PCR_MAX_LEN], digest_len;
	uint8_t buf[HASH_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE];
	uint32_t offset;
	size_t len;
	struct vb2_digest_context ctx;

	if (!rdev || !rname)
		return TPM_E_INVALID_ARG;

	digest_len = vb2_digest_size(TPM_MEASURE_ALGO);
	assert(digest_len <= sizeof(digest));
	if (vb2_digest_init(&ctx, vboot_hwcrypto_allowed(), TPM_MEASURE_ALGO,
			    region_device_sz(rdev))) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error initializing hash.\n");
		return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
	}
	/*
	 * Though one can mmap the full needed region on x86 this is not the
	 * case for e.g. ARM. In order to make this code as universal as
	 * possible across different platforms read the data to hash in chunks.
	 */
	for (offset = 0; offset < region_device_sz(rdev); offset += len) {
		len = MIN(sizeof(buf), region_device_sz(rdev) - offset);
		if (rdev_readat(rdev, buf, offset, len) < 0) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Not able to read region %s.\n",
			       rname);
			return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
		}
		if (vb2_digest_extend(&ctx, buf, len)) {
			printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error extending hash.\n");
			return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
		}
	}
	if (vb2_digest_finalize(&ctx, digest, digest_len)) {
		printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error finalizing hash.\n");
		return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
	}
	return tpm_extend_pcr(pcr, TPM_MEASURE_ALGO, digest, digest_len, rname);
}
#endif /* VBOOT_LIB */