From 2fdabd90382fc468a339201031c21974baa8c1e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Rudolph Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 10:57:01 +0200 Subject: smmstore: Verify userspace-provided pointer to protect SMM Use the introduced functions and verify pointers in the SMMSTORE. Make sure to not overwrite or leak data from SMM and update the documentation as well. Change-Id: I70df08657c3fa0f98917742d8e1a6cb1077e3758 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph Signed-off-by: Christian Walter Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41085 Reviewed-by: Angel Pons Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) --- Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md b/Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md index 53bac4dc9e..70827477df 100644 --- a/Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md +++ b/Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ storage driver. ## SMMSTORE -SMMSTORE is a SMM mediated driver to read from, write to and erase a +SMMSTORE is a [SMM] mediated driver to read from, write to and erase a predefined region in flash. It can be enabled by setting `CONFIG_SMMSTORE=y` in menuconfig. @@ -117,7 +117,18 @@ INPUT: - `val`: pointer to the value data - `valsize`: size of the value data +#### Security + +Pointers provided by the payload or OS are checked to not overlap with the SMM. +That protects the SMM handler from being manipulated. + +*However there's no validation done on the source or destination pointing to +DRAM. A malicious application that is able to issue SMIs could extract arbitrary +data or modify the currently running kernel.* + ## External links * [A Tour Beyond BIOS Implementing UEFI Authenticated Variables in SMM with EDKI](https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/cf/ea/a_tour_beyond_bios_implementing_uefi_authenticated_variables_in_smm_with_edkii.pdf) Note, this differs significantly from coreboot's implementation. + +[SMM]: ../security/smm.md -- cgit v1.2.3