From 834b3ecd7cbefbad8f09a9bda4f10cd7842cdbcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julius Werner Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 16:52:08 -0800 Subject: cbfs: Simplify load/map API names, remove type arguments MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This patch renames cbfs_boot_map_with_leak() and cbfs_boot_load_file() to cbfs_map() and cbfs_load() respectively. This is supposed to be the start of a new, better organized CBFS API where the most common operations have the most simple and straight-forward names. Less commonly used variants of these operations (e.g. cbfs_ro_load() or cbfs_region_load()) can be introduced later. It seems unnecessary to keep carrying around "boot" in the names of most CBFS APIs if the vast majority of accesses go to the boot CBFS (instead, more unusual operations should have longer names that describe how they diverge from the common ones). cbfs_map() is paired with a new cbfs_unmap() to allow callers to cleanly reap mappings when desired. A few new cbfs_unmap() calls are added to generic code where it makes sense, but it seems unnecessary to introduce this everywhere in platform or architecture specific code where the boot medium is known to be memory-mapped anyway. In fact, even for non-memory-mapped platforms, sometimes leaking a mapping to the CBFS cache is a much cleaner solution than jumping through hoops to provide some other storage for some long-lived file object, and it shouldn't be outright forbidden when it makes sense. Additionally, remove the type arguments from these function signatures. The goal is to eventually remove type arguments for lookup from the whole CBFS API. Filenames already uniquely identify CBFS files. The type field is just informational, and there should be APIs to allow callers to check it when desired, but it's not clear what we gain from forcing this as a parameter into every single CBFS access when the vast majority of the time it provides no additional value and is just clutter. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner Change-Id: Ib24325400815a9c3d25f66c61829a24a239bb88e Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39304 Reviewed-by: Hung-Te Lin Reviewed-by: Wim Vervoorn Reviewed-by: Mariusz Szafrański Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) --- src/security/intel/stm/StmPlatformSmm.c | 3 +-- src/security/intel/txt/ramstage.c | 11 ++++------- src/security/vboot/ec_sync.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/security') diff --git a/src/security/intel/stm/StmPlatformSmm.c b/src/security/intel/stm/StmPlatformSmm.c index eb9a0bb22f..abd7667355 100644 --- a/src/security/intel/stm/StmPlatformSmm.c +++ b/src/security/intel/stm/StmPlatformSmm.c @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ int load_stm_image(uintptr_t mseg) memset((void *)mseg_base, 0, CONFIG_MSEG_SIZE); // clear the mseg - stm_image_size = cbfs_boot_load_file("stm.bin", mseg_base, - stm_buffer_size, CBFS_TYPE_RAW); + stm_image_size = cbfs_load("stm.bin", mseg_base, stm_buffer_size); printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "STM:loaded into mseg: 0x%p size: %u\n", mseg_base, stm_image_size); /* status is number of bytes loaded */ diff --git a/src/security/intel/txt/ramstage.c b/src/security/intel/txt/ramstage.c index 76eeaaffef..81d2dd1083 100644 --- a/src/security/intel/txt/ramstage.c +++ b/src/security/intel/txt/ramstage.c @@ -221,10 +221,9 @@ static void txt_initialize_heap(void) data.bdr.no_logical_procs = dev_count_cpu(); void *sinit_base = (void *)(uintptr_t)read64((void *)TXT_SINIT_BASE); - data.bdr.bios_sinit_size = cbfs_boot_load_file(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT_CBFS_SINIT_ACM, - sinit_base, - read64((void *)TXT_SINIT_SIZE), - CBFS_TYPE_RAW); + data.bdr.bios_sinit_size = cbfs_load(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT_CBFS_SINIT_ACM, + sinit_base, + read64((void *)TXT_SINIT_SIZE)); if (data.bdr.bios_sinit_size) { printk(BIOS_INFO, "TEE-TXT: Placing SINIT ACM in memory.\n"); @@ -277,9 +276,7 @@ static void txt_initialize_heap(void) data.heap_acm.num_acms = 1; } data.heap_acm.acm_addrs[0] = - (uintptr_t)cbfs_boot_map_with_leak(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT_CBFS_BIOS_ACM, - CBFS_TYPE_RAW, - NULL); + (uintptr_t)cbfs_map(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT_CBFS_BIOS_ACM, NULL); /* Extended elements - End marker */ data.end.type = HEAP_EXTDATA_TYPE_END; data.end.size = sizeof(data.end); diff --git a/src/security/vboot/ec_sync.c b/src/security/vboot/ec_sync.c index 1fd7e7590b..7e3d29a4ab 100644 --- a/src/security/vboot/ec_sync.c +++ b/src/security/vboot/ec_sync.c @@ -385,7 +385,9 @@ static vb2_error_t ec_get_expected_hash(enum vb2_firmware_selection select, { size_t size; const char *filename = EC_HASH_FILENAME(select); - const uint8_t *file = cbfs_boot_map_with_leak(filename, CBFS_TYPE_RAW, &size); + + /* vboot has no API to return this memory, so must permanently leak a mapping here. */ + const uint8_t *file = cbfs_map(filename, &size); if (file == NULL) return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN; -- cgit v1.2.3