/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if CONFIG(TPM1) static uint32_t tpm1_invoke_state_machine(void) { uint8_t disabled; uint8_t deactivated; uint32_t result = TPM_SUCCESS; /* Check that the TPM is enabled and activated. */ result = tlcl_get_flags(&disabled, &deactivated, NULL); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't read capabilities.\n"); return result; } if (disabled) { printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: is disabled. Enabling...\n"); result = tlcl_set_enable(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n"); return result; } } if (!!deactivated != CONFIG(TPM_DEACTIVATE)) { printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Unexpected TPM deactivated state. Toggling...\n"); result = tlcl_set_deactivated(!deactivated); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't toggle deactivated state.\n"); return result; } deactivated = !deactivated; result = TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT; } return result; } #endif static uint32_t tpm_setup_s3_helper(void) { uint32_t result; result = tlcl_resume(); switch (result) { case TPM_SUCCESS: break; case TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT: /* * We're on a platform where the TPM maintains power * in S3, so it's already initialized. */ printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Already initialized.\n"); result = TPM_SUCCESS; break; default: printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Resume failed (%#x).\n", result); break; } return result; } static uint32_t tpm_setup_epilogue(uint32_t result) { if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) post_code(POST_TPM_FAILURE); else printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: setup succeeded\n"); return result; } static int tpm_is_setup; static inline int tspi_tpm_is_setup(void) { /* * vboot_logic_executed() only starts returning true at the end of * verstage, but the vboot logic itself already wants to extend PCRs * before that. So in the stage where verification actually runs, we * need to check tpm_is_setup. Skip that check in all other stages so * this whole function can be evaluated at compile time. */ if (CONFIG(VBOOT)) { if (verification_should_run()) return tpm_is_setup; return vboot_logic_executed(); } if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT_INIT_BOOTBLOCK)) return ENV_BOOTBLOCK ? tpm_is_setup : 1; if (ENV_RAMSTAGE) return tpm_is_setup; return 0; } /* * tpm_setup starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the * anti-rollback mechanism. tpm_setup can fail for three reasons. 1 A bug. * 2 a TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack. In * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases. The recovery mode calls tpm_setup * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations. There is a * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the * failure will repeat itself. (In general this is impossible to guarantee * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the * previous boot.) In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set * bGlobalLock). The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a * bricked device. * * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces. We do this to avoid writing * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about * the durability of the NVRAM. */ uint32_t tpm_setup(int s3flag) { uint32_t result; result = tlcl_lib_init(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize.\n"); return tpm_setup_epilogue(result); } /* Handle special init for S3 resume path */ if (s3flag) { printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Handle S3 resume.\n"); return tpm_setup_epilogue(tpm_setup_s3_helper()); } result = tlcl_startup(); if (CONFIG(TPM_STARTUP_IGNORE_POSTINIT) && result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) { printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: ignoring invalid POSTINIT\n"); result = TPM_SUCCESS; } if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't run startup command.\n"); return tpm_setup_epilogue(result); } result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { /* * It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical * presence command disabled. This tries enabling it, then * tries asserting PP again. */ result = tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't enable physical presence command.\n"); return tpm_setup_epilogue(result); } result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't assert physical presence.\n"); return tpm_setup_epilogue(result); } } #if CONFIG(TPM1) result = tpm1_invoke_state_machine(); #endif if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT)) result = tspi_measure_cache_to_pcr(); tpm_is_setup = 1; return tpm_setup_epilogue(result); } uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void) { uint32_t result; printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Clear and re-enable\n"); result = tlcl_force_clear(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initiate a force clear.\n"); return result; } #if CONFIG(TPM1) result = tlcl_set_enable(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n"); return result; } result = tlcl_set_deactivated(0); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set deactivated state.\n"); return result; } #endif return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(int pcr, enum vb2_hash_algorithm digest_algo, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const char *name) { uint32_t result; if (!digest) return TPM_E_IOERROR; if (tspi_tpm_is_setup()) { result = tlcl_lib_init(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize library.\n"); return result; } printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Extending digest for `%s` into PCR %d\n", name, pcr); result = tlcl_extend(pcr, digest, digest_algo); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Extending hash for `%s` into PCR %d failed.\n", name, pcr); return result; } } if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT)) tcpa_log_add_table_entry(name, pcr, digest_algo, digest, digest_len); printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Digest of `%s` to PCR %d %s\n", name, pcr, tspi_tpm_is_setup() ? "measured" : "logged"); return TPM_SUCCESS; } #if CONFIG(VBOOT_LIB) uint32_t tpm_measure_region(const struct region_device *rdev, uint8_t pcr, const char *rname) { uint8_t digest[TPM_PCR_MAX_LEN], digest_len; uint8_t buf[HASH_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE]; uint32_t offset; size_t len; struct vb2_digest_context ctx; if (!rdev || !rname) return TPM_E_INVALID_ARG; digest_len = vb2_digest_size(TPM_MEASURE_ALGO); assert(digest_len <= sizeof(digest)); if (vb2_digest_init(&ctx, vboot_hwcrypto_allowed(), TPM_MEASURE_ALGO, region_device_sz(rdev))) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error initializing hash.\n"); return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR; } /* * Though one can mmap the full needed region on x86 this is not the * case for e.g. ARM. In order to make this code as universal as * possible across different platforms read the data to hash in chunks. */ for (offset = 0; offset < region_device_sz(rdev); offset += len) { len = MIN(sizeof(buf), region_device_sz(rdev) - offset); if (rdev_readat(rdev, buf, offset, len) < 0) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Not able to read region %s.\n", rname); return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE; } if (vb2_digest_extend(&ctx, buf, len)) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error extending hash.\n"); return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR; } } if (vb2_digest_finalize(&ctx, digest, digest_len)) { printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error finalizing hash.\n"); return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR; } return tpm_extend_pcr(pcr, TPM_MEASURE_ALGO, digest, digest_len, rname); } #endif /* VBOOT_LIB */